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Abstract 
This thesis explores what it means to be Kadazan today by studying the interplay between 
the Kadazans’ ethnic fluidity and their formal ethnic labels. The Kadazans, who come from 
Sabah, Malaysia, on the northern end of Borneo, are typically classified as non-Muslim 
indigenes. They are among Sabah’s most culturally mixed groups and their use of a plethora 
of ethnic labels testifies to this. Yet, the Kadazans’ lack of a definitive label has been 
criticised as endangering identity (Reid, 1997). To understand how ethnic labels and identity 
work among Kadazans, I explore their relationships with Malay, Dusun and Chinese groups 
as well as with Kadazandusun, their current official ethnic group. The thesis shows that 
Kadazans have a range of possible forms of identification open to them. For some the label 
‘Sino-Kadazan’ is important in that it establishes a mixed Kadazan-Chinese identity that 
they find attractive. Others assert the importance of the ‘Kadazandusun’ label, especially in 
the public/political sphere. Some prefer the ‘Dusun’ or even ‘Malay’ labels. Following Chua 
(2007), I argue that Kadazans are constantly faced with the choice of fixing their identities 
in line with certain labels or criteria, or of keeping their identity fluid. I also show that these 
choices are always made in the context of the constraints imposed by both increasing 
Malayanisation and the rigid ethnic identification rules of the Malaysian state. The case of 
the Kadazans illustrates clearly that a distinction always needs to be made between formal 
ethnic structures and the often more flexible forms of identification found on the ground. 
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Preface 
In 2005, at my MA Linguistics thesis defense at which I presented on how the 
Kadazandusun language came to be, an audience member remained puzzled and questioned 
me as to why the Kadazan and Dusun groups, with separate histories and traditions, would 
want to combine their languages and ethnic labels. This question stayed with me well after 
my defense and eventually led me to this PhD thesis in which I explore the nature of 
Kadazandusun ethnicity from an anthropological angle, and create an ethnography 
focussing on the interplay between ethnic labels and identity.  
I was born and raised in Sabah and, like many other Sabahans of mixed identity, ethnicity is 
important to me. Coming from a Kadazan and Chinese background, I grew up in the 1970s 
and 1980s alongside Sabahan friends from differing cultural and religious groups.                 
As products of Sabah’s extensive intermarriages, my friends and I shared more cultural 
similarities than differences, and all fitted neatly into Sabah’s kaleidoscope of identities.               
We felt little need to interrogate our own ethnic labels and to discuss their fluidity or fixity, 
as I do in this thesis. Yet, I have observed, over time, that more and more Sabahans are 
asking questions about where they belong, in which group and category, and hence, which 
ethnic label best suits them.  
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Today, the Sabahan population has grown exponentially since Independence (1963), and 
the topic of illegal immigrants is rife. Fears that newcomers are usurping locals’ resources 
and identities are commonplace. The situation is complex: while native-born Sabahans may 
desire belonging and recognition, many also revel in their ethnic fluidity. Yet, as the ethnic 
situation becomes increasingly complex, ethnicity, as many Sabahans are finding, may need 
more conscious formulating and formalising in order for a group to retain influence in the 
broader public arena.  
For many Kadazans, the dilemma of which ethnic label to use sits at the core of political 
and economic survival: as part of the traditionally pagan and largely non-Muslim indigenous 
population in Sabah, Kadazan identities appear diffuse and ambiguous when compared with 
those of the dominant Muslim groups. This situation has forced Kadazan and other 
indigenous leaders to come up with a reindigenisation plan to formulate a clear and 
concrete ethnic identity. Their hope is that through the creation of a definitive shared ethnic 
label, forty predominantly non-Muslim indigenous groups will achieve cohesion, and so 
greater influence, in the public domain.  
However, the production of such an ‘artificial’ label and entity clearly has repercussions for 
how Kadazans and members of other Sabahan indigenous groups see themselves. The 
purpose of this thesis therefore is to survey the use of ethnic labels among the Kadazans to 
understand how Kadazan ethnicity works in the present.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When Malaysia comes to mind, most people think of three major ethnic groups—
Malay, Chinese and Indian—as representing the Malaysian population. In Sabah and 
Sarawak, the two Malaysian states on the island of Borneo, there is a diverse range of 
groups, which include the three groups aforementioned, foreign groups, and a myriad of 
indigenous groups with Bornean roots and from the wider Malaysian-Philippine-
Indonesian archipelago. While all these groups are categorised by the Malaysian 
government as being officially either Bumiputera (Native) or non-Bumiputera (non-
Native), many Sabahans do not easily fit the Bumiputera scope because of extensive 
intermarriage among them but instead deploy mixed identities based on differing groups 
and categories, testifying to their ethnic fluidity. The Kadazans, the case study in this 
thesis, are an exemplar in this regard, and yet one wonders which label, and hence which 
group and category they adhere to, in what context, and why. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide an ethnography that illustrates the 
Kadazans’ relationship to their ethnic labels, particularly in the area of ethnic choice.       
In this thesis, I focus on the Kadazans’ engagement with the three major groups in 
Sabah—Muslim (including Malay), Chinese and Dusun. I argue that Kadazans are 
primarily sinicising (becoming Chinese) and indigenising at the same time—leading to 
the use of differing labels among them, namely the Sino-Kadazan and Kadazandusun 
labels. This chapter begins with a discussion on challenges in the categorisation and 
description of fluid ethnic identities. This is followed by an overview on the ethnic 
situations in Malaysia and in Sabah; and an overview of the Kadazans’ ethnic situation.  
I then discuss the fieldwork that I had undertaken and end the chapter with the overall 
structure of the thesis.  
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Challenges facing categorisation and description of fluid ethnic identities 
Ethnicity, in the general sense, refers to a state of belonging to a social group that has a 
common national or cultural tradition (Oxford Dictionary).1 Ruane and Todd (2004: 
217) argue that ethnicity is in fact a thin category and that a multiplicity of peoples may 
fill this category with beliefs of common biological descent and blood belonging, or 
with religious or linguistic content, or with a set of cultural values or political ideas. 
Ethnicity is further not ‘a pre-given, unchanging attribute of human populations, 
spontaneously arising among groups, sharing culture and origins in isolation’ (Sillander 
& Alexander, 2016: 95). Yet, ethnographers often feel drawn to compare similarities and 
differences of people in order to delineate where group boundaries lie.  
One of the key concerns in this thesis is to understand how groups determine their 
ethnic categories given the fluid ethnic identities of their members. Barth (1988: 14) had 
said that while cultural differences are important, the features taken into consideration 
in the formation of a group boundary are only those that the actors regard as significant. 
As such, it cannot be assumed that there is a simple one-to-one relationship between 
ethnic units and cultural similarities and difference. This can be seen in the island of 
Borneo, when King (1993) said:  
Given the processes both socio-cultural fission and fusion have 
taken place in Borneo, it would be a grave mistake to examine 
one Dyak group in isolation from others. What is more, we can 
only establish approximate ethnic categories and groupings in 
Borneo, because boundaries are invariably blurred, and social, 
political and economic relations do not correlate with particular 
ethnic identities.  
(King 1993: 38)  
                                                
1 See Oxford Dictionary – https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ethnicity. 
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The question arises as to whether it is truly possible to categorise fluid identities. 
Seligman and Weller (2011) argue that notation or categorisation can never fully resolve 
ambiguity given that by attempting to conquer ambiguity, this creates ever more 
categories and rules that produces new ambiguities. Following Leach (1970), I further 
argue that determining ethnic categories is inherently problematic, as practitioners will 
discern just as many similarities as there are differences. Leach first discovered this 
problem in categorisation in his study of Highland Burma groups in the 1950s, where he 
found that the Sema Nagas and the Angama Nagas were not actually independent of 
each other—these groups changed their ethnic representation according to the 
economic and political shifts surrounding them. Leach said, ‘It is futile to attempt to 
record all the stereotyped ethnographic variations for they are almost numberless. The 
assiduous ethnographer can find just as many different “tribes” as he cares to look for’ 
(1970: 291). Thus, the exercise of contrasting groups may produce listings of these 
‘groups’ but there could be no certainty that a neat categorisation of the groups at hand 
would ever materialise. 
Given the above, it is perhaps more important for the purpose of this thesis to consider 
the kinds of phenomena that allow ethnic fluidity to manifest. One demonstrates ‘ethnic 
switching’, that is, the tendency of individuals to move between groups, either oscillating 
over time or remain unilateral. Leach, for instance, found that the Kachins of the 
Kachin Hills in Burma oscillated between gumlao (a democractic model of political 
organisation) and Shan (an ‘autocracy’) with the majority of Kachins at any one time 
being located somewhere in between, termed gumsa (1954: 9) While economic influences 
predicted Kachins becoming Shan, the switching was also motivated by the individual’s 
desire to acquire prestige for him/herself and his/her family. Kachin individuals thus 
switch back and forth from gumlao to Shan over generations.  
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In another example, traditionally pagan or non-Muslim groups in Borneo masuk melayu 
(become Malay), a local phenomenon of becoming a member of the Malay group via 
conversion to Islam, where in the case of the Ngadju Dayaks, the switching process is 
unidirectional and irreversible (Miles, 1976: 142). According to Miles (1976: 147), 
Ngadju Dayaks in the Upper Mentaya plains in southern Borneo (Kalimantan) become 
Bandjarese Malays because the latter are open to outsiders and accept the former as full 
members of Bandjarese Malay society when they embrace Islam and conform to their 
ethnic values.  
Another pattern supporting ethnic fluidity shows how the bond between members 
becomes crucial in the overall membership. By way of example, the Sama Dilaut from 
the eastern coast of Sabah, a group that is part of the wider Sama-Bajau grouping in the 
Malaysian-Philippine-Indonesian archipelago, is characterised by their gregarious, open-
aggregated community (Sather, 2011: 245). Goodwill is expressed through verbal 
courtesies and exchanges of acknowledgements, pledges of support and promissory 
vows, and food sharing, particularly of fish. Sama Dilaut groups in the Philippine 
regions are similarly ethnically fluid and prefer to have an open-aggregated ethnic 
community that is characterised by fellowship and harmony among like members 
(Macdonald, 2011).  
Macdonald’s study of kinship and fellowship of the Palawan in the Philippines shows 
that the constant is not the group at all, but the desire for community (2011: 137). 
Macdonald argues that groups like the Sama Dilaut do not operate as basic societies 
owing to a lack of principles to do with debt and reciprocity or authority and ranking. 
Instead, such groups create loose arrangements of their own, for example, by 
substituting ‘fellowship’ for ‘group’ to account for the openness and aggregation in their 
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types of communities. These ‘groups’ or ‘fellowships’ operate based on precepts such as 
felicity and ‘gregarious relatedness’ when they seek to foster successful and continued 
interaction (2011: 35).  
Yet, state-defined categories can hugely influence ethnic identity and its fluidity. In 
Gros’s (2004) account of the political names of the Dulong or Drung in China, the 
Drung were elevated to Dulong as a national category under the minzu shibie or 
Nationalities Identification Project. For the Drung people, their ethnic identification as 
‘Dulong’ made ‘common sense’ because of the reference to the valley they inhabit, sense 
of autochthony, and pride of finding a place of their own. Gros said that all of these 
factors contributed to the legitimisation of the Dulong category, as the Drung’s status as 
a full-fledged minzu (nationality) reinforced their local identity and boosted their faith in 
the development and improvement of their social conditions. The Drung’s response to 
state categorisation, argues Gros, is ‘a kind of contractual acceptance, hinged on the 
state’s promise of better integration and improved access to wealth’ (2004: 292). 
In recent studies on Bornean communities, the influence of official categories shows 
how a certain criteria or ethnic label can cause identities to lose or maintain fluidity. In 
the example of the Bidayuh in Sarawak, in the western part of Borneo, Chua (2007: 266) 
found that Malays, who influence the Malaysian category and infuse it with concepts of 
Malayness, are recognised by the Bidayuh as the dominant group in control of the dunia 
moden (modern world). The Bidayuh view themselves as ‘fixed’ by Malay leaders on the 
lower rungs of the ethnic ladder: some masuk Melayu, as it is the only official mechanism 
of flux available to Bidayuhs who wish to rise from their disadvantageous position in the 
Malaysian ethnic hierarchy.  
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However, Chua (2007) claims that the Bidayuh are able to avert complete 
transformation into a Malay identity by remaining Bidayuh in bangsa (ethnicity) (the 
official identity in their Malaysian Identity Cards), as bangsa is permanent and inalienable. 
A girl of Malay-Bidayuh parentage, according to Chua, would take off her tudung (head 
scarf worn by Muslims for propriety) when she returned for traditional festivals in the 
Bidayuh village, and put it on again when she left. Chua further claims that it was now 
easier for Muslim Bidayuhs to live in Bidayuh villages, because villagers accepted that 
they could follow aspects of the Bidayuh ‘lifestyle’ (apart from eating pork) while being 
Kirieng (Bidayuh term for Malay) and Muslim in their own homes. 
Similarly, Sillander (2004) found that the Dayak-Malay dichotomy is the result of 
colonial attempts to localise and separate the two groups. The association of Dayak with 
primitiveness, ignorance and savagery in popular discourse among government officials 
and urban Indonesians in Borneo and beyond, which has for a long time made many 
Dayaks ashamed of their ancestry and disinclined to identify as Dayak, has led to some 
Dayaks becoming Muslim or Christian in order to escape this stigma. Sillander notes 
that one factor that has promoted the process of masuk Melayu in Southeast Borneo is 
the superior status accorded to Malay over Dayak languages as a result of its 
resemblance to the national language (Indonesian). During the Indonesian New Order 
regime (1965-1998), adopting the national language as their first language became 
fashionable among Dayaks who wanted to be seen as maju (progressive). 
However, Sillander claims that although the advantages of becoming Malay often 
outweighed those of remaining Dayak in the past, it was no longer the case. The trend 
to retain Dayak identity has increased and significant numbers of Dayaks who are 
Muslim have not given up their Dayak identity. One of the primary reasons contributing 
8 
 
to this involves land rights through the existence of special laws giving special tenure to 
societies that follow masyarakat adat (customary law). As such, the stereotypical portrayal 
of Dayaks and Malays distorts a complex and fluid ethnographic reality in which the 
border lines between cultures, languages and ethnicities often do not coincide with or 
add up to a consistent pattern (Sillander, 2004: 44).2 
Another Bornean case shows how mixed identities maintain fluidity when they 
become—or un-become—Dayak. Oesterheld (2016: 144) found that children of mixed 
parentage in Samarinda, East Kalimatan have cultivated various modes of adaptation to 
the expectations of Dayak indigenism, for instance, in the strategic use of essentialised 
suku. According to Oesterheld, due to the lack of a significant dominant culture in the 
hybrid social structure of urban and sub-urban Samarinda (East Kalimatan), children of 
mixed parentage often maintain indeterminate suku identities and are sometimes 
regarded as Dayak Gado-Gado (‘vegetable salad Dayaks’).  
Oesterheld compares two cases: in the first, informants self-identified as ‘Dayak’ but 
their ‘will to belong’, to become and to be a ‘Dayak’, were not matched by others’ 
perceptions. Lack of acceptance occurred not because of mixed ancestry but rather 
because the strong Catholic identity of the informants clashed with traditional ritual 
obligations. In the second case, informants faced dilemmas of belonging and 
consequently developed an unfulfilled ‘wish to belong’ as Dayak. These informants 
embraced Catholicism and perceived their primary markers as being Indonesian and 
Orang Samarinda (Samarindan) at the expense of their Chinese and Benuaq ancestry.  
                                                
2 Note that a ‘Malay’/ ‘Dayak’ dichotomy has never gained any real foothold in Sabah. I point 
this out in Chapter 3 when I discuss how Muslim Kadazans appropriate the term ‘Muslim’ to 
denote Malayness instead of using ‘Malay’ as a permanent ethnic label. 
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Oesterheld claims that as suku become a fixed term of reference in Kalimantan and an 
important vehicle for cultural and political revitalisation, the fixed character of suku 
identities in turn challenge children of mixed parentage to create their own ‘identity 
legends’ and situate themselves in the ethnicised ‘collage’ of urban social structure. 
These mixed-ancestry individuals have a strong urge to fit into an already established 
suku category, in order to validate ‘what they are’ (Oesterheld, 2016: 153).  
The patterns of ethnic categorisation and description discussed above are also seen in 
the case of the Kadazans in Sabah. While the Kadazans’ lack of a permanent ethnic label 
owing to their ongoing reconstruction of ethnic labels is viewed as endangering identity 
(Reid, 1997), we will see that some Kadazans are now seeking to fix their identity labels, 
such as in the case of the Sino-Kadazans, while other mixed-identity Kadazans 
manipulate the use of various ethnic labels that loan certain desired identities.  
 
Overview: The Bumiputera ethnic situation in Malaysia and in Sabah  
Malaysia, a country of over 30 million people, is located in the South China Sea and is 
represented by a confederation of states on the Malaysian Peninsula and the states of 
Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo. In 1957, the Federated States of Malaya’ 
became independent of British colonisation and in 1963 amalgamated with Sabah, 
Sarawak and Singapore, which had also come under British colonisation. Like many 
countries in the region, Malaysia’s ethnic composition is diverse. It comprises three 
major ethnic groups—Malay, Chinese and Indian—with Malay, the Bumiputera (Native) 
group, being the largest at 65 per cent of the national population (Malaysian 
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Department of Statistics, 2010). Minor populations of Orang Asli (Aboriginal People) 
are also found among the Peninsular Malaysian population.3  
In Sabah and Sarawak, the ethnic composition is more complex given the plethora of 
indigenous groups originating in Borneo itself and from the nearby Philippine and 
Indonesian islands, and other parts of Asia, and other countries. Intermarriage has 
further given rise to new Malaysian groups, such as the Baba-Nyonya group, which is 
derived from intermarriage between Malays and Chinese on the Malaysian Peninsula. In 
Sabah, Kadazans, the focus of this thesis, also identify in many different ways owing to 
their extensive intermarriages with the Malay, Chinese and Dusun groups, among 
others.  
Today, the plethora of groups with various cultural and religious backgrounds has 
created a distinctive multicultural society in Malaysia, and the phenomenon of inter-
ethnic or mixed-ethnic marriages occurs throughout Malaysia. According to Pue and 
Sulaiman (2013: 270), one of the main challenges faced by inter-ethnic couples is the 
registration of their newborns. As the state expects Malaysians to identify with one 
single ethnic identity, the arguably more accurate mixed-identity ethnic label, such as 
Peranakan, Malay-Thai, Chindians are not recognised at the official level. Pue and 
Sulaiman (2013: 274) found that many progeny of inter-ethnic marriages face identity 
crises whereby they do not feel like they belong, whether phenotypically or culturally, to 
the particular ethnic category being prescribed as their official identity.  
                                                
3 The number of Orang Asli population in Peninsular Malaysia is 147,412 people (0.5% of the 
entire population in Peninsular Malaysia) as of the year 2008. See Malaysia Department of 
Statistics, Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia: Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 
(2008).  
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The subject of ethnic identification in Malaysia is always shadowed by the use of 
‘Bumiputera’ as a controversial tool for ethnic classification and social organisation by 
the Malaysian government. The term Bumiputera means an indigenous person of 
Malaysia and first came into existence when the British colonial government in the then 
Malaya divided groups by race4: the Malays and aboriginal groups were classified as 
‘Bumiputera’ in the Malay language (literal translation: ‘prince of the earth’) and the term 
‘non-Bumiputera’ was used to refer to immigrant groups: the Chinese and Indians. After 
1963, Malaysian authorities adopted the term ‘Bumiputera’ to refer to Malays, aboriginal 
groups in the Malay Peninsula as well as indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak. 
Today, the term ‘Bumiputera’ denotes their formal indigenous status and ‘Bumiputera’ is 
used widely in government literature and in censuses.  As indicated in the following 
paragraphs, ‘Bumiputera’ as a term has come to be further legalised through the 
invention of policies and rights, which serve only the so-called Bumiputera groups.  
Bumiputera is a controversial label among Malaysians because the government 
continues to deploy the colonial race construct to advance ‘Natives’ over other groups. 
The Malaysian Constitution guarantees a ‘quota of entry’ for Bumiputera to civil service 
jobs, public scholarships and education. In Malaysia’s 1971 New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and subsequent economic policies, a wealth distribution quota system 
determined that the share of economic wealth be increased to 30% for Bumiputeras, 40 
per cent for Other Malaysians and 30 per cent for Foreigners (Funston, 2001: 168). The 
Malaysian government also created a national ideology, the Rukunegara (National 
Principles), which indemnifies ‘the Malays and other Natives’ against future challenges 
                                                
4 Note that the British colonial government used ‘race’ to delineate primarily indigenous from 
non-indigenous populations. The British colonial rulers in Sabah also tended to distinguish 
between pagan and Muslim indigenes (see Singh 2000: 6-9). In the Malay Peninsula, according 
to Hirschman (1986: 348), ‘race’ as an ideology and a political-economic framework resulted in 
the Malays’ lack of participation in wage earning and entrepreneurship. 
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to Native rights (Means, 1991: 12). Further, the Sedition Ordinance was amended to 
protect Bumiputera rights by making it illegal to question, ‘any matter, right, status, 
position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative’ of the Bumiputera (Means, 1991: 14).  
As a direct result of Bumiputera-friendly policies, the socio-economic status of 
Bumiputeras has vastly improved. Bumiputera participation in business increased from 
13 per cent to 28 per cent over a 20-year period in the 1980s and 1990s (Milne & Mauzy 
1999: 62) while participation in the professions increased five-fold between 1991 and 
2000 (Funston, 2001: 193). Poverty among Bumiputeras reduced dramatically from 64.8 
per cent in 1970 to 8.3 per cent in 2004 based on the Malaysian GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product).  Meanwhile, 80 per cent of all government jobs are typically held by 
Bumiputera individuals with Bumiputera entrepreneurs receiving training and credit 
assistance such as permits and licenses to start small-scale businesses (Milne & Mauzy 
1999:56). Bumiputera students are also entitled to attend public secondary schools and 
universities such as the Junior Science College (established in 1966), Fully-residential 
Schools (established in 1970) and (Universiti) Institute Teknologi MARA. These 
institutions were established exclusively for Bumiputera children.  
Studies also show that while Bumiputera access to resources is seen as privileged, 
Bumiputera wealth is being shared to a certain extent with non-Bumiputeras. For 
instance, non-Bumiputeras typically seek access to the Bumiputera ‘wealth quota’ by 
creating business partnerships with Bumiputera. Some non-Bumiputeras set up ‘sleeping 
partner’ businesses with Bumiputera groups whereby a Bumiputera and a non-
Bumiputera businessman team up, with the former identifying as proprietor for official 
purposes. It is the non-Bumiputera partner who fully operates the business, while the 
Bumiputera is a ‘sleeping partner’ whose only task is to apply for the necessary license to 
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start the business, a license which is gained more easily ‘because s/he is a Malay’ (Milne 
& Mauzy 1999: 53). These covert Malay-Chinese business partnerships are labelled ‘Ali-
Baba’ arrangements and are not easy to identify. They are seen by some as a disincentive 
for Bumiputeras to gain vital business experience for themselves (Means, 1991: 313).  
However, opponents have called on the Malaysian government to revamp or scrap the 
Bumiputera system because of the rise of Bumiputera wealth. In 2006, a government-
commissioned corporate equity study by the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute 
(ASLI), an independent Malaysian think tank, showed that Bumiputeras held shares 
worth 45 per cent of the Malaysian stock market,5 while the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange showed Bumiputera share ownership to be 36.7 per cent in 1996 (Funston, 
2001). Some Malay leaders on the Malaysian Peninsula have opposed ensuing calls to 
revamp Bumiputera policies while some Malay leaders argue that Malays are being 
pressured into giving up their sovereign rights as indigenes. However, others argue that 
although certain Bumiputera groups may still need government assistance, Bumiputera 
policies on the whole must be restructured to reflect the current economy. 
Opponents also want the Bumiputera system to be abolished because of the belief that 
the preference for Bumiputera belonging is undermining Malaysian social cohesion. 
While the government’s overt focus on improving the livelihoods of Bumiputeras, 
relative to other groups, is strongly opposed by non-Bumiputeras for limiting their 
socio-economic potential, it is also opposed because the application of the wealth 
distribution quota has resulted in Bumiputeras being given preference and priority over 
non-Bumiputeras across many areas. From a non-Bumiputera point of view, the 
Bumiputera system has not only limited their socio-economic potential but also 
                                                
5 See “ASLI Admits Report Did Not Reflect The True Picture On Equity”, 2006.  
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fractured their sense of belonging to Malaysia. Non-Bumiputeras feel slighted by 
Bumiputera policies that minimise their basic rights as citizens even as they experience 
prejudice from mainstream society. References to non-Bumiputera by some 
Bumiputeras as ‘migrants’ and in some pro-Malay speeches as penumpang (‘hitchiker’), in 
the Malay language, are used to reinforce the secondary position of non-Bumiputeras 
from the Malay viewpoint (Daniels, 2004: 227-8). The term ‘second-class citizens’ has 
also surfaced to describe the place of non-Bumiputera in Malaysian society.  
In Sabah, Bumiputera total more than 60 per cent of the population (total: 3.2 million) 
owing to the predominance of indigenous groups. In the colonial period, Sabah’s 
indigenous groups were recognised as ‘Sabah Native’ and the Sabah government 
continues to maintain this status, as it is related to Native Title (Native land), which can 
only be held by Sabah Natives. The Malaysian government has recognised Sabah 
Natives as Bumiputera, and Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputeras are categorised as 
‘Bumiputera Malay’ and ‘Bumiputera Other’ in the census.  
However, full recognition of mixed Sabah Natives, who are descendants of Natives and 
Chinese, does not exist at the federal level even though they are recognised as ‘Sabah 
Native’ and issued with a Sijil Anak Negeri (SAN) (Certificate of Native) since the 
colonial period. The differing treatment of Sino-Natives federally has meant that Sino-
Natives may only have access to Bumiputera programs at the local level. To ensure that 
the authorities concerned recognise Sino-Natives as belonging to the indigenous group 
and not the Chinese one, many Sino-Natives such as the Sino-Kadazans are willing to 
abandon their Chinese surnames and their identity as ‘Chinese’. These individuals, as 
described later in the thesis, prefer to be ‘Kadazan’ and to use their Kadazan names.  
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Exacerbating the problems for Sino-Natives are migrants and illegal immigrants 
(Pendatang Tanpa Izin or ‘PTI’) who were found to be in possession of SANs, among 
other documents, enabling false identity as Sabah Natives and therefore as Bumiputera. 
The Sabah government terminated the SAN provision in the 1980s leaving Sino-Natives 
thereafter without a means to prove their Sabah Native status. The large presence of 
PTIs in Sabah has further impacted the ethnic labels and identity of Sabahans, as PTIs 
share many physical and cultural similarities to local Sabahans. PTIs are able to blend 
into Sabahan society easily given that the name, ethnic group and/or religion of the 
individual are the only details required by the authorities before access is given to 
Bumiputera economic incentives and programs. Based on the 2010 Sabah census, PTIs, 
who are largely believed to come from the Philippines and Indonesia, now make up 
close to 30 per cent of all Sabahans (see Table 1 in the following chapter).  
PTIs further impact the security and economy of Sabah as well as its sovereignty. Prior 
to British rule, Sabah was under the influence of the Sultan of Sulu in the 18th century 
and now the revived Suluk kingdom is seeking a claim on Sabah. Native-born Sabahans 
fear that Suluk nationalists are among the scores of Suluk PTIs in Sabah. However, the 
Sabahan economy is heavily dependent on foreign labour, including PTI labour. 
Stakeholders in the palm oil and infrastructure industries in Sabah protest the call to 
expatriate PTIs fearing that the Sabahan economy would collapse. Sabah is the largest 
producer of palm oil in Malaysia to date at 33 per cent of the nation’s palm oil export; 
after Indonesia, Malaysia is the world’s second largest exporter of palm oil at 40.9 per 
cent of total world production.6 
                                                
6 See Sabah Palm Oil Industry (POIC) website for statistics – http://www.poic.com.my. 
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Meanwhile, PTIs are heavily implicated in the politics between Muslim and non-Muslim 
Bumiputeras. Given that many PTIs are Muslims from the Islamic regions in the 
Philippines and Indonesia, they are believed to vote, albeit illegally, to aid Muslim 
Bumiputera leaders and groups in winning state elections. This is a great concern for 
non-Muslim Bumiputeras, especially Kadazandusuns whose leaders are represented in 
the state government. The current Sabahan government now faces growing opposition 
from local Sabahan groups and political parties owing to Sabah’s precarious sovereignty 
and PTI situation. On the rise are various pro-sovereignty movements, which seek the 
annexation of Sabah from Malaysia. Overall the political situation in Sabah is seen as 
weak and lacking in autonomy due to the Sabah government’s pro-federal stance, which 
supports the leadership of Peninsula Malays. 
 
The Kadazans’ ethnic situation 
The Kadazans are one of the most politically active groups in Sabah and the subject 
matter of ethnic identity, especially between Kadazans and Dusuns, is linked to their 
political activism. Prior to Independence, Kadazans and Dusuns had attempted 
nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s but failed to position themselves as ‘the definitive 
people’ of Sabah (Roff, 1969; Reid, 2011). Reid (2011: 187) states that Kadazans and 
Dusuns are a ‘lateforming ethnie’ due to Sabah’s entry to the Malaysian confederation at 
a point in time when the Malay nation-state had already begun developing. As a result, 
they ‘remain outside and in tension with the Malay ethno-nationalism, which has a 
central place in Malaysia’s state nationalist project’ (Reid, 2011: 187). 
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Recent studies on the Kadazans show that their identities on the ground continue to be 
politically active and dynamic. Barlocco (2014) highlights how Kadazans identify 
themselves and their practices as Kadazan, Malaysian, Sabahan and kampung (village) at 
different times and under different circumstances (Barlocco, 2014: 141). For example, 
Kadazans use their identity as Sabahans to distinguish themselves from the people from 
Semenanjung Malaysia (Peninsular Malaysia), and when they discuss the issue of illegal 
immigration. Kadazan and Dusun identities are further explored in their engagement of 
tourist spaces where they identify as being Sabahan and Bornean (Gingging, 2012).  
While the studies above are concerned mainly with the political identity of the 
Kadazandusuns as minorities, what is missing in the literature on the Kadazans today is 
how Kadazans relate to their identity through the plethora of ethnic labels given to 
them owing to intermarriage, change of religion, desire for a business identity, or a 
political identity, among other reasons. For instance, Kadazans have intermarried 
extensively with the Chinese group in the past, as such, some Kadazans are categorised 
as Non-Bumiputeras. Similarly, some Kadazans do convert to Islam and yet, it is unclear 
as to how this conversion impacts upon their ethnic identity, that is, whether Muslim 
Kadazans seek to reidentify as Malay, remain Kadazan, or switch between the Malay and 
Kadazan labels. Further, with Sino-Kadazan (descendants of Chinese-Kadazan unions) 
sentiment on the rise, it has yet to be properly studied whether Sino-Kadazans then now 
choose to identify as Sino-Kadazan.   
The current literature on the Kadazans points mainly to how Kadazan identity conflates 
with Dusun identity. However, the complexity within the Kadazan-Dusun relationship 
has not been properly understood to know and understand how Kadazans and Dusuns 
relate to their labels, especially given the multiple shared categories and relabelling 
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exercises. In the colonial period, both Dusun and Kadazan groups were at first classified 
as ‘Dusun’ with the category ‘Kadazan’ appearing at the end of the colonial period. This 
resulted in the Kadazans’ identity being seen as intertwined with that of the Dusuns, as 
some Kadazans were officially designated as ‘Dusun’. The identity of Kadazans and 
Dusuns became increasingly complex when Kadazan leaders promoted the Kadazan 
label to Dusuns, Muruts and other predominantly non-Muslim indigenes in Sabah. At 
the end of the colonial period, in anticipation of the Malaysian confederation, Kadazan 
leaders sought to elevate the Kadazan label over Dusun because the term Kadazan was 
seen to connote modernity. While many Dusun leaders rejected the label switching, 
other Dusuns and other indigenes identified as Kadazan.  
In 1997, Kadazan and Dusun leaders compromised on a shared label in Kadazandusun. 
The category ‘Kadazandusun’ then replaced the Kadazan and Dusun categories in the 
census and in other administrative contexts. However, many Kadazans and Dusuns 
protested against the Kadazandusun label. Stephen (2000: 20-21) criticised the confusing 
practice of label reconstruction when some Kadazan and Dusun leaders sought to 
further relabel ‘Kadazandusun’ as ‘KadazandusunMurut’ in order to be more inclusive 
to Muruts, who are predominantly non-Muslim indigenes and strongly aligned with 
Kadazandusun leaders in government.  
Given the multiple categorisations in censuses, Reid (1997: 120) questions the identity 
of Kadazans and Dusuns when he asks, ‘Going back through three previous censuses, 
all were called Pribumis (indigenous people) in 1980, all were called Kadazans in 1970, 
and all were called Dusuns in 1960 and all previous censuses. Who, we might ask, do 
they [emphasis Reid] think they [Kadazans and Dusuns] are?’ The study of Kadazans 
relationship to their ethnic labels thus continue to be needed in order to understand 
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why, for instance, do many Kadazans continue to identify against Dusuns, and vice-
versa, when both are now formally recognised as Kadazandusun. Also, the interplay 
between labels and identities among the Kadazans is important to know and understand 
if we are to understand the complexity of ethnic identification among the Kadazans.   
Kadazans may self-identify as Kadazan but it cannot be assumed, with which category a 
Kadazan will identify: as Dusun, Kadazan, Kadazandusun, Malay or Chinese, or any 
other ethnic label.  
 
Fieldwork  
For this research, I undertook fieldwork over a seventeen-month period in Sabah, 
Malaysian Borneo, between July 2010 and November 2011. My primary fieldwork site 
of Kota Kinabalu, the capital of Sabah, contains several enclaves populated 
predominantly by Kadazandusun people. I focussed on Penampang, an enclave 
associated with Kadazans southeast of the city spanning 289,988 sq. kilometres (178,948 
sq. miles). The locations of Kota Kinabalu and Penampang are shown in Map 2 on the 
following page. Penampang is flanked by the districts of Tuaran, Tambunan and Papar, 
where Kadazandusuns also make up a large proportion of the population. 
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Map 2: Penampang, Sabah 
Penampang is a densely populated and highly urbanised area and has one of the largest 
populations (125,913) outside of Kota Kinabalu proper (462,963) on the west coast 
(Malaysian Department of Statistics, 2010). 35 per cent of residents in Penampang fall 
into the Kadazandusun category, inclusive of Kadazans and Dusuns, with the remaining 
proportions (in order of size in percentages) belonging under these census categories: 
Chinese (23%), PTI (16.5%), Other Indigenous (10.5%), Bajau (7.5%), Malay (4.5%), 
Murut (1%), Other (1.5%) and Indians (0.5%).7  
                                                
7  See Malaysian Department of Statistics (2000).  
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Note that the number of PTIs in Penampang is higher if compared to other adjacent 
districts. There are 20,854 PTIs in Penampang compared to 112,145 PTIs in Kota 
Kinabalu. In Papar there are 21,500 PTIs recorded in year 2010; in Tuaran and 
Tambunan, there are 5,243 and 2,137 PTIs, respectively. There are 125,913 people in 
Papar while Tuaran and Tambunan are populated by 105,435 and 36,297 people, 
respectively.  
Most Kadazans and Dusuns in Penampang are Christians belonging to the Catholic 
Church. The strong influence of Catholic missionising in Penampang since the late 
1880s saw many Kadazans and Dusuns become Catholics by WWII (Rooney, 1981).  
Some Kadazans and Dusuns continue to adhere to traditional animistic beliefs and 
consult with bobohizan, the Kadazan ritual priestess (Tongkul, 2000). Some also hold on 
to beliefs centering on the idea of karma, luck, pantang (taboo) and fatalism, among 
others. Typically, Kadazans on the coast and plains become Muslim through 
intermarriage with the Bajau (Philippine origin) group that live along the Penampang 
coastline; while intermarriages with the Chinese show some Kadazans converting to 
Buddhism or Taoism under strong Chinese influence.  
As Catholic missions occurred mainly at the coastal plains areas in Penampang as 
opposed to hill areas, more Kadazans than Dusuns became exposed to Westernising 
influences and formal education offered by the Catholic Church. This has resulted in 
Kadazans being seen as relatively more educated, more modern and more Westernised 
in comparison to Dusuns (Reid, 2011). This has also seen to rice-planting being no 
longer the main occupation of the Kadazans as well as an erosion of traditional Kadazan 
culture, beliefs and especially language, as many Kadazans seek a multilingual and 
cosmopolitan identity. One of the key events that I studied is the Kaamatan, the 
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Kadazandusun rice harvest festival, to understand what contemporary Kadazan 
worldviews are like. I also paid attention to Kadazans’ relationship to their language use 
to explore which ethnic and hence language label they endear themselves to.  
Participant observation was utilised as a main method for collecting data from 
Kadazandusun individuals. To collect more data, I conducted an archival study at 
selected libraries in Sabah and at the Sabah Archives. In particular, there was much 
historical, cultural and legal information on the Kadazan and Kadazandusun people 
written by local writers in commemorative magazines, such as buku buah-tangan dan 
program (‘souvenir programme books’ given out or sold during festivities and events). 
This material was produced in conjunction with Kaamatan, for instance, and written in 
English as well as Malay, Kadazan, Dusun or other dialects in the Kadazandusun 
grouping.  
Interview data provided key data for my thesis: I conducted open-ended and semi-
structured interviews with selected individuals, and collected audio-visual data using a 
tape recorder, camera and video recorder. Discussion centred mainly on informants’ 
perceptions of their own ethnic identity in contrast with others’ ethnic identity. 
Informants told me of their rich inter-ethnic experiences during their childhood, their 
school days and at their workplaces. They also related experiences of friendships, 
marriage and family relations that had influenced and shaped their ideas about ethnicity. 
Note therefore that given informants’ multilingualism, unless stated otherwise, all 
interview data in excerpts in the thesis represents paraphrasing in English by the author. 
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My informants came from the towns of Donggongon and Putatan in Penampang, and 
many worked and also lived in the city. Penampang is administered separately as two 
separate townships, Putatan and Donggongon. Donggongon is derived from the 
Kadazan word tundoongon (meaning ‘a place for a short rest’) and Putatan is named after 
the Putat tree (scientific name: barringtonia asiatica). Putatan Town lies at the non-
Muslim-Muslim boundary in contrast to the town of Donggongon, which is central to 
the predominantly non-Muslim areas of Penampang. Donggongon is comprised mainly 
of Kadazandusuns while Bajaus are dominant in Putatan Township. The Chinese lived 
in both towns and their influence is seen in the rise of the well-known Sino-Kadazan 
group. 
My informants represented a good cross-section of the Kadazandusun umbrella 
grouping and informants included individuals who identified as Kadazan, Dusun, Sino-
Kadazan, Muslim Kadazan and Kadazandusun, among others. As part of my fieldwork, 
I also spoke to Kadazandusun-PTI individuals, that is, PTIs who were perceived to be 
or identified themselves as ‘local’ through close association with Kadazandusuns via 
marriage, affianced status or a change in identification resulting from legal proceedings. 
Informants were drawn from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds and age 
groups: some worked in the civil service, corporate world or NGO sectors, others were 
school-leavers, pensioners and non-working parents.  
Overall, I spoke with 75 informants. My informants’ ages ranged from late teenage to 
octogenarian with an equal number of female to male informants. Informants in their 
40s and 50s, compared to younger informants in their 20s and 30s, were significantly 
more knowledgeable on current issues concerning Kadazandusun ethnic dynamics. 
Much older informants, aged 60 years or more, shared much local knowledge pertaining 
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to terms and names used in the Penampang context. It can be said that younger 
informants were not as familiar with the formation of the Kadazandusun group starting 
with the Kadazan and Dusun political amalgamation during the colonial period. Note 
that all care has been taken to protect the identities of all informants to preserve their 
anonymity. The names of informants in this thesis, therefore, represent pseudonyms.  
While this thesis discusses the three major groups that the Kadazans have intermarried 
with—Muslims (including Malays), Chinese and Dusun—it is important to note that 
that there are other groups that Kadazans have intermarried with that are not covered in 
this thesis. For instance, Kadazan-Indian individuals do exist although the size of the 
Indian population in Sabah is very small. Similarly, there are Kadazans who have 
intermarried with foreigners such as orang putih (‘white person’: Westerners/Caucasians) 
and South Koreans, a growing population in Sabah. These and other examples show 
that there are still cases of mixed Kadazan identity to be studied in order to round out 
our portrayal of Kadazan ethnic identity.  
 
Thesis Structure  
In Chapter 2, I provide a background on Sabah highlighting the various ethnic groups 
and their classification according to Sabah Native and Bumiputera, the two official 
Native categories, and the demographical changes in Sabah owing to the PTIs. I argue 
that PTIs not only impact on the current ethnic classification of Sabahans but influence 
the politics between Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputera, and the Sabahan society 
overall.  
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In Chapter 3, I begin exploring the Kadazans’ relationship to major groups and discuss 
the Kadazans’ views towards Islam and the Malay label. Many Kadazans find that they 
must negotiate their identity in the face of increasing Malayanisation. Despite it being 
advantageous for socio-economic and political potential if one were a Muslim, non-
Muslim Kadazans typically seek to avoid Islamic and Malayanisation influences to avoid 
becoming subsumed under the Malay identity.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss the Kadazans’ relationship to the Chinese and the identity 
variation among so-called Sino-Kadazans. I show how there are many motivations for 
Sino-Kadazans’ desire to identify as Kadazan or Chinese. A desire for the Sabah Native 
and Bumiputera statuses may prompt Sino-Kadazans to switch from Chinese to 
Kadazan. However, the Sino-Kadazan movement has risen, where there is a desire to 
identify solely as Sino-Kadazan.  
In Chapter 5, I discuss the Kadazans’ relationship to Dusuns and explore their 
intertwined identities and to narrate the ambiguity and ambivalence involved in 
deploying Kadazan identity in relation to Dusuns. Using Penampang, my fieldwork site, 
I explore how the Kadazan and Dusun labels are both used by Kadazans and Dusuns. 
Some Kadazans seek to distinguish themselves socially from the Dusun by using 
derogatory symbols but many are now seeking to re-Kadazanise through language. 
However, Kadazans lack contrast with Dusuns: many are not practising their language 
and/or using the Kadazan label.  
 
26 
 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the Kadazandusun identity from a Kadazan perspective to show 
Kadazan responses to the broader grouping label in Kadazandusun. Leaders may have 
deconstructed the pre-existing Kadazan and Dusun categories to create a cohesive 
Kadazandusun grouping. Yet, during the official state-level Kaamatan, a rice harvest 
festival in Sabah, a single cultural identity is not apparent. Instead, a group of Kadazans 
have rejected the Kadazandusun label and the Kadazandusun language. I end my thesis 
in Chapter 7 with a summary of the points made and a conclusion with remarks on 
possible areas for future study identified through this research. 
Note on special terms and “PTI” 
Various terms are used in this thesis to refer to indigenous and migrant belonging. It is 
important that the reader distinguish between, on the one hand, formal categories that 
are constructed and used by the authorities and, on the other hand, categories on the 
ground that are used by the Sabahans themselves. For instance, ‘Bumiputera’ and ‘Sabah 
Native’ refer specifically to Malaysian and Sabahan government constructs. ‘Aboriginal 
People’ is also an official term in Malaysia that is used specifically for indigenes in the 
Malaysian Peninsula that belong to ‘Orang Asli’ groups, but is not salient in Sabah. 
Instead, the Malay term ‘Orang Asal’, which means ‘original inhabitant’, is popularly 
used among Sabahan (and other Malaysian) non-Muslim indigenes. While this term and 
the term ‘Indigenous People’ may be used in Sabah specifically by indigenes with 
Bornean roots to highlight their claim as the primary indigenous populace, these are not 
typically considered official terms and categories by the authorities concerned. For the 
purpose of this thesis and to prevent confusion with the reader, note that I use 
‘indigenes’ to mean ‘original inhabitants’ to refer to those groups originating from the 
island of Borneo.  
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As for the term ‘Pendatang Tanpa Izin’ or PTI, note that this term is also referred to 
elsewhere by the authorities as ‘Pendatang Asing Tanpa Izin’ or PATI; and/or as ‘non-
citizen’ in census. Some scholars now advocate the use of the term ‘irregular migrant’ as 
opposed to ‘illegal migrant’ to highlight the fact that some ethnic groups in Sabah, such 
as the Bajau Laut, have yet to be granted Malaysian citizenship despite being part of the 
local population (Acciaioli et al, 2017). Distinctions are also being made upon street 
children in Sabah as being stateless rather than illegal; street kids are often regarded with 
suspicion by locals and local authorities for being part of the PTIs (Allerton, 2017).  
However, the reader should note, that while PTIs may be viewed as ‘stateless’ persons 
with restricted access to Malaysian rights such as voting and social services, and further 
as ‘persons temporarily residing in Sabah without Malaysian citizenship’, I use the term 
PTI in this thesis to mean illegal immigrant, unless stated otherwise. I do this because 
this is how the Kadazans, the subject of my thesis, mainly use the term.  
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Chapter 2: About Sabah—Background  
Sabah is at the northern end of the island of Borneo in the South China Sea. Adjacent to 
Brunei and Sarawak in the southwest, Sabah borders Indonesian Kalimantan and the 
Philippines in the southeast and northeast, respectively. In the past, Sabah came under 
the influence of the Sultanate of Brunei, a vassal of the Muslim empire in the Malay 
Archipelago, which had its capital in Malacca on the Malayan Peninsula. By the 16th 
century, the Brunei Empire had extended to all of Borneo Island and to the Philippine 
islands in the southern island region of Sulu. The Brunei Empire began to decline in the 
17th century because of rivalry among its royalty. In return for his assistance in a royal 
war, the Sultan of Brunei gave Sabah to the Sultan of Sulu of the southern Philippine 
islands, a blood relative (Human Relations Area Files, 1956). The Sultan of Sulu then 
began to deal with the British foreseeing that their presence would help to balance the 
Spanish and Dutch monopolies in the Malay Archipelago.8 
Sabah subsequently came under extensive British influence in the late 1800s. The British 
opened a trading post in the northern area of Kudat but constant raiding from pirates 
forced the British to move their capital to Sandakan on the east coast. Then in 1881, the 
British set up another post in the southwest of Sabah under the name, British North 
Borneo Provisional Association Ltd. The American Trading Company had previously 
leased the southern part of Sabah in 1875 but failed to gain support from the Sultan of 
Brunei to legitimise its claims (Tregonning, 1965: 4–10). The American, Torrey, and his 
partners, then sold their leasehold to the Austrian consul in Hong Kong, Baron von 
Overbeck, who in turn sold his leasehold to the English Dent brothers (Human 
Relations Area Files, 1956; Tregonning, 1965). 
                                                
8 See also Singh (2000). 
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In 1881, the British government formally authorised the British North Borneo 
Company (then known as North Borneo Chartered Company (NBCC)) and 
incorporated it by Royal Charter. In 1882, all British outposts in Sabah formally came 
under the British Crown’s Royal Charter and were consolidated as the British North 
Borneo Chartered Company (BNBCC). In 1888, the Sultanate of Brunei sought the 
protection of Britain and became a British protectorate. Sabah became a British Crown 
Colony in 1946 after World War II and became known as North Borneo (Padasian, 
1981). Of British colonies in the Southeast Asian region, Sabah was the last area to be 
colonised; Malaya and Singapore were colonised by the British in 1771 and 1819, 
respectively. Prior to Sarawak becoming a British colony, James Brooke and his 
successors ruled Sarawak from 1841 to 1941. 
In 1963, Sabah became independent from Britain following the emancipation of other 
British colonies in the region. In the same year, Sabah joined the Malaysian confederacy 
comprising the independent Federated States of Malaya, which had gained 
independence from the British in 1957, and the states of Sarawak (independence from 
British rule in 1963) and Singapore (independence from British rule in 1958). Singapore 
was expelled from the confederacy in 1965. Due to their geography, Sabah and Sarawak 
on the island of Borneo is often colloquially viewed as being ‘East Malaysia’ to ‘West 
Malaysia’ comprising the rest of the Malaysian states on the Malaysian Peninsula, which 
is also collectively called ‘Peninsular Malaysia’.9 
 
                                                
9 Locally, the term ‘Peninsula’ and semenanjung (peninsula) in the Malay language are often used 
by Sabahans when referring to persons hailing from Peninsular Malaysia irrespective of the 
state they come from. Note therefore that in this thesis, I refer to Malays from Peninsular 
Malaysia as ‘Peninsula Malays’ to distinguish them from Malays from Sabah and elsewhere. 
30 
 
The Sabahan population has grown exponentially over time owing to migrant 
populations. In 1960, the Sabah state population was 929,999 and the Dusun 
(Kadazandusun) grouping was the largest group at 32 per cent of the state population. 
The Chinese group was the second largest at 23 per cent, followed by the Other 
Indigenous group at 17.5 per cent; the Bajau group at 13.1 per cent; ‘Other’ at 9.5 per 
cent; and the Murut group at 4.9 per cent.10 After 1963, the following census categories 
were added: ‘Malay’ (first appearing in the 1970 census),11 ‘PTI’ (first appearing in the 
2000 census), and ‘Indian’ (first appearing in the 2010 census). Otherwise, all other 
categories aforementioned have persisted unchanged (with the exception of label 
changes to Dusun) since the time of the colonial census prior to 1963.  
There are currently around 3.2 million people in Sabah (2010 census).12 Under the 
Malaysian census, Sabahans are officially grouped in terms of nine ethnic categories: 
Bajau, Chinese, Indian, Kadazandusun, Malay, Murut, Other Indigenous, Others & PTI 
(Pendatang Tanpa Izin), translated as ‘undocumented arrival’ or locally as ‘illegal 
immigrant’. Note that PTIs now comprise the largest grouping in Sabah at close to 30 
per cent followed by the Other Indigenous grouping at slightly over 20 per cent. Details 
of the Sabahan population, outlining the size of each ethnic group, are indicated in 
Table 1.   
 
 
                                                
10 Sources: Lim (2008: 48) citing census data from the 1961 British North Borneo census and 
1979 Sabah Government statistics; 2000 Sabah Government Statistics.  
11 The term ‘Malay’ was not used in census data prior to 1970. It can be assumed that the Bajau 
grouping referred to both Bajau and Malay groups at that time. 
12 See Malaysian Department of Statistics (2000). 
31 
 
Table 1: Sabah population in 2010 by ethnic group and size (percentage) 13 
Name of group Number of population Percentage (+/-) 
PTI 889,779 27.7% 
Other Indigenous 659,856 20.5% 
Kadazandusun 568,575 17.7% 
Bajau 450,279 14% 
Chinese 295,674 9.2% 
Malay 184,197 5.7% 
Murut 102,393 3.2% 
Other 48,527 1.5% 
Indian 7,453 0.2% 
Total population:                              3,206,742 
 
Sabah’s economy depends heavily on migrant and PTI labour.  In the 1920s, Chinese 
labourers worked in the timber and rubber industries. By 1950, rubber exports were 82 
per cent of the Sabahan revenue and more Chinese labourers were recruited. The British 
government also recruited Cocos Islanders, Filipinos (from the northern Philippines 
Luzon province) and Javanese (Human Relations Area Files, 1956: 166) as well as Bugis 
migrants from Sulawesi (Ito, 2002; Ito, 2004). Thus, at the time, 56 per cent of those 
employed in the estates and industries were from indigenous populations, while 26.5 per 
cent were Chinese, 7.5 per cent were Javanese and 10 per cent were Others (Human 
Relations Area Files, 1956: 166).14  
                                                
13 Source: Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics, Malaysia Department 
of Statistics (2010).  
14 Note that the colonial government had also recruited Sikhs from India to form the 
constabulary (Singh, 2000: 158-9). 
32 
 
After 1963, timber exports and the production of palm oil and (petroleum) crude oil 
began to make significant changes to the economy of Sabah. In the year of 
Independence in 1963, timber exports made up 82 per cent of Sabah’s commodity 
production, replacing rubber as the dominant export industry (Pang 1988: 105) but in 
2008, the Sabah government reported that rubber and timber exports only contributed 
1.2 per cent and 4.3 per cent, respectively, while the tourism industry earned close to a 
billion dollars (RM 2.875 billion) in 2006.15 In 2010, Sabah’s major exports were mainly 
palm oil (including palm kernel oil) and crude petroleum at 39.4 per cent and 35.4 per 
cent, respectively, of the total exports of RM 43.61 billion or close to 15 billion 
Australian dollars (Sabah Government Statistics, 2010: xxiii).  
The boom in the palm oil industry has meant a greater demand for labour, which 
attracted migrant labourers, both legal and illegal, to work in the estates and industries in 
Sabah. It is estimated that at the present time, for the palm oil plantations alone, at least 
180,000 workers are needed on the basis of one worker per 13 acres of plantation. This 
high number of labourers is necessary because the acreage for plantations increased 
almost 50 times from 50,000 acres in 1963 to 2.3 million acres in 2002. It should be 
noted that foreign workers comprise the primary recruits by palm oil estate owners, 
since local workers have tended to shun the manual tasks of pruning and harvesting, the 
bulk of the work required, in favour of tasks within the refinery or the lighter tasks of 
weeding and fertilising (Gatidis, 2004).  The ratio of local to foreign workers is 30:70, 
with only around 20 per cent of foreign workers (or one out of five) holding legal work 
permits. The importation of foreign labour to work in the estates and industries has vast 
implications for contemporary Sabahan society, as PTIs are heavily implicated in 
obtaining identity documents illicitly. 
                                                
15 See Sabah Tourism Board, Visitor Arrivals and International Visitor Profiles Statistics.  
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Sabah’s ethnic groups and ethnic classification 
From an anthropological point of view, Sabahans can be divided into three different 
groups based on their indigenous Bornean status. Appell and Harrison (1969) reported 
that groups of Bornean stock are ‘indigenous’ and, in the census, this typically refers to 
groups belonging under Other Indigenous, Kadazandusun and Murut. Almost 50 per 
cent of these Bornean Sabah indigenes are identified as ‘Other Indigenous’ and more 
than 40 per cent are identified as ‘Kadazandusun’ while the remainder are considered to 
be part of the Murut grouping. Kadazandusuns and Muruts are traditionally pagan or 
predominantly non-Muslim (Christian, animist, Buddhist or other) in their beliefs and 
are comprised primarily of inland agricultural groups throughout Sabah.  
Kadazandusuns and Muruts are agrarian by tradition and practice swidden and wet-rice 
cultivation. Encouraged in the past by the British government, Kadazandusuns and 
Muruts began to settle and farm, or work for wages in the agricultural estates and in 
industry. In terms of governance, Native chiefs, together with village headmen and 
elders, traditionally lead the Kadazandusuns and Muruts. Decision-making is based on a 
‘consensus-style’ leadership.16 Apart from their political alliances, Kadazandusun and 
Murut leaders rely on ethnolinguistic surveys as well as other socio-cultural evidence to 
claim close ethnic relations to the groups in their areas.  
Other indigenous groups in Sabah that do not claim to be ethnically Kadazandusun or 
Murut tend to be categorised by the authorities under the ‘Other Indigenous’ grouping. 
Note that by Independence in 1963, 80 per cent of those under the Other Indigenous 
                                                
16 The ‘consensus-style’ decision-making involves deliberations made between chiefs, headmen 
and elders at the village and area levels prior to a consensus being proclaimed. See further Lim 
(2008: 30–1), Tongkul (2002) and Lasimbang & Miller (1990). 
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grouping were Muslims owing to extensive intermarriage with Muslim groups.17 For 
instance, among the Paitan grouping towards the central northeastern parts of Sabah, 
those who are Muslims self-identify as Sungai as they are descendants of intermarriage 
between Paitan (Other Indigenous) (Singh, 2000: 15-6) and Tausug/Suluk (classified 
under the Bajau category in census). Similarly, the Idaan grouping in Lahad Datu town 
and district on the east coast of Sabah are represented mainly by Begak (Muslim) and 
Idaan (non-Muslim) people (Harrisson & Harrisson, 1971; Gourdswaard, 2005).  
Muslim groups, which originate from elsewhere in the wider Malay Archipelago, such as 
the Bajau and Malay groups, are viewed as separate from the Bornean Sabahan 
indigenous groups (Appell & Harrison 1969). The Bajau grouping in Sabah is divided 
culturally and linguistically into two major groups, that is, West Coast Bajau and East 
Coast Bajau, with the latter being more closely related to Southern Sama in the southern 
Philippines than to West Coast Bajau (Sather, 1997). The Malay grouping typically refers 
to groups like the Bugis from the Indonesian islands, the Malays from the Malaysian 
Peninsula, and Malays or ‘Brunei’ from the adjacent country of Brunei. Today, the Bajau 
and Malay groupings are predominantly found along the coasts of Sabah and in all 
major towns.  
The Bajaus and Malays are wholly viewed by religious authorities as being Muslims, 
where Muslims in the past were collectively referred to as Mohammedans (Rutter 1929). 
In contrast to the agricultural pursuits of Sabahan indigenes, seafaring is the primary and 
traditional occupation of the Bajaus. For instance, the Bajaus are renowned for 
collecting and trading items such as shark fin, dried fish, pearls, turtle eggs, mother-of-
pearl, trepang (sea cucumber, holothurian or bêche-de-mer) and more (Sather 1997: 13). The 
                                                
17 Based on census data from the government of British North Borneo (1961), Sabah 
government (1979) and Sabah Statistics (2000). See also Lim (2008: 48). 
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Bajau and Malay groups became full-time fishermen and settled on Sabah’s coastal 
fringes (Rutter 1929: 26–27; Human Relations Area Files 13–14). The Bajaus and Malays 
are hierarchically organised according to tradition. The leaders of these groups are 
descendants of military leaders and cohorts of the past Suluk and Bruneian royalty. 
Some are titled datu (a Malay title of nobility and ruler) and pangeran (a Brunei term).  
Note that while ‘Bajau’ and ‘Malay’ are identities that are transnational in the Malay-
Philippine-Indonesian archipelago, these terms imply certain national origins when read 
in Sabah. The term ‘Bajau’ implies broadly Philippine descent, and is commonly used in 
Sabah as an exonym; while the alternate ethnic name ‘Sama’ when used as a self-referent 
indicates a Bajau interlocutor’s recognition of other Bajau people in their midst (Stephen 
2000: 2). Meanwhile, ‘Malay’ as an identity label in Sabah typically refers to groups like 
the Bugis from the Indonesian islands, the Malays from the Malaysian Peninsula, and 
Brunei Malays from the adjacent territory of Brunei.  
In the census, non-Bornean groups like the Chinese represent another population type 
in Sabah. Chinese presence in Sabah has been dated back to the spice trade era: an old 
Chinese settlement in the Kinabatangan area (central and east Sabah) was excavated 
along with Chinese ceramics from the Sung dynasty (960-1280) (Rutter, 1929: 8; Human 
Relations Area Files, 1956). In the early 1900s, Chinese were recruited en masse by the 
British to fill labour shortages in the estates and industries; the Hakka and Cantonese 
comprised the two largest Chinese groups from which labourers were sourced (Wong 
2005). The Chinese are traditionally led by towkays (Chinese for head of a household or 
business (Lee, 1976: 1) and a Chinese consulate in 1916 was influential in establishing 
the Chinese in Sabah (Wong, 2005). The Chinese mainly reside in the city and town 
areas, as they primarily engage in business and entrepreneuring.  
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By comparison, the population of Indians is small in Sabah and there is little academic 
documentation about them. An organisation called ‘Sabah Indian Association’ (SIA) 
looks after their social and welfare needs. The predecessor of the SIA, ‘The Indian 
Association of North Borneo’, was established in 1947.18 Note that the census category 
‘Other’ typically refers to any other non-Bornean group apart from the Chinese and 
Indian. For instance, there is a sizeable Korean community in Sabah with Korean 
expatriates working in the booming engineering, oil (petroleum) and gas sectors.19 
Migrants in Sabah come from elsewhere in the Asian region including Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, India and Japan. There are also Westerners that reside in Sabah and marry 
with locals. 
The close proximity of Sabah to the Philippines and Indonesia has given rise to the 
contemporary issue of PTIs. Note that the term ‘PTI’ first became prominent after 1989 
when the Sabahan government began to distinguish economic and political refugees and 
heavily restrict immigration into Sabah. Among Sabahans, a distinction is made between 
those migrants who are viewed as coming legally and those viewed as having illegally 
entered Sabah. The latter category includes asylum seekers who arrived in the 1960s and 
1970s fleeing civil war in the Philippines and were subsequently absorbed into Sabahan 
society, becoming Malaysian citizens. They and their descendants are generally not 
considered as PTI. Thus, in a technical sense, ‘PTI’ refers explicitly to those migrants 
who, at the time of being apprehended by the authorities, do not possess proper 
identification documents such as valid visas or work permits.  
 
                                                
18 See Sabah Indian Association (SIA) (Facebook page).  
19 See “Brisk business at Korea Fair”, 2009.  
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In terms of cultural similarity to the local population, most Filipino and Indonesian 
migrants, whether PTIs or not, are Muslim and tend to share cultural and physical 
similarities with the local Bajaus and Malays. Many migrants may therefore adopt the 
Bajau or Malay labels as reflective of their new identities in Sabah while still upholding 
their affiliation to their respective cultural groups. As mentioned in earlier paragraphs, 
the terms ‘Bajau’ and ‘Malay’ presently include indeterminate Malaysian, Filipino and 
Indonesian groups of Muslim background. However, as some Filipinos who came to 
Sabah prior to Independence under the British government’s labourer scheme were 
from the province of Luzon in the northern regions of the Philippines and were 
predominantly Christian (Catholic) (Human Relations Area Files, 1956), it is important 
to keep in mind that Filipino and Indonesian migrants to Sabah may also distinguish 
among themselves by religion.20 In the current period most migrants to Sabah come 
from the neighbouring Philippines and Indonesia with Filipinos making up 40 per cent 
of all foreign nationals in Sabah in year 2000 (Peters, 2005: 141). 
While intermarriages are the norm in Sabah, occurring four times more than the 
Malaysian average (Pue & Sulaiman, 2013), claiming ethnic membership to more than 
one group is viewed as a problem in the eyes of the Malaysian government agencies, 
such as the National Registration Department (NRD). Groups in Sabah, and in Malaysia 
in general, may be referred to anthropologically by their source of origin and 
intermarriage but for purposes of allocation of resources, the Malaysian government 
reads Sabahan official ethnic identities strictly in terms of ‘Bumiputera’ and ‘Sabah 
Native’ classificatory systems.  
                                                
20 Predominantly Christian, the Tator (Toraja) people from the southern parts of Sulawesi and 
Timorese from Flores (who are mainly Catholics) are among the many migrant groups residing 
in Sabah.  
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At the time of confederation in 1963, the interim governments of the Sabah and 
Sarawak states had demanded that, as a condition of their joining Malaysia, the status of 
Bumiputera in the Malayan states be extended to Sabah and Sarawak Natives, who 
would hitherto be entitled to claim ‘Bumiputera’ status in addition to their respective 
Native statuses. This became part of the Constitution, which states that in Sabah, 
Bumiputera status may only be awarded to those having the position and privilege of 
Sabah Native, which is a state-level status ‘given to a citizen of Sabah who is a child of 
persons from any of the indigenous groups, but whose father’s domicile must be in 
Sabah at the time of the child’s birth’ (The Malaysian Constitution, Article 161A 6 (b))21.  
This has meant that since the colonial administration, the Sabah state government has 
recognised all Sabahan indigenes—the Malay, Bajau, Kadazandusun, Murut and Other 
Indigenous groups—as Sabah Natives and hence as Bumiputeras. Additionally, the 
Sabah government also recognised Sino-Natives—offspring of Sabah Native and 
Chinese parents—to have the same rights and privileges as full-blooded Sabah Natives. 
Sino-Natives, for instance, can access Sabah Native Title, which accords them the right 
to own land through inheritance or purchase Native Title from other Sabah Natives.  
However, there are inconsistencies in the application of the terms ‘Sabah Native’ and 
‘Bumiputera’ at the state and federal levels regarding Sino-Natives. Although Sino-
Natives are recognised as Sabah Native at the state level and hence ought to have 
Bumiputera status, federal authorities view Sino-Natives as non-Bumiputera because of 
their Chinese surnames, especially if ‘Chinese’ is stated anywhere in their identification 
documents (birth certificate and/or identity card). Prior to 1963, the interim Sabah 
government raised the potential problem of the status of Sino Natives. According to 
                                                
21 See Federal Constitution (2011).  
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Luping (1989: 29), the Sabahan inter-governmental committee, as part of the Inter-
Governmental Committee (IGC) meeting in 1962 preceding Independence, stressed 
that the Native population in Sabah also included many people of mixed blood, in 
particular, a large number of Sino-Kadazans (through Kadazan-Chinese intermarriage).  
The Sabahan interim government recommended that in the extension of the provisions 
of Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution to Sabah, the King (of Malaysia) should act 
only upon the advice of the Sabah state government (Luping, 1980: 29; Luping, 1994: 
70-72). The interim government was concerned that the ‘Yang di Pertuan Agong’ (King 
of Malaysia) and the federal cabinet might not know who the indigenous races in Sabah 
were and thus how to act on the matter of a Bumiputera quota system for the Natives 
of Sabah. However, no federal-level recognition process for Sino-Natives in Sabah was 
created. 
Given the above, in order to protect the ongoing rights of Sino-Natives at the local 
level, the Sabah state government after 1963 continued with the colonial convention of 
issuing a ‘Sijil Anak Negeri’ or SAN (Native certificate) through the Sabah Native courts 
to Sino-Native individuals who could claim no less than one-fourth ‘anak Negeri’ or 
‘Native’ blood (whether paternal or maternal) (Roff, 1969; Sullivan & Regis, 1981; 
Leong, 1982: 99). Additionally, many Sino-Natives sought to change their names to 
indigenous ones to ensure that they could access their Bumiputera rights at the federal 
level. Note that federal government officials typically scan the Malaysian Identity Card 
(IC) of Sabahans to determine whether their identities (as seen in their names and the 
names of their ethnic groups) are those of Bumiputera groups.  
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However, the SAN provision was jeopardised in the 1980s, when Sabahan authorities 
found that some pure Chinese individuals had falsified information and bribed 
government officials in order to obtain SANs, enabling them to buy Native land and 
access Bumiputera incentive programs. Many PTIs had also used SANs to establish 
local and/or fake identities, prompting the Sabah government to shut down its SAN 
services in 1985. This has resulted in some Sino-Natives seeking paperwork from 
various Sabahan government agencies, such as their local district offices, to help verify, 
for instance, their ties to a Native predecessor. The documentation allows them some 
leverage when attempting to access Sabah Native and Bumiputera programs.  
The lack of proper Sabah Native recognition has created fundamental problems for 
many Sino-Natives. Those without such recognition are typically barred by the state 
from inheriting ancestral Native Title and gaining access to Bumiputera benefits, such as 
scholarships and the ‘Amanah Sabah Bumiputera’ or ASB (Bumiputera Shares Trust), a 
popular alternative wealth enhancement or savings scheme for Bumiputeras. In recent 
years, the Sabah government has been more open to calls from the public to review the 
nativisation process for Sino-Natives, resulting in the ‘Sino-Native’ category being 
formally introduced into the Sabah Native system. However, the Sino-Native category 
has an ambiguous status within the federal classification system: as shown in Figure 1, 
Sino-Natives may be classified as ‘Bumiputera Other’ or as ‘Non-Bumiputera’, 
depending on whether or not the particular individual has been able to demonstrate 
‘nativeness’ to the federal authorities.  
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Fig. 1 Bumiputera vs. Sabah Native categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTIs have a serious impact on ethnic classification in Sabah. In addition to breaches of 
the SAN, PTIs are heavily implicated in the racketeering of a wide range of identity 
documents, whether fake, forged or genuine articles, sold on the black market, namely 
the Malaysian Identity Card.  Many PTIs claimed that they were issued proper ICs 
through ‘Projek IC’ also called ‘Projek Mahathir’ or ‘Project M’ after the ex-Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, an allegedly covert operation by the authorities to legitimise the 
identities of PTIs (Chong, 2009). According to informants, some PTIs also take 
advantage of mobile IC campaigns conducted by the authorities to ensure that rural 
Sabahans are equipped with ICs. During IC campaign periods, some PTIs stay with 
relatives in remote villages and adjust their lifestyle accordingly to convince government 
officials whose role it is to scrutinise the identity of applicants to determine localness 
before endorsing them for higher-level approval by their superiors.  
Other ways that PTIs sourced their IC and other documents such as birth certificate are 
by taking the identities of dead persons, whose relatives had sold the deceased’s 
paperwork on the black market. Informants holding these kinds of documents disclosed 
that they had not experienced any issues with the authorities so far and used their 
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‘official’ name (the name of the deceased) only rarely. Some PTI informants also 
mentioned that locals had adopted them in exchange for cash. The outcome of formal 
adoption thus enables these PTIs to legitimise their identity in Sabah.  
PTIs also use other identity documents such as the ‘Kad Burung-Burung’ (literal 
translation: ‘Bird Card’), a document that has some clout but whose origin is 
contentious. Some PTIs claim that Sabah government officials issued them with the 
card, which bears a logo resembling a bird. Other PTIs say that they obtained these 
cards in the Philippines en route to Sabah.  The Sabahan and Philippine cards in question 
did not however bear the same logo or design and had different serial numbers.22  
One of the more commonly used documents by PTIs is the ‘IMM13’ (a social visit pass 
issued for Filipino refugees in Sabah in the 1970s and 1980s), which allows the holder 
the right to work.23 However, this document has since been criticised for bestowing 
legal identity on PTIs who are not political refugees. Chong (2009) states that ‘tens of 
thousands’ of IMM13 holders have received permanent residency in Malaysia and that 
the validity of some of these IMM13 visas is dubious. The IMM13 visa has been and 
continues to be abused by counterfeiters who sell them to PTIs.24 
Through all or any of these documents above, many genuine Sabahan Bumiputeras are 
concerned that PTIs’ identity documents have helped them to establish local identities 
that can continue to be seen as Native or Bumiputera. Equipped with their 
documentation, PTIs can lay claim to Sabah Native land, which is reserved for Sabah 
                                                
22 See “Suluks had NRD receipts issued in Tawi-Tawi”, 2013. See also, “‘Kad Burung Burung’ 
issued in Philippines – witness”, 2013.  
23 See “Official blog of the Malaysian Attorney-General” for an explanation of the IMM13 (in 
the Malay language).  
24 See “Sabah Immigration cripples document forgery syndicate”, 2017. 
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Natives and their descendants. One of the concerns of genuine Sabahan Bumiputeras 
therefore is Sabah’s current definition of Sabah Native that is open to interpretation. 
Apart from what has been articulated in the Malaysian Constitution, ‘Sabah Native’ in 
the 1952 ‘Definition of Native’, Ordinance Cap 64 of the Sabah Laws has remained 
unchanged since the colonial period: 
Any person who is ordinarily resident in the colony, is a 
member of a people indigenous to Indonesia, or the Sulu group 
of islands in the Philippines archipelago or the Federation of 
Malaya or colony of Singapore, has lived as and been a member 
of a native community for a continuous period of five years 
immediately preceding the date of his claim to be a Native, has 
borne a good character throughout that period and whose stay 
in the colony is not limited under any of the provisions of the 
Immigration Ordinance.25  
(Luping, 1989: 26) 
The Sabah state government as a whole now accepts that a review of the Sabah Native 
term is needed to properly assess claims to ‘Sabah Native’ status, while some state 
agencies urge the reformulation ‘Sabah Native’ to be aligned to the Native Title (NT). 
The Local Government and Housing ministry in Sabah, for instance, is not inclined to 
support the Sabah Native review process, if it is rushed, citing the complications of NT 
transfer to subsequent descendants who do not qualify as ‘Native’ under the proposed 
terms.26 The issue of NT transference is hotly debated because of rampant cases of NT 
lands being sold through trust deeds or nominees of non-Natives and via shady 
agreements with public listed companies and cash-rich foreigners or wealthy Chinese 
nationals.27  
                                                
25 Excerpt taken from ‘Special Position of the Indigenous Race’, a paper prepared by the 
constitutional sub-committee of the Inter-Governmental Committee for Meetings prior to 
Independence in 1962 (see Luping, 1989). 
26 See “Defining ‘native’ to take time”, 2011.  
27 See “Stop NT land deals via nominees”, 2014.  
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Meanwhile, disputes between groups reveal the relation between Sabah Native and 
Native Title to be complex. For example, a Bajau group from Sabah’s east coast town of 
Semporna claimed that many Bugis had gained access to NT lands meant for Bajaus in 
the 1980s.28 The Bugis responded that they were ‘Bugis Sabah’, asserting that they had 
already been awarded SAN prior to the SAN system closing in 1982.29 The Bugis group 
has cultural links to Sulawesi (Celebes) in Indonesia where they are believed to originate. 
However, the Bugis Sabah group claims that their antecedent came from pre-colonial 
communities on Sabah’s east coast. For instance, the Bugis have been instrumental in 
developing the town and district of Tawau since the 1880s (Sintang, 2007).  
To address the PTI problem perceived as being out of control, in 2011 a proposal to 
revamp the identification system in Sabah was put forward by some political leaders, 
notably from the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), in response to calls from local 
Sabahans to prevent PTIs from blending into Sabahan society. This proposal demanded 
the recall of all existing Malaysian Identity Cards. The Malaysian IC would subsequently 
only be reissued to those Sabahans whose identity had been verified. In addition, these 
Sabahans would be issued with a Sabahan identity card. The SAPP gained support from 
‘Solidariti Tanahairku’ or STAR (Homeland Solidarity) and ‘Parti Cinta Sabah’ or PCS 
(Love Sabah Party), aligning under the ‘Gabungan Sabah Charter’ or United Sabah 
Alliance. Several NGOs in support of the idea, for instance, SORAK Sabah, MOSIK 
(Momogun Movement for Self-Determination), United Borneo Front (UBF), ‘Angkatan 
Perubahan Sabah’ or APS (Sabah Change Force) and ‘Sunduvan’ (Soul), have begun 
independently creating ‘Sabah IC’ cards for their members.30  
                                                
28 See “Newly-formed Bajau association joins calls for setting up of RCI”, 2012.  
29 See “Bugis NGO denies any role”, 2013.  
30 See SAPP website and SORAK facebook.  
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Meanwhile, at the federal level, the Malaysian government has sought to tighten security 
measures around the IC by developing a bio-security feature comprising thumbprint 
identification and microchip. The Malaysian government also approved a ‘Royal 
Commission of Inquiry (RCI) on the PTIs in Sabah’ to be initiated in 2012. This RCI 
reported in 2014 that government officials were involved in issuing ICs to illegal 
immigrants (The 2014 RCI Report). Several officials have now been prosecuted in court. 
The RCI also reported an increasing burden on the healthcare system from illegal 
immigrants due to unpaid costs for treatment and increased births; loss of tax revenue 
from rampant smuggling activities (cigarettes, alcohol, fireworks, etc.); increased crime 
(30 per cent attributed to PTIs); and prison space and cost due to incarceration of PTIs. 
However, many Sabahans lack confidence that the authorities can address the impacts 
of PTIs in Sabah. Major stakeholders representing Sabahan industries have spoken out 
against the deportation of PTIs, claiming that the economy in Sabah has always been 
dependent on foreign labour and has become even more dependent in recent years. 
Many Sabahans expressed fear that PTIs are increasing in number over time and have 
outnumbered actual citizens. For instance, official statistics for the year 2000 revealed 
that authorities either apprehended or processed some 614,824 PTIs. Studies show that 
only 20 per cent of foreign nationals in the same year possessed a legitimate working 
visa while PTIs represented 40 per cent of all foreign nationals in Sabah with children 
and elderly PTIs representing a further 40 per cent (Kassim, 2004: 6-7).  
Protest against PTIs has led to the rise of various pro-sovereignty movements; one of 
the largest movements is the SSKM or Sabah Sarawak Keluar Malaysia (literal 
translation: ‘Sabah Sarawak Leave Malaysia’) (Minahan 2016). Established in 2011, a 
separatist group called ‘Sabah dan Sarawak Keluar Malaysia’ (SSKM) (‘Sabah and 
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Sarawak (to) Leave Malaysia’) has gained massive support from the grassroots. The 
SSKM is affiliated to ‘Sabah Sarawak Union – United Kingdom’ (SSUK), an NGO 
based in England under the leaderships of Zurainee Tehek from Sarawak and Doris 
Jones, a Sabahan, who is seeking a consensus for the Sabahan state to leave the 
Malaysian confederation citing the failure of the Malaysian state to work in the best 
interest of the Sabahans. SSKM and SSUK are in the process of collecting petitions 
from its supporters in the hopes that this can be tabled at the United Nations.31  
One of the primary concerns of separatist movements such as the above and of many 
Sabahans is the matter of Sabah’s sovereignty. This is because royal descendants of the 
Suluk Sultanate in the southern Philippines continue to persist in their claim to the 
territory of Sabah.32 In 2013, a royal Suluk militia attacked Sabah on its eastern front but 
Malaysian forces were able to stop the attack carried out by a large group of over 100 
heavily armed intruders.33 As a result of the Suluk attack, Malaysian authorities have 
placed Sabah’s borders in the north and east under full military control and established 
the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) along the border areas.34 Fears that 
future Suluk attacks may occur are prevalent among Sabahans, who believe that Suluk 
loyalists can be found among the numerous Filipino migrants in Sabah.35  
 
                                                
31 See “Sabah Sarawak Keluar Malaysia – Sabah Sarawak Union”.  
32 In the late 1800s, following the decline of the Bruneian Sultanate, the Sultanate of Sulu fell to 
the Spanish. After the Spanish–American war in 1898, a treaty was signed between the Sulu 
and the United States governments, which was an agreement to gradually cede power to the 
Philippine-American administration. Sulu is now part of Mindanao, an autonomous southern 
region of the Philippines since 1989. 
33 See the statement by Anifah Aman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia. 2014. 
34 See Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSSCOM). Official Website.  
35 See “ESSCOM seals off Sabah plantation after armed men spotted”, 2017.  
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With PTI misuse of identification systems in Sabah, particularly breaches in relation to 
the Malaysian Identity Card, the primary form of official identification, reports have 
shown that PTIs are recruited as ‘phantom voters’ during election periods. As phantom 
voters, PTIs can assume the identity of deceased citizens, for instance, as well as take 
the identities of ex-Malaysians, that is, those who have migrated out of Malaysia and 
have returned their citizenship documents (passport) to the Malaysian embassy in their 
new countries of residence.36 Some informants said that they had gone to the polling 
station on Election Day only to find that their names were not on the list but had 
mysteriously appeared in another district, and that someone—presumed to be a PTI and 
allegedly paid off by crooked politicians—had already cast a vote in their name. The 
complicit participation by PTIs in the situation above affects relations between Muslim 
and non-Muslim Bumiputeras: non-Muslim Bumiputeras question their Bumiputera 
standing because they fear that the high proportion of PTIs who are Muslim means that 
they are voting as Muslim Bumiputera.  
Power, politics and religion: Muslim Bumiputera and non-Muslim Bumiputera  
Throughout Sabah’s political history, the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim 
Bumiputeras is imbalanced: they have been contesting each other for leadership in the 
Sabah state government with Muslim Bumiputera typically being more dominant. Prior 
to 1963, indigenous and migrant groups in Sabah were separately governed under the 
British administration, where group leaders communicated the needs of their respective 
groups through their own governing bodies or elders. For instance, the Chinese 
Consulate spoke for the Chinese group and towkays sat in municipal council committees 
led by British officials to ensure that the Chinese community’s needs were met.  For the 
                                                
36 See “What now, migrated phantom voters?”, 2008.  
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Native populations, leaders from Bajau, Malay (Brunei origin) and indigenous groups, 
such as Dusun—datu, pangeran and orang tua—convened in a ‘Native Council’ to 
negotiate directly with British officials, typically the district officer in their respective 
areas. 37 The Native Council had the financial power to administer villages and 
constituencies. It performed administrative tasks, such as handling the collection of 
taxes/levies, and managed a series of ‘Native courts’, which were incorporated into the 
district structure for the purpose of maintaining adat, that is, customary law and 
practices38 (Lee, 1976: 10; Lim, 2008: 32; Singh, 2000).  
After 1963, the first Sabah state government saw Donald Stephens, a then non-Muslim 
Kadazan-Japanese-British-Australian, become chief minister with Mustapha Harun, a 
Muslim Suluk of royal standing, as the Tuan Yang Terutama (TYT) or head of state.39 
To foster alliances with other non-Muslim groups, that is, Dusuns and Muruts, Donald 
Stephens renamed his political party, the United National Kadazan Organization 
(UNKO) as the United Pasok Kadazan Organization (UPKO). The term pasok refers to 
‘indigene’. Mustapha Harun registered the United Sabah National Organization 
(USNO), which catered to the Muslim groups while Chinese leaders created the Sabah 
Chinese Association (SCA). However, prior to the 1967 state election, so that he might 
actively pursue politics, Mustapha Harun vacated the TYT post to become the Sabah 
chief minister while Donald Stephens took up the more prestigious TYT post. Stephens’ 
                                                
37 Note that the British government turned its control of indigenous land and natural resources 
over to the Natives (Lim, 2008: 30), and subsequently permitted them self-rule after several 
incidences of Native resistance, namely the Bajau-Suluk resistance led by Mat Salleh from 
1894-1903 and the Dusun-Murut resistance at Rundum led by Antanomu in 1915. The 
Advisory Council of Native Affairs (ACNA) was then instituted in 1915 (Lim, 2008) and 
became the ‘Native Council’ in the 1930s (Singh, 2000).  
38 The adat in Sabah continues to be upheld by the Sabah state government. For instance, Sabah 
Natives can choose to marry under federal law (Marriage and Divorce Act 1976) or under 
customary law in their respective district (Maning, 2015: 6). 
39 Typically, the head of state position is apolitical. In Sabah, Penang and Sarawak, a civilian can 
fill the position; elsewhere in Malaysia, this position can only be filled by the sultan of the state 
in question. 
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power defused, his party, UPKO, did not win any seats in the election, and the 
government went to USNO and SCA. Stephens then disbanded UPKO, became a 
Muslim and joined USNO. 
Non-Muslim Bumiputeras faced difficulty in retaining political power given the 
conversion of Donald Stephens and Ghani Gilong, leaders of the Kadazans and 
Dusuns, respectively, which further acted to promote Islam to the non-Muslim 
indigenous population. The conversion of Chief Bobohizan, the head of all traditional 
priestesses in Kuala Penyu (in the south of Sabah), also influenced conversion among 
non-Muslim Bumiputeras in the area (Lim, 2008; Rooney, 1981). Islamisation in Sabah 
saw to the state sponsorship of mass conversion ceremonies among pagan populations, 
specifically among non-Muslim Bumiputera groups in the rural areas. According to Lim 
(2008: 111), in mass conversion ceremonies, hundreds and in one case up to 2000 
individuals became Muslims in a single ceremony. High-profile guests, such as the 
Malaysian Prime Minister, kings of Malaysia and Brunei, and visiting dignitaries from 
Islamic countries, attended these ceremonies.  
At the time, to strengthen the Islamic base in Sabah, action was taken against any 
protest against Islamisation; for instance, Christian priests’ visas were cancelled and they 
were deported (in the past, most priests in Sabah were foreigners) (Rooney, 1981). 
Further, in order to weaken any opposition to the state government and its policies, 
leaders defying the government at the time were sent to detention without trial 
(permissible under the Internal Security Act (ISA), a preventive detention law (Lim, 
2008: 52) which was repealed in 2012 and replaced with the Security Offences Act).  
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The intensive Islamisation of Sabah also saw a standardisation of Islamic practices 
among the Muslim Bumiputera groups. Under the British government in the colonial 
period, institutional support for Muslims was typically denied (Lim, 2008: 33-4 citing 
Singh, 2000: 293). Under the government of Mustapha Harun between 1963 and 1975, 
government aid was given to support the missionising activities of various Islamic 
charities and associations (Lim, 2008: 105-10). Government-aided Islamic missions 
continued to increase in Sabah in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, in the 1978 budget, 
80 per cent of federal funds for religious development projects went to the ‘Majlis 
Ugama Islam Sabah’ or MUIS [Sabah Islam Affairs] with the remainder going to other 
religious bodies.  MUIS was given responsibility for establishing Sabah’s Islamic base, 
for example, by selecting and authorising Bajau Islamic teachers as uztaz and by 
providing uztaz training facilities for Muslim youth (Nagatsu, 2003).  
As a result, due to Islamisation campaigns, the Muslim population in Sabah rose from 
37.4 per cent in 1960 to 51 per cent in 1980. Non-Muslims typically become Muslim 
owing to intermarriage. Note that in Malaysia, Muslims are not allowed to marry a kafir 
(a non-Muslim, a term used chiefly by Muslims). Based on statistics, Muslim numbers 
are currently rising in Sabah while non-Muslim numbers are falling: in year 2000, there 
were 1,658,285 Muslims to 724,833 Christians, representing 64 per cent and 29 per cent, 
respectively, of the total population of 2.6 million people. In year 2010, in a total 
population of 3.2 million people, Muslim numbers rose to 2,096,153 people or 65.5 per 
cent in relation to Christian numbers, which were 853,726 or 26.7 per cent (Sabah 
Government Statistics, 2000 & 2010). 
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The Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputera relationship in Sabah is further affected by 
the presence and influence of Peninsula Malays. The IGC had agreed that Peninsula 
Malay officers from could fill the top government posts in Sabah, given the disparity in 
educational attainment between Peninsula Malay and local Bumiputera groups.  In the 
1960s, at the time of Sabah’s transition into Malaysia, only 0.1 per cent of all Sabah 
Bumiputera groups had attained the ‘Secondary School Certificate’ compared to 3.5 per 
cent of the Peninsula Malay group. More recent data shows the national average of          
90 per cent with Peninsula Malays’ completion of basic Malaysian education at the 
secondary school level at 92 per cent, while the Bajau and Kadazandusun groups 
representing Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputera in Sabah score 79 per cent and 85 per 
cent, respectively. In Sabah, the Chinese group continues to be the most highly educated 
group with an educational attainment score of 93 per cent.40  
The entry of Peninsula Malays into the Sabahan administration saw the topmost 
government positions going mainly to Peninsula Malay officials while local Bumiputeras 
filled deputy and senior officer roles. For instance, while 60 per cent of the management 
and skilled posts in the civil service went to Sabahan Bumiputeras in 1975, only 45 per 
cent of top posts were given to Sabahan Bumiputeras (in 1978 and 1981) (Lim, 2008). 
Malay administrators from the Malay Peninsula thus held an average of 40-60 per cent 
of management and skilled posts in the civil service in the 1970 and 1980s. This 
represented a ratio of one Peninsula Malay Bumiputera officer to three Sabahan 
Bumiputera officers (the present ratio is unknown). 
 
                                                
40 See Malaysia Department of Statistics, Education and Social Characteristics of the Population 
(2000). 
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The influence of the federal government through Peninsula Malay presence in Sabah is 
became increasingly apparent in Sabah Muslim leaders’ acquiescence to its power. From 
1967 to 1976, the Sabah government under the leadership of Mustapha Harun became 
autocratic, and when oil deposits were discovered on Sabah shores, Mustapha Harun 
began speaking of secession from the Malaysian confederation. In response, the federal 
government began to support an opposition party, BERJAYA (meaning ‘victorious’ and 
standing for the official party ‘Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah’ or the United Sabah 
People’s Party) to topple Mustapha’s government despite BERJAYA’s multi-ethnic 
platform. From 1976-1986, BERJAYA was the ruling party under the leadership of 
Harris Salleh, a Suluk-Bajau-Pakistani leader.  
During this period (1976-1986), Harris Salleh enabled a ‘federalisation’ of Sabahan 
government agencies: the administration of Immigration and Road and Transport were 
turned over to the federal government; Malay officials in top government posts were 
increased in the name of national integration; and the island of Labuan in the southern 
part of Sabah became a federal territory. USNO, under Mustapha Harun, continued to 
win favour among the older generation of Peninsula Malay politicians who supported 
the idea of an Islamic state. To improve his standing with UMNO (United Malay 
National Organization)41, the main Peninsula Malay political party which led and 
continues to lead the Malaysian coalitional government called ‘Barisan Nasional’ or BN 
((National Front), Harris Salleh allowed the religious monitoring body, ‘Majlis Ugama 
Islam Sabah’ (MUIS), which was formed under the USNO government, to intensify its 
missionising. USNO was ousted in 1984 after Mustapha Harun fell out of favour with 
the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad.  
                                                
41 Formed in 1946, UMNO is currently the ruling party in Malaysia. 
53 
 
In 1985, non-Muslim Bumiputera sought to gain power when Pairin Kitingan, a 
Christian Kadazan-Dusun leader, left BERJAYA to form Parti Bersatu Sabah or PBS 
[Sabah United Party]. The following year, PBS won the state election by a landslide and 
became part of ‘Barisan Nasional’ (BN). In 1990, PBS won the state election but the 
annual federal budget to the Sabah state was decreased, state logging exports were 
banned, and several key state cabinet members were accused of secessionism and 
detained. Pairin attempted to re-enter PBS into the BN but was unsuccessful and many 
PBS leaders defected to BN. In 1994, PBS won the state for the third time with a 
narrow majority of 25 out of 48 seats. However, all state ministers under the PBS ticket, 
except Pairin Kitingan and his deputy, left PBS to enter BN, thus collapsing the state 
assembly. The then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad, instituted a policy 
of rotation of the chief minister position every two years, allowing representation from 
each major ethnic grouping in Sabah. In 1994, many Sabah Muslim leaders, with their 
followers, made the decision to enter UMNO, which also opened its membership to 
non-Muslim (Christian) Bumiputeras.  
Peninsula Malay influence has deepened progressively over time. In 2005, the two-year 
rotation system was abolished. From 2005 until the present, a Muslim Bumiputera, 
Musa Aman, a Dusun-Pakistani leader, has held the position of Sabah chief minister. 
UMNO currently holds the largest majority of seats in Sabah (30 out of 60 seats). 
Ethnic-based political parties continue today, for example, Parti Demokratik Sabah or 
PDS, renamed UPKO, and associated with non-Muslim Bumiputera, and SAPP, which 
is associated with the Chinese. The mainstream opposition party, the ‘Pakatan Rakyat’ 
(People’s Pact) led federally by Anwar Ibrahim, a well-known opposition figure, has 
expanded into Sabah to compete against UMNO for seats. Despite Pakatan Rakyat 
contesting all seats in the 2008 election, the Sabahan public voted for the current 
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government. According to political analysis, Sabahans are still voting for BN because 
they fear that if they do not, they will not be able to press the government for much-
needed development and infrastructure in the state. Chin & Puyok (2010) also claimed 
that Sabahans lack a strong connection to Anwar Ibrahim and his Peninsula-based party.  
Today, the government Opposition attributes the political situation in Sabah to the 
weaknesses of past governments. The issue of early Islamisation in Sabah persists as a 
controversial issue, as it went against the ‘no official religion’ policy that was included in 
the 20-point agreement made between the Sabah state government and the federal 
government in 1963 (Ongkili, 1967: 77).  The topic of Islamisation is a sensitive one 
among many non-Muslim Bumiputeras in Sabah who feel disadvantaged in the 
workplace, as these do not feel that they receive the same opportunities as Muslim 
Bumiputeras.42 Some non-Muslim Bumiputeras may therefore choose to become 
Muslim. I address the topic of conversion to Islam in the following chapter. 
The federalisation of some of Sabah’s government agencies also causes debate among 
Sabahans. By opening up state departments to the federal government, the participation 
of Sabahans has also reduced in civil service positions based in Sabah but are advertised 
nationally. While the island of Labuan, a booming oil and gas hub, for instance, was also 
annexed to the federal government in 1984, which has turned it into a tax-free free trade 
and shopping zone and an Islamic banking hub. In short, federalisation entailed 
replacing the bulk of policy-making decisions at the state level with directives from the 
federal government.  
                                                
42 It is important to note that the Muslim Bumiputera category is not homogenous either, and 
that some of the issues that concern the Kadazans also concern minority Muslim groups in 
Sabah. Due to a lack of space, issues specific to the Bajau and other Muslim minorities, such as 
assimilation as ‘Malays’ and loss of distinctive languages and cultural identities, are not 
explored in this thesis. 
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The effects of federalisation also involved an oil royalty issue between federal and state 
governments. The division of oil royalties between the state and federal governments is 
based on an agreement made in 1976, which resulted in Sabah’s crude oil revenue 
surrendered to the confederation with only a 5 per cent share flowing back to Sabah. 
The 5 per cent royalty figure is now being contested; critics believed that a higher 
percentage was negotiated before the tragic death of the key negotiator, the then Chief 
Minister of Sabah, Donald Fuad Stephens. Critics have raised the possibility that a 20 
per cent royalty was being discussed, but the death of Stephens prior to the signing of 
the oil royalty agreement prevented this from coming to pass.  
The oil sales split between federal and state governments is further linked to the federal 
budget to Sabah. Many Sabahans are unhappy about infrastructural development and 
poverty in the state and believe that Sabah’s contribution through the oil sales split is 
not commensurate with the yearly budget. The state of Sabah has been cited as the 
poorest state in Malaysia with 23 per cent of its population living below the poverty line 
(Hassan, 2011).  
Today, there is considerable sentiment in Sabah against UMNO, stemming from a 
desire to return to local-based political parties. A new party called ‘Parti Warisan Sabah’ 
(Sabah Heritage Party) heavily criticises the Sabahan government on the grounds that it 
is made up of pro-federal government loyalists.43 However, political analysts predict that 
Sabah will continue to be a BN state owing to the distribution of seats favouring 
UMNO leaders, and Muslim Bumiputeras overall.  
                                                
43 See “Parti Warisan Sabah is new name of Shafie-led party”, 2016.  
56 
 
Meanwhile, the identities ‘Sabahan’ and ‘Orang Asal’ (Indigenous People) have a 
growing place in the lives of non-Muslim Bumiputeras indicating that many Native-born 
Sabahans are broadening their perception on ethnic identity. I touch on the Orang Asal 
identity in the penultimate chapter of this thesis when I discuss Kadazandusun in 
relation to Kadazan. As for the Sabahan identity, while separatists continue to heavily 
influence Sabahans to harden their political stance as ‘Sabahan’, some Sabahans also 
question whether it is possible to separate completely from PTIs. Many informants told 
me that due to ongoing blending with locals, it is no longer clear which migrants are PTI 
and which do not. A key example was given in how many migrants including PTIs have 
adapted to Sabahan culture and produce a crucial sign of localness by using the local 
language, Sabah Malay. Sabah Malay spoken with a heavy Indonesian or Filipino accent 
quickly identifies ‘migrant’ and signals the likelihood of being PTI. As local Bugis tend 
to distinguish between themselves and migrant Bugis, the latter seek to tapok 
kebugisannya (hide their Bugisness) and that ‘this was especially true for those whose 
“[Malay] language is really Bugis” (kebugisan betul bahasanya) and decidedly foreign’ 
(Carruthers, 2017a: 137-8; Carruthers, 2017b: 251). 
The boundary between local and migrant is also blurring because locals tend to look 
approvingly at those migrants who learn to discern hierarchy and status within Sabahan 
society, and who aspire to elevate their position. In many cases, Chineseness becomes 
key, as the Chinese symbolise success and wealth, and both locals and migrants are 
deliberately ‘sinicising’ to acquire higher social status in society. Similarly, ‘Westernising’, 
through speaking English can override a migrant’s PTI identity through functioning as a 
status symbol indicating a more globalised identity and prowess. Non-English speaking 
Filipinos, according to some informants, are not as welcome as English-speaking 
Filipinos because they are often associated with poorer, provincial backgrounds.  
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Some other Sabahans view PTIs differently, as these may comprise their spouse and/or 
children or descendants, and see them as being as much a part of Sabahan society as 
locals. A deeper discussion with informants revealed that ascertaining the identity of 
Sabahans, migrant or local, can involve a wide range of references but ultimately it is the 
feeling of belonging to Sabah that is more important. For instance, among those who 
consider themselves to be Sabahan, there is the perception that the only ‘real Sabahans’ 
are those Sabahans who come from pre-Independence communities, that is, groups that 
existed before 1963 and before the arrival of large numbers of PTIs. Thus, immigrants 
who have relatively longer histories in Sabah and have acquired knowledge of the local 
frames of reference, especially those who have married into the pre-Independence 
Sabahan set have a greater claim to Sabahan identity. 
Many migrants actively seek to manufacture an identity, which is considered legitimate 
in the eyes of locals in order to establish themselves in Sabahan society. Migrants aspire 
to possess legitimate paperwork, rather than fake or illegal documents, not only out of 
fear of capture and deportation by the authorities, who regularly conduct raids on 
business offices and set up road blocks, but also to demonstrate their determination not 
to be identified with PTIs as a group. PTIs compete with each other to appear ‘more 
Sabahan’. Harnita, an informant of Indonesian background in her late 20s, was born in 
Sabah.  Some of her siblings reside in Sabah along with their mother but she has a 
brother in Indonesia. Her father is deceased and was an itinerant worker in logging 
camps. Harnita speaks fluent Sabah Malay as well as English and Mandarin, and has a 
job with a marketing firm. At the nail salon (beauty salon) where we met, several 
beauticians, local Chinese and Filipino, started chatting with us while they ushered us 
into a private room. After a while, guessing that Harnita was a migrant, one of them 
casually asked her: 
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‘What colour is your IC?’ Harnita replied, ‘Oh no [you’re 
mistaken], I was born here. So, of course, it’s the blue one’. The 
beautician, a Filipino lady, responded: ‘Oh, wow!’ in admiration 
and continued, ‘I only have the red one’.  
Later when Harnita spoke in Mandarin to the Chinese beautician attending her, this 
elicited praise again from the Filipino beautician. An IC (Malaysian Identity Card) may 
be blue or red and obtained from the Registrar or purchased on the black market. Red-
coloured ICs indicate permanent residency status in Malaysia as opposed to the 
citizenship conferred by the blue IC. The colour of one’s IC is crucial for accessing 
government services and facilities, such as schools, hospitals, banks and other places of 
business. PTIs also often question one another concerning who among them were born 
in Sabah and who have localised names. These details, shown on ICs, enable PTIs to 
build up a storyline of another PTI’s Sabahan identity.  
Yet, some Sabahans say that they simply cannot accept that many among them in Sabah 
have illegal statuses and believe that these people cannot be allowed to be Sabahan. 
These required evidence of even longer connection to Sabah. One of the concrete ways 
in which locals find out whether others around them are ‘real’ Sabahans or not is by 
judging their claims made to the local area. That is, many Sabahans engage in 
preliminary conversations about where they come from as a way of claiming ‘Sabahan’ 
identity. For instance, locals say they look to see whether the ethnic group of a person 
matches the name of the kampung or village and whether it can be verified: did such and 
such a group reside or originate in the area before Independence; before the colonial 
period? Other informants say that it is more effective to ascertain the claimed identity of 
a person through family ties and to verify this claim with those who know the clan or 
kin mentioned. Such questions that probe personal and family histories are becoming de 
rigeur among Sabahans. 
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Meanwhile, authorities appear keen to emphasise the unique cultural milieu of Sabah 
and to draw on its strengths of cultural harmony and group unity. The Sabah 
government, for instance, continues to support the ‘Filipino market’ or Pasar Pilipin, an 
iconic landmark in the city of Kota Kinabalu built by the UNHCR in the 1980s to 
encourage self-sufficiency and enterprise among Filipino refugees, which has now 
evolved into an arts and crafts shopping centre. Religious bodies such as the Catholic 
Church, also seek to accommodate the needs of Christian migrants, who represent a 
minority in the overall migrant population. The Catholic Church in Sabah, for instance, 
caters to the Timorese (Flores) and provides masses in Tagalog for Filipino church-
goers. A mass in Korean is also conducted in Church of Mary Immaculate in Kota 
Kinabalu. 
Government authorities also seek to be more inclusive in promoting cultures. For 
instance, poco-poco, a line dance with origins in Sulawesi, Indonesia, is very popular during 
weddings and parties. The Sabah Tourism Board recently organised both poco-poco and 
sumazau (Kadazandusun dance) as part of the entertainment during the 23rd Conference 
of Speakers and Presiding officers of the Commonwealth in Sabah in January 2016.44 
Poco-poco, however, has drawn criticism by some Muslim religious authorities in 
Malaysia, who find it lewd and having roots in spirit worship; while others saw it as a 
form of senam robik or aerobic exercise.45 Kadazandusun leaders on the other hand saw 
the dance as threatening to eclipse traditional dances, especially when poco-poco dancing 
occurs during Kaamatan, the major celebration of the Kadazandusuns, as ‘it is alien to 
the festivity and causing it to lose its intrinsic value’.46 
                                                
44 See “CSPOC delegates dance Sabah’s sumazau dance”, 2016.  
45 See “Poco-poco diharamkan di Perak, Malaysia”, 2011.  
46 See “Poco-poco did not fit into event: Jornah”, 2007.  
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A mock-up of the proposed Sabah IC with words ‘Sabahan Tulen’ (Original Sabahan)47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
47 Taken from the Facebook page of SORAK. 
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Chapter 3: Kadazan, Islam and the Malay label 
Mentioning PTI today to local Sabahans often elicits negative reactions: PTIs are ‘rude’; 
‘dirty’; ‘criminal’; ‘illegal’; ‘hostile’; and have ‘foreign cultures’. Many speak of the 
problems that PTIs bring such as street children, who are made up primarily of 
homeless migrant children. In town areas, many of these children are found trying to 
survive on their own: some peddle smuggled cigarettes, selling them at intersections to 
drivers in their vehicles who stop at the traffic lights; some beg; and some of these 
children also become vulnerable to vice and crime. The negative view towards Sabah’s 
street children masks the problem of their being stateless, an issue that Allerton (2017) 
argues is not being treated as a genuine problem by the Sabahan government due to 
political and moral conflicts involving illicit documentation of PTIs and a strong 
resentment from locals towards PTIs.  
The foreignness of PTIs has been found unsettling: migrant cultures are perceived to be 
‘alien’ to Sabahans and incompatible with the local Sabahan culture (Chong, 2009). 
Other unacceptable behaviours popularly linked to the PTI population include: littering, 
lack of hygiene, and abandoning newborns where Sabah is second highest state in 
Malaysia after Selangor.48 Others speak of the violence perpetrated by and among PTIs, 
which also causes many locals to compare Sabahan society in the present with Sabahan 
society in the past when migrant influence was not seen as overt and one felt relatively 
safe. Alisha, a Filipino-Chinese small business owner, is in her 30s. Alisha’s grandparents 
were originally from the Philippines and came to Sabah before Independence to work in 
Sandakan. Alisha’s mother married a Sandakan-born Chinese man. Alisha said: 
                                                
48 See “Minister says 697 abandoned babies from 2010 to 2016”, 2017.  
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Back in those days, my parents said that no one knew to build 
fences between their houses. Then we moved to KK [Kota 
Kinabalu, capital city of Sabah] and I saw that houses were all 
fenced in. Broken glass cemented in the fence prevented 
anyone from climbing it. Then, my parents said we too had to 
get grilles for all our doors and windows or else the PTIs would 
come to steal things from us.  
To many Christian Kadazans, migrants and PTIs represent more than just being 
dangerous and foreign outsiders. As many are Muslims, they mirror the overall 
Malayanisation in Sabah, where Islamisation is both feared and resented, given the 
drastic change of lifestyle it can incur and the lack of Muslim privilege in the workplace. 
For the predominantly Catholic Kadazans,49 becoming Muslim is antithetical to their 
identity and adherence to the Malay label, now used widely by an indeterminate number 
of local and migrant Muslim groups, is to allow the Kadazan identity and label to 
become subsumed.  
The Kadazans of Penampang are among the most culturally mixed of the non-Muslim 
Bumiputera groups. Heavily intermarried with the Chinese and Dusuns, the Kadazans 
have also intermarried with Muslims albeit in smaller numbers. The number of Muslim 
Kadazans in Penampang today is unclear. Based on anecdotal observation and 
knowledge, I estimate that at least one or two members in each Kadazan clan are 
Muslim. Note that contemporary intermarriage among Muslim Kadazans occurs with 
Muslims from the Malaysian Peninsula (Peninsula Malays), Muslim Indonesians and 
Filipinos including PTIs, and other Muslim groups from other parts of Sabah.  
                                                
49 While at first, Kadazans rejected Christianity for fear that ‘white men’—foreign priests from 
Austria, England and other places—were taking their children away from them, they sought to 
embrace it seeing that their children were being educated at the same time in Catholic mission 
schools. Christianity is thus positively associated with Westernising influences, modernity, 
speaking of English language, among others. See Rooney (1981), Sacred Heart Cathedral 
(Sabah) (2003) and St. Aloysius Church Limbanak (Sabah) (2010). 
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In the pre-colonial and colonial period, Kadazan and Muslim contact typically occurred 
through trade. Bajau traders exchanged items such as salted fish and salt for rice grains 
with Kadazans residing up the Moyog River. The Bajaus came in sampans (small boats 
with oars at the stern) to attend the then famous Moyog tamu (outdoor market; barter 
trading site). Cornelius, a non-Muslim Kadazan man, aged in his 70s, said that at night 
after trading had taken place in the day, some of the Bajaus would put on cultural shows 
for the Kadazans in the area. Many of the Kadazan men, said Cornelius, would fall 
head-over-heels in love with a Muslim Bajau woman called ‘Maya’ who was a dancer 
with the travelling Bajaus. These wanted to do the joget, a popular Malay dance, with her.  
Intermarriages also occurred between Kadazans living near the coastal areas of Putatan 
and Petagas in Penampang and Bajaus on the coast; and also with Brunei Malays. 
Kadazan-Bajau intermarriages are often spoken of in sentimental terms. For instance, an 
informant, Jamilah, a Kadazan-Bajau in her 40s from the town of Putatan, told me that 
the reason why her mother, a Kadazan, came to marry her father, a Bajau, was due to 
their parents’ desire to keep their adjacent lands within their two families. ‘My mother 
was like a princess in her village [she was a daughter of a wealthy Kadazan landowner] 
and my father loved her greatly’ said Jamilah. In another case, Bartholomew, a Sino-
Kadazan man, aged in his late 50s, spoke fondly of Bajau relatives ‘living on the other 
side of the hill’ in the Putatan-Penampang boundary area and reminisced about his 
childhood: 
Yes, we have Muslim relatives who are Kadazan mixed-in with 
Bajau. When I was a small boy, I remember a Muslim aunt 
coming from the other side of the hill. She would walk for a day 
and come and spend at least two weeks with my family. My 
parents would exchange husked rice — two bagfuls — for salt 
and fish that she would bring with her, since she lived on the 
coast. While she lived with us, she would mill rice into flour and 
make those lovely Malay cakes you see in the tamu. It was 
fascinating to watch!  
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Can you imagine all that rice for just some cakes? My siblings 
and I would fight over the cakes. Then I remember that one 
time my aunt came again and this time she brought her teenage 
daughter along. “To introduce [her], or else relations are 
forgotten [Mau kasi kanal-kanal, nanti lupa saudara]”, she said.  
After Independence, however, Kadazans came to view Muslim contact more negatively. 
Bartholomew said that one day, his aunt simply stopped visiting and he found tales of 
conversion to Islam among Kadazans were being discussed with much apprehension for 
it incurred a total change in lifestyle. Starting from the decision to convert, Kadazans are 
expected to cease eating pork and drinking alcohol; some Kadazan parents feared that 
their daughters would endure a strict and regulated life as Muslims as well as being a co-
wife due to the institution of polygamy in Islam. Some informants referred to Kadazan 
women they knew who had become a bini kedua (second wife) or bini ketiga (third wife) 
to their Muslim husbands. Meanwhile, male Muslim converts must undergo 
circumcision. Michael, a Kadazan man in his 60s, said in mock jest, ‘I don’t want to be a 
Muslim. I will get the snip [circumcision] [Nanti kana putung!]. I also like my vugok (pork 
or pig), you see’. 
Informants also spoke of the switch to Islam as being irreversible and punishable, as 
Malaysia’s shariah law does not permit the renouncing of Islam. In some cases, the 
converted partner of a born Muslim may be allowed to return to their original religion 
under specific circumstances, such as divorce, as seen in cases among indigenes from 
the states of Sabah and Sarawak (Sintang et al, 2011). Some informants said that what 
increases their wariness of becoming Muslim is the treatment of Muslim Kadazan 
apostates upon death; it was claimed that Muslim authorities would force the family to 
surrender the body of a deceased Muslim relative for burial in a Muslim plots, even 
when the deceased had not given consent. 
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Despite the drastic change in lifestyle, some Kadazans do convert to Islam. It is claimed 
that converts typically become Muslim prior to marrying a born Muslim. Some Muslim 
Kadazan informants who say that they chose to convert based on personal conviction 
refute this view stemming from non-Muslim Kadazans. Shareen, a Kadazan-Dusun 
informant in her 40s, had converted to Islam from Christianity before she met and 
married her Muslim partner. She told me that she was aware of the perception among 
many non-Muslim Kadazans that Kadazan Muslim converts only do so superficially. 
Shareen said that it was her own decision to convert to Islam and that it had helped her 
to change her lifestyle, which she felt was out of control when she was a Christian. She 
said, ‘Muslim culture is better’ because after her conversion to Islam she found that she 
was no longer wild in her ways, that is, drinking and smoking. Shareen also said that 
being Muslim enforced propriety through strict and explicit rules: ‘For instance, 
Christianity does not tell you not to smoke. But in Islam, it is taught that it isn’t good’.  
For many non-Muslim Kadazans, one of the main reasons why Islamisation is seen 
through negative lens is due to past Islamisation campaigns by the state, which affected 
their political position. This was seen when Donald Stephens, Kadazan leader in the 
1950s to the 1970s, became a Muslim. The announcement from Stephens, as recalled by 
older informants, was received with shock and disappointment in the Christian Kadazan 
community. Many Christian Kadazans thus believe that by becoming Muslim, they go to 
‘the other side’ (join the Malay grouping) and their overall Kadazan number will 
dwindle, and Kadazans will become a minority ‘in their own land’. However, by not 
converting and remaining non-Muslim Bumiputera, many Christian Kadazans fear that 
they will continue to sit at the bottom rung of Bumiputera society. Yet, many seem to 
endure disadvantage and lack of opportunity as a protest against the perceived coercive 
nature of Islamic conversion.  
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I found that in general many non-Muslim Kadazans when feeling frustrated about their 
given situation would attempt to mask their feelings, as these work with Muslims and 
sought to negotiate their identity carefully around them. Facial expression and body 
language, discreet and miniscule, are carefully constructed and used deliberately to vent 
non-Muslim Kadazans’ frustration. Ellen, a Kadazan public servant in her thirties, said: 
I’m coordinating this program now. Most of “our people” 
[referring to non-Muslim Bumiputera] are coordinating this 
program. Also, the Chinese [are coordinators, too]. But they 
[Muslim Bumiputeras], they are managing the overall program, 
and all of them hold the top positions in this school. 
I asked Ellen, ‘Why do you think you did not get the job [in the coveted administration 
part of the department]?’ Ellen had applied for such a role previously and said, ‘Well, I 
don’t have “Vitamin M” now, do I?’ ‘Vitamin M?’, I asked inquiringly. ‘Don’t you 
know?’ replied Ellen, taking her fingers and rubbing them on her forearm. It took me a 
while to understand that she was referring to the skin colour of the Malay ethnic group. 
In the quiet of her office, Ellen had felt free to make such a gesture but when a Muslim 
colleague entered her room to consult about their work schedule, Ellen’s face assumed a 
neutral expression. 
In another interview, I spoke with Martin, a non-Muslim Kadazan in his forties, about 
perceived job and opportunity loss between Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputeras in 
the workplace. After explaining his own situation in the workplace, he then ended his 
narrative with ‘Koiho ko, no’ (You should know, right). He said this while quickly averting 
his eyes towards a table beside ours at the café where we met. Following his gaze, I saw 
that the patrons on the other table were Muslims, discernible by the mother’s headscarf 
(hijab or tudung), a sign of propriety for Muslim women.  
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However, other informants were less guarded and spoke strongly of Muslim privilege in 
the workplace whereby only Muslims receive automatic recognition and access to 
position and power. This was the case of Alex, a Christian Kadazan man in his early 50s, 
who said: 
I have been in the same post for over five years [deputy general 
manager]. Yet when the general manager retired, my junior 
[research assistant] who came in only two years ago got his 
spot. How can this be? It’s just not fair, and not right. He has 
no experience in this role but he is given the top post because 
he is a Muslim Bumiputera. I just know it. 
Alex gave me his business card as he narrated his story. His card contained the 
information that he was a manager in a government branch. When I commented that he 
must have a good job in government, Alex replied: 
Yes, I am now a manager. But you see, they [his Muslim 
Bumiputera bosses] knew that I was quite upset about the guy’s 
promotion. So, they quickly gave me a job as manager. But as a 
manager of this station [in a far-flung/remote area]. It looks like 
a promotion, doesn’t it? But they’re just getting rid of me; 
taking me away from HQ so that it won’t look so obvious to 
people [that he should have gotten the prime job]. Everyone 
knows that I have been doing the work of the general manager 
all this time. The job should have gone to me.  
‘But you know-lah’, Alex added with emphasis while shrugging his shoulders in 
resignation. Muslim applicants typically are favoured to fill the so-called 
Bumiputera quota. Another informant said that Muslim managers or supervisors 
tend to shortlist more Muslim than non-Muslim Bumiputeras, even though the 
latter may be more qualified for promotion. Typically, the informant said, non-
Muslim Bumiputera applicants are fewer because there is an increasing number of 
Muslim job applicants from the ‘new Bumiputera’ group, that is, the migrants and 
PTIs who have acquired Bumiputera status.
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Many Christian Kadazans say their disadvantaged position is serious and that they are 
now resorting to other strategies to gain success. For instance, to avoid the pressure to 
Islamise, non-Muslim Bumiputeras resort to patronising those leaders who they feel are 
most influential in Bumiputera society. Among Bumiputeras, a patronage system exists: 
non-Muslim leaders obtain resources for their followers, since these leaders are 
connected to influential Muslim leaders. These resources take the form of contracts and 
projects in development, housing and roadworks; job appointments; paid positions as 
suppliers and providers of services, among others. Once obtained, these resources are 
then distributed among non-Muslim followers.  
In another scenario, to gain access to resources to which Muslim Bumiputeras are 
entitled, non-Muslim Bumiputeras attempt to partner with Muslim counterparts. 
However, informants say that they realise that the profit margin may be minimal for 
non-Muslim Bumiputera entrepreneurs because their Muslim Bumiputera partners may 
take a bigger share of the project’s profits. This situation typically occurs because the 
latter exacts a kind of ‘fee’ for enabling their counterpart access to certain resources.  
In another example, individuals court powerful men and women in the Bumiputera 
community to help them gain access to certain opportunities. For instance, informants 
spoke about their attempts to get scholarships for their children or relatives. Some 
applicants mentioned approaching well-connected relatives in positions of power to 
‘pull strings’, a popular euphemism among Sabahans to refer to the act of obtaining 
resources without going through the proper channels. Kadazan informants say that this 
may render them beholden to their relative, for example, one must demonstrate loyalty 
by voting for them in the next election or support their political ambitions; as a way to 
return the favour. 
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In some cases, bribes are involved. While some non-Muslim Kadazans said that some 
bribery was acceptable to ‘get the job done’, others felt that participating in bribery 
made them complicit. For instance, some Chinese building contractors may seek 
sleeping business partnerships with Muslim Bumiputeras, which can involve under-table 
money. However, non-Muslim Bumiputeras can become involved in the process by 
acting as a buffer between the Chinese and Muslim Bumiputeras. Tony, a 50-something 
Chinese businessman said:  
Thank God, He [Jesus] has been good to me. I got the contract 
by going through the right channels. I didn’t pull strings or 
anything. But later on, just to make things easy for my staff and 
me, I did give something-lah to the Muslim fella in charge of 
the project on the other side. I asked my non-Muslim 
Bumiputera staff to do it, since he can at least talk to this 
person for me.  
In several cases, non-Muslim Bumiputeras attempted to improve their access to 
Bumiputera resources by faking their identity—acting as if they were Muslim—with 
some success. In one case, Edward, a young non-Muslim Kadazandusun man in his 
early 20s, had failed an earlier application for university entrance. He had learned from 
other friends that applications like his are likely to be passed over in favour of those 
from Muslim candidates, who form the majority of applicants. Edward explained:           
‘A friend said to me, “Why don’t you tick ‘Islam’ as your religion in the application 
form?” So, I reapplied and did this. I could not believe it but I got in!’.  
In another example, Azhar, a Dusun man in his 40s, said that because his name is a 
Malay name, many of his colleagues had assumed when he first stepped into the office, 
that he was a Muslim. Azhar said that he never bothered to correct their assumption, 
especially since he was often included in conversations with Muslim colleagues who held 
high-level positions, and so became privy to their plans for the department.                
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Azhar said that he would join Muslim colleagues in fasting (during the holy Muslim 
month of Ramadhan) and use the Malay male costume during Muslim festivities around 
his workplace. Azhar admitted that he benefited from his ‘Muslim’ identity and that he 
had often been identified for a post that might otherwise have gone to a Muslim in his 
department. Yet, Azhar also told me that he wished to migrate out of Sabah one day so 
that he could stop the pretense. ‘I don’t want my children to eventually have to be 
Muslim’, Azhar confessed. Azhar then explained that he did not think that Christian 
colleagues in his department knew that he was Christian like them. Azhar said, ‘I am 
friendly to my Christian workmates but I don’t tell them anything about my life. As far 
as I know, they think I am a Muslim too’. Azhar continues to attend church services 
when he visits his wife’s family in another part of Malaysia, and observes Christmas.  
While there are some non-Muslim Kadazans who may consider Islamic conversion for 
the purpose of socio-economic advancement, others mainly observe their Muslim 
counterparts to see how conversion is changing their life outcomes. Muslim converts 
are seen as increasing their opportunities, for instance, in their chances of promotion in 
their existing workplace. This belief is so commonplace among non-Muslim 
Bumiputeras that some believe that potential converts can already begin to reap the 
benefits of conversion even while they are in the process of conversion. Diana, a non-
Muslim Kadazan housewife in her 40s said:  
I don’t believe that nothing happens afterwards. Don’t you 
think that was not their [Muslims’] consideration in the first 
place? That when Kadazans become Muslims it will float 
through their minds that they will get better attention from 
their bosses and Muslim friends? I am sure that converts think 
this. You see, even when you are preparing to become a Muslim 
and undergo all the religious classes and so on, even then you 
are already looked upon differently. You have a new status. 
You’re suddenly better than the rest [non-Muslim Kadazans].  
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Jenny, a non-Muslim Kadazan woman in her 30s, noticed that her Kadazan workmate, a 
recent Muslim convert, began to receive a lot of attention from their new boss despite 
being a non-permanent staffer:  
My colleague, Fadzil [previously Stanley], married this Muslim 
girl from Beaufort [a Brunei Malay enclave]. He’s only an 
auxiliary staff [staff tambahan] but wow, our big big boss from 
KL, who was visiting Sabah at the time, even came to his 
wedding in the kampung. You know how remote his village was? 
It was not easily accessible. So, all that effort—it was like he 
was being given due respect and recognition [macam kena beri 
penghormatan lah, kira] [for having converted to the main religion 
of the country]. 
Some Muslim Kadazan informants, however, do not agree that Islamic conversion is a 
pathway to economic success and increased social status. Hamdan, a Bajau-Kadazan 
man, aged in his 30s and a born Muslim, said that it all depends on one’s self-initiative 
and that new converts with high expectations of elevated status may find that this 
cannot be gained easily, quickly or free-of-charge. Hamdan said that new converts 
should not expect sudden good fortune upon Muslim conversion. Hamdan told me: 
It doesn’t mean that now just because I am Muslim, everything 
is better for me. You see, you have to see yourself as a goal-
getter, and go for that job promotion, or whatever. I, 
personally, never use my status or myself as ‘Muslim’ in order 
to get what I want. My being Muslim is not the main reason 
why I excel in my job. 
Two women who were ex-schoolmates, Nor Alinah and Siti Khadijah, both aged in 
their early 40s, confirmed Hamdan’s opinion. Nor Alina is a Muslim by birth. She has a 
Kadazan mother and a Bajau father. Siti Khadijah, on the other hand, is a Muslim 
convert and married a Peninsula Malay man whom she met while studying in Kuala 
Lumpur in the 1990s. Nor Alina started by saying: 
72 
 
Okay, yes, it may appear as if things start looking up for us 
Kadazan Muslims. But it’s complicated. In any case, it all 
depends on the boss in your department. For instance, where I 
work, my boss is a Peninsula Malay lady. She takes care of her 
own first [Peninsula Malays]. Then, another supervisor of mine 
[Sabah Chinese] will notice this and complain that this is biased. 
You see, we [Sabahan Muslims] don’t get looked at 
immediately. It’s like this: if there are no Peninsula Malay takers 
then it goes to Sabahan Muslims. Then, if there are none from 
that group it will go to Sabahan non-Muslims.  
Siti Khadijah agreed, and said:  
That is true. Now, I work for the private sector. Just because I 
am Bumiputera, I am the one my boss will ask to represent the 
company whenever we need to deal with government officers. 
But you see, I use my original name [not a Muslim name] at my 
work and I have a Chinese last name [siang]. To my boss, it’s 
okay. To him it’s like I have everything. He is Chinese, and he’s 
mentioned more than once to me, “You go. You’re 
Bumiputera. You can talk to them”. So, I don’t think it’s even 
about being Muslim. My boss just feels I can connect with them 
better than the others could.  
Both Nor Alina and Siti Khadijah then said that, from their point of view, whether 
Kadazan Muslims work in the government or private sectors, treatment by one’s boss 
depends in part on the boss’s ethnicity. A Malay boss is inclined to favour Malay 
employees, just as Chinese bosses will be more supportive of their Chinese employees. 
Further, both agreed that the responsiveness of the employee is also a factor. Both said 
that they are often expected to play by the boss’s rules whether they are Muslim 
converts or not.  
Meanwhile, in private spaces, although some tension can also occur, non-Muslim 
Kadazans seek to place their frustrations aside in order to maintain good social relations 
with their Muslim Kadazan family members and friends. The area of food and drink was 
one that informants spoke much on given that social relations are maintained via 
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hospitality, food and drink prohibitions could comprise an obstacle. In general, non-
Muslim and Muslim Kadazan say that prohibitions do not compromise social relations. 
Non-Muslim Kadazans, for instance, provide halal (food prepared according to Muslim 
code) options for their Muslim family members while Muslim members assist to prepare 
the halal part of the menu during meals at home or at wedding celebrations and funeral 
gatherings. Kadazan Muslims and non-Muslims also visit each other’s homes during 
religious holidays such as Hari Raya (main Muslim holiday) and Christmas day. 
Tolerance among Muslim Kadazans can also be high with some Muslim Kadazans 
choosing not to strictly observe halal food and drink. Some non-Muslim Kadazan men 
said to me that if one knew which Muslim Kadazans were more liberal, they could 
socialise with them by drinking alcohol together. These liberal Muslims are described as, 
‘Muslim yang okay punya’ (Muslims who are not particular about what they eat or drink). 
In Sabah, it is commonplace for both Muslim and non-Muslim to eat together in 
restaurants. One of the iconic features of Sabahan eateries and restaurants is the generic 
menu offered, enabling Muslims and non-Muslims, including Chinese, to select without 
reservation. Some Muslims, however, may find that the ‘no pork’ menu served by some 
restaurants, such as ‘fish-soup only’ restaurants, is not necessarily a halal menu. These 
may seek to inspect a restaurant to check whether official halal certification is displayed, 
indicating the owner has fulfilled the criteria laid down by the Muslim authorities. 
In the example of Junaidi, and his wife Mimi, a Kadazan Muslim convert and a Muslim-
born Kadazan respectively, both in their 30s, are relaxed about Muslim codes. The 
couple live in close proximity to non-Muslims in Junaidi’s natal village in Penampang. 
Mimi, who comes from a Muslim village in another district, did not consider herself 
pious and wore seluar puntung (cropped pants that ended at the calves) when I met her, a 
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fashion that some Muslim informants considered to be unIslamic although others found 
it daring and modern. While Junaidi no longer ate pork, he occasionally drank beer or 
hiing, a Kadazan alcohol made from fermented rice. Mimi vouched for Junaidi that he 
did not do this to get drunk but only sipped. At family get-togethers, Mimi said: 
When we have our family gatherings, someone always yells, 
“Watch out for the pork!” so that the Muslim families do not 
accidentally eat the dish that has pork in it. You see, Junaidi’s 
sister is also Muslim and all our kids are always over at their 
grandmother’s house whether to eat their meals there or to 
keep their grandma company. But sometimes, we forget to say 
this, because we all assume everyone knows which is which 
[which dish has pork meat]. So, hopefully none of the kids [her 
kids and Muslim nephews and nieces] accidentally ate [termakan] 
pork.  
In some Kadazan families, however, to avoid issues arising from food prohibitions, 
members must cooperate with one another and parents typically take the lead. Mary, a 
Christian Kadazan aged 40, spoke of her older sister, Normala, a 50-year-old Kadazan 
who had converted to Islam in her teens. Mary said that her sister, Normala, converted 
to Islam in her university days in the 1980s prior to meeting her Peninsula Malay 
husband. Normala, according to Mary, is fairly pious and wears the tudung (a head-scarf 
that completely covers her hair) while her husband is a fairly moderate Muslim man and 
has no qualms about living in the Christian Kadazan household of Normala’s parents, 
whenever they visit along with their children during their school holidays.  
When Mary and her siblings decided to rebuild their ancestral family home, their father 
requested that the newly built house include several self-contained apartments. Mary 
recounted what her father said:  
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With my children all marrying people from various ethnic 
groups, it is nice to have a halal kitchen for the Muslims. This is 
for their convenience. There, they can cook anything they want, 
and they do not have to ask whether the food being prepared is 
halal or not. It makes me happy when everyone’s preferences 
can be accommodated. 
Yet, in the following excerpt, a non-Kadazan Muslim can influence his Muslim convert 
wife to strictly follow food prohibitions at gatherings of her own (non-Muslim) family, 
causing tensions. Kenny, a non-Muslim Kadazan in his 60s, recounted what happened 
with his Muslim convert sister: 
My sister is a Muslim and she can be quite overbearing. Yes, I 
know that our Kadazan cooking is not halal with pork and what 
not. But really, she should know better. There are more of us 
[non-Muslim Kadazans] than there are of them [Muslim 
Kadazans] in the family. There are eight of us siblings who are 
Christians, and she is the only one who is Muslim. We prepare 
some halal food for her when we have our family parties. But 
she insists that we cook all halal food the next time. How can 
she insist this, when there are only a handful of Muslims at the 
party? Herself, her husband and their two children. 
But over the years, I have come to realise that her husband is 
the one who is influencing her. Sometimes, during gatherings, 
he’ll come to the table, take one look at our food, and walk 
away. He will not even touch the vegetables. That’s so rude! 
Then one time, they left after coming for just one hour, without 
waiting for the meal to start. So, why bother coming at all? 
Discussions with several Muslim Kadazans showed that they were keenly aware of how 
conflict can arise between them and non-Muslim Kadazans due to the opinions of more 
pious Muslims. Zaidah, a Kadazan-Bajau in her 30s from Putatan, and a second 
generation Kadazan on her mother’s side, said: 
People, especially Malays from the Peninsula, should 
understand how we Muslims in Sabah live. It’s like that we are 
so mixed here and that’s why we are more tolerant than them 
because in the Peninsula not many of the Malays marry with 
other ethnic groups, compared to here in Sabah.                      
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They just have to understand us—that we can sit down and eat 
and drink together, no problem! But I know, it’s different for 
non-Sabahan Muslims. They look at us and they feel mixed 
feelings—confused, angry, upset but amazed that we can live 
together peacefully. You see, just because we can do all these, it 
does not mean that we [the Muslims] become apostate [murtad]. 
I am still a Muslim, aren’t I? It doesn’t change me at all. 
In another example, Norashikin, a Kadazan-Dusun Muslim convert in her late 40s, 
whose father is a Kadazan from Penampang and who converted to Islam upon marrying 
her husband, a Bajau-Dusun man from Tuaran, said: 
It’s not ‘us’ [the Muslims in Sabah] that are changing 
perspectives around. It is rather ‘them’ [Muslims from the 
Malaysian Peninsula] who are bringing this kind of narrow 
thinking over here. We, in Sabah, we never had problems about 
who is Christian or who is Muslim, and who can eat this or 
that. You should know who you are! [Kau sendiri tau bah!] If you 
don’t eat pork, then don’t go and eat pork. If Islam says don’t 
drink alcohol then why do you drink alcohol if you are Muslim? 
We are different here in Sabah. We are okay with all kinds of 
cultures around us. We have gotten used to it. It is just other 
people who refuse to understand us. 
The practices surrounding holidays provide another area that offers insights into how 
Muslim and non-Muslim Kadazans negotiate their identities. Aminah, a Muslim 
Kadazan woman in her 30s who converted upon marriage, and her husband Shahid, a 
Malay man from Peninsular Malaysia, both live and work in Kuala Lumpur. At first, 
Shahid was open to their children’s desire to explore their Kadazan identity. Aminah 
said the children looked forward to visiting Sabah in the year-end so that they can take 
part in Christmas events. ‘They really like singing Christmas carols’, said Aminah. 
However, when Shahid found out, he was angry and told the children not to take part in 
carol singing, as the songs mentioned Jesus. Aminah responded by organising their 
holidays separately, but over the years Shahid has relaxed his stance. Aminah said: 
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How we deal with this kind of problem is that I just take the 
kids back to Sabah earlier during the school holidays. So that 
when the Christmas season begins, they can join in the carolling 
program. Shahid then comes to join us around one week later. 
By then, he will have missed out on the whole Christmas 
carolling thing and won’t have to feel uncomfortable or 
offended.  
Meanwhile, there are efforts among Muslim Kadazans to incorporate their traditional 
Kadazan culture into their identity. During fieldwork I noted that many Muslim 
Kadazans and Dusuns who took part in organising the Kaamatan programs in Kota 
Kinabalu, in Penampang and at the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association (KDCA) 
event, wore the traditional costumes of their groups. In fact, some informants told me 
that, unlike in the past, people were now proud to wear traditional costumes. It has 
become commonplace, and cheaper than having one tailor-made, to hire a costume 
from one of several businesses established in response to this demand. Some also said 
that it was exciting to try on various traditional costumes in a costume hire shop because 
one was not restricted to wearing the particular costume of one’s own group and did 
not risk complaints from the group concerned. At wedding celebrations, Kadazan men 
and women, whether Muslim or not, are reported in print and social media (for instance, 
Facebook) as proudly wearing their traditional costumes symbolising their ethnic 
heritage. The Kadazan costume is otherwise not used as daily wear. 
However, in some extreme cases, religious differences can generate significant tension 
and there becomes a need for some physical space between Muslim and non-Muslim 
dwellings. Crispin, a 30-year-old Christian Kadazan man sensed some hostility brewing 
between his brother, Jack, and other Christian siblings. Jack is married to a Peninsula 
Malay woman and works in Kuala Lumpur. Jack ’s Muslim name is Irfan but his siblings 
still call him by his Christian name. He and his wife have a teenage son and they 
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frequently return to Sabah to visit Jack’s mother, who is a widow. Crispin said that some 
of his Christian siblings were unhappy when Jack bought the piece of land next to their 
mother’s home, which is also part of the family estate. Jack built a holiday home for his 
own family on the land he bought. Crispin told me: 
I don’t think Jack ‘moved out’ from the big house, because he 
is Muslim, or anything. I mean, we have the separate kitchen 
there for his family to use. But he could afford to, you see, to 
build a new house and we have quite a lot of land around the 
main house. So, good for him.  
But then, of course, my other sister, Carol, was quite upset. I 
just don’t understand the two [Jack and Carol]. They have never 
gotten along, especially after Jack became a Muslim. You see, 
Carol’s very active in church and feels that Jack is a hypocrite 
since the two used to do everything in church together, for 
example, carolling and choir and so on. 
The other day, after Jack’s house had already been built, Carol 
confided in me. She said that ‘the Muslims’ were taking over the 
village. So, I figured out that that must be why she was upset 
about Jack buying the land from Mum. I mean, he has a good 
job and was able to buy it from Mum, and so he should. It’s 
nothing to do with being Muslim. But that’s just Carol, she’s a 
public servant and sees a lot of this unfair treatment towards 
non-Muslims at work. She’s very sensitive about this Muslim 
versus non-Muslim Bumiputera thing. 
Today, while tolerance is high in Sabah, there is increasing pressure from Islamic 
authorities upon Sabahans overall. Informants cited the much-publicised verdict by the 
Malaysian courts to prohibit Christians from using the term ‘Allah’ as a direct translation 
of ‘God’. The Catholic Church in Malaysia appealed a 2007 directive from the Home 
Ministry of Malaysia, which sought to revoke the publishing permit of the Herald, a 
newspaper for Catholic churchgoers, due to use of the word ‘Allah’ in its Malay-
language edition, which is meant primarily for Malay readership among Catholics in 
Sabah and Sarawak. In 2009, in a lower court, the Catholic Church won their case 
arguing that ‘Allah’ had been used for centuries—in Malay language Bibles and other 
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literature in reference to ‘God’ outside of Islam. However, an appeals court in October 
2013 overturned the lower court’s ruling and reinstated the ban. Muslim authorities 
argued that using ‘Allah’ in non-Muslim literature could confuse Muslims and entice 
them to commit apostasy.50  
In Penampang, some Christian Kadazans have reacted negatively to what they 
considered to be ‘Muslim projects’. In 2013, some Kadazan opposition leaders 
questioned the state government’s proposal to build a mosque, claiming that the 
planned location for the mosque was not sensitive to the surrounding predominantly 
Christian community.51 In a separate case, some Christian Kadazans protested against 
the building of a mosque beside the Penampang Police Department52 However, 
spokespersons for Muslim Kadazans assured that the majority of people in Penampang 
were related to one another and were peaceful, and hence there is no cause to worry.53  
Many Christian Kadazans also recently criticised the use of Islamic nuances in a cultural 
Kadazan event. In May 2017, a group of Muslim Kadazans from the district of Papar 
hosted a Muslim-oriented Kaamatan program. Funded by the Hidayah Center 
Foundation (HCF) in Sabah, the program conducted events similar to Unduk Ngadau—
a beauty pageant in honour of the legendary Huminodun, the daughter of Kinoingan 
(God). A ‘Momogun Muslim’ beauty queen contest coupled with an ethnic Islamic 
fashion show was organised. The ‘Kaamatan Islamik’ program also replaced the 
traditional worship of the rice spirits with a thanksgiving prayer in Dusun and Arabic.54 
                                                
50 See “Malaysia’s highest court backs a ban on ‘Allah’ in Christian bibles”, 2014.  
51 See “No different from Mazu issue, says MP”, 2013. 
52 See “No necessity to have a mosque in the middle of Christian dominated Penampang”, 2015.  
53 See “No reason to oppose P'pang mosque: YIS”, 2015.  
54 See “Sabah festivity name change to reflect inclusiveness”, 2017.  
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Organisers of the event represented it as a creative attempt to synthesise their 
indigenous (Kadazan) and religious (Muslim) identities. However, the program was 
viewed negatively by many non-Muslim Kadazans, reflecting their opposition to 
Malayanisation. Kadazan activists condemned the name ‘Kaamatan Islamik’ as an 
‘oxymoron’ given that the Kaamatan is based on paganistic rituals. They also stressed 
that the Kaamatan served to inculcate indigenous identity whereas the Kaamatan 
Islamik program was an attempt to ‘rape our culture, our customary practice [adat] and 
the essence of being Indigenous People [Orang Asal]’.55 While the organisers agreed to 
drop the term ‘Islamik’ in the future after high-level officials from the state government 
intervened,56 some informants continued to express alarm at the whole event, as they 
considered that Kadazan and Malay cultures were generally not compatible and should 
not be merged in any way.  
Labels: Malay or Kadazan?  
Today, many non-Muslim Kadazans say that the religion of Islam and the label Malay is 
now so intrinsically woven into the matrix of mainstream power that when someone 
among them identifies as Muslim, they are keen to see if this entails allegiance to the 
Malay identity. In the past, if local Muslim Bumiputeras in Sabah identified themselves 
by using the term Malay, this would be considered as breaching a social norm; for 
seeking to identify as Malay is to claim to be Peninsula Malay. In fact, a tripartite 
distinction exists among Sabahans: Peninsula Malays in Sabah are known as ‘Malay’; 
Sabah-born Muslim Bumiputeras are referred to as ‘Muslim (Bumiputera)’; and non-
Muslim Bumiputeras are typically understood as being ‘non-Muslim (Bumiputera)’.        
For example, Brunei Malays may figure as ‘Melayu Brunei’ and become listed under  
                                                
55 See “Hotly debated in social media”, 2017.  
56 See “‘‘Islamic’ to be dropped from Kaamatan event”, 2017.  
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‘Malay’ in the census, but locally, Brunei Malays self-identify as ‘Brunei’. The local 
influences here thus keep the Muslim and Malay terms separated, in contrast to the 
situation elsewhere.  
However, owing to external pressures, current views towards the Malay label show that 
the local framing of identity is changing, that is, the Malay term is now perceived by 
some as a blanket term of reference for all Muslims regardless of their ethnic identity. 
For many Kadazans, this is a worrying trend because they feel the pressure of 
Malayanisation and not to mention to feeling of betrayal, when one among them choose 
to convert out of Christianity to Islam.  
In 2013, an incident involving the Sabah state mufti (senior Muslim official (scholar and 
expert)) caused a furore among Kadazan elders, as he had questioned the ethnogenesis 
of the Kadazans. In his speech to a convention for Muslim religious leaders, the mufti 
began by stressing the need for all Muslims in Sabah to formally adopt Malay as a 
singular identification label.57 The mufti then stated that many groups in Sabah did not 
have a proper ethnic identity and cited the Kadazans as an example of an invented race 
who were ambivalent about their own ethnic labels.  
The mufti’s allegation caused elders from The Kadazan Society of Sabah (KSS) to file a 
saman malu (defamation summon) and the Sabah Native court later found the mufti to 
be guilty and fined him the customary sogit (traditional Kadazan fine paid in the form of 
livestock, typically buffalo for major grievances). The mufti afterward stated that, as a 
fellow Sabahan, from the Brunei and Dusun ethnic groups, he had not intended to 
                                                
57 The Mufti, head administrator of the Shariah (a body of Islamic laws) in Sabah, presented the 
speech titled ‘The Malay Agenda in the Leadership Crisis’ in a religious symposium in Kuala 
Lumpur (Putrajaya) for a Bumiputera Muslim audience. See “MeMelayukan' Suku Kaum Sabah 
(‘Malay’anising the Sabahan ethnic groups’), 2013. 
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cause offence to any race or ethnic group in Sabah. High-level Sabah officials then 
commented on the issue, reiterating that the official view of the Sabah government was 
to respect the diversity of Sabah’s Native groups, and described the call to become 
‘Malay’ as the personal view of the mufti.58 
Despite the tolerant view of the Sabah government towards self-identification, the 
pressure to adopt the Malay label continued. In 2014, some Sabahan leaders expressed 
openness to the idea of broadening Malay ethnicity from group to ‘stock’ or rumpun (in 
Malay) to include all related groups in Sabah and throughout Malaysia. However, 
Kadazandusun leaders argued that, in social, cultural and political terms, ‘Malay’ was 
antithetical to the indigenous, non-Muslim Bumiputera identity. Further, Kadazandusun 
leaders argued that Malaysian legislation clearly stated that a Malay person must both 
habitually practise the Malay culture and be a practising Muslim.59 In other words, as 
many of my non-Muslim Kadazan informants explained, they simply cannot apply this 
term to themselves; to call oneself Malay is not congruent with their lived identities as 
Christian Kadazans. 
The tension surrounding the Malay label is pin-pointed as stemming from its popular 
use among existing Sabahan Muslim Bumiputeras, especially among Muslim migrants, as 
becoming ‘Malay’ is a conscious consideration among migrants. These are making 
extensive use of the ‘Malay’ identity—and so obscure their localised or migrant 
identities—in order to successfully navigate the social and political world of Sabah and 
Malaysia overall. An informant called Maria, a Kadazan woman from Penampang in her 
50s, highlights this in her narration of her long-time migrant worker, ‘Z’, originally from 
Nusa Tenggara Timor (Flores). Without the legal paperwork that would permit him to 
                                                
58 See “Kadazan Society summons Mufti”, 2013.  
59 See “Google my statement on ‘Rumpun Melayu’, says Masidi”, 2014.  
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remain in Sabah, Z had switched employers in the past. Maria told me that she felt 
kasian (pity) for him and employed him to tend to her vegetable farm. One day, Z 
confided in Maria that he had recently been offered a Malaysian Identity Card by 
someone involved in politics in exchange for his vote during an upcoming election. The 
catch was that Z had to become a Muslim and adopt a Malay name. Maria told Z that he 
could not pass for a Malay since he was a man of Flores origin, and that he did not fit 
the phenotype commonly associated with Malays. Maria said, ‘Z kept saying to me, 
“Boss, couldn’t I, boss? I’m sure I can be Malay”. He had stars in his eyes. I think he 
was already thinking of the lucrative jobs he might be able to get once he switches to his 
new identity’. 
Some non-Muslim Bumiputeras now find that political parties and interest groups are 
creating imbalance in the Bumiputera Malay-Bumiputera Other relationship by 
promoting the Malay identity. Gary, a Christian Kadazandusun informant in his 50s, 
said, ‘What I detest is the way that people are conveniently welcome to join political 
parties, and then be declared Malay. It is all about winning in the election and getting 
more votes.’ 
However, many Muslim Kadazans informants say that Christian Kadazans should not 
worry about the perceived threat of the Malay label towards Kadazan identity, because 
many, if not all, Muslim Kadazans continue to retain their identity as Kadazan. In this, 
the influence of parents appears key, as some Muslim Kadazans say that they prefer 
simply to call themselves Kadazan over Malay because they have done so since 
childhood. Other Muslim Kadazan informants in their teens and early 20s say that it is 
their parents who want them to identify only as Kadazan. Other young Muslim Kadazan 
informants also say that parents want them to identify as Kadazan on the basis that 
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Kadazans are unique to Borneo while Malay refers to a broader identity used 
throughout the Indonesian-Philippine-Malaysian archipelagos. As one young Muslim 
Kadazan in his late teens said to me: 
My father said you can find Malay anywhere, but Kadazan is 
rare. So, he says, tell people that you are Kadazan. I also feel 
kind of special, when people ask me what that [Kadazan] is, I 
can tell them that I come from Borneo and that it is one of the 
indigenous groups there; that we are very rare now in the world 
because there are fewer of us, and so on. This is important 
when you study overseas, because there, you will meet 
Indonesians and other Malaysians.  
The stance of many Muslim Kadazans to be flexible and maintain their own freedom to 
choose their ethnic labels also helps to allay tension and fear among non-Muslim 
Kadazans. As Arianti, a Kadazan Muslim convert in her 20s said: 
I don’t feel like I have to drag out this deep identity inside me 
to show to anyone just who I am or what I am. For me, my 
religious identity is the most important and that is evident in 
what I do every day, how I act, how I wear my clothes. But as 
for my deep ethnic identity, it is hidden inside me and it should 
remain private and not for others to tell me what or who I am. 
So I can be Kadazan or Malay or whatever. But to me, I am 
Muslim, full stop. 
Some Christian Kadazans feel somewhat reassured that Muslim Kadazans used the 
Malay label less if compared to other Kadazandusuns. By comparison, the Dusuns are 
relatively more Malayanised than the Kadazans. Muslim Dusuns or Dusun Islam are 
prominent owing to the spread of Islam in their areas before WWII (Joko et al, 2016). 
Intermarriages between Dusuns and Muslim labour migrants from Indonesia occurred 
in Ranau (Lobou Estate) and a prominent Indonesian called Mandur Syarif or ‘Bapak 
Tua’ (elder) was influential, especially in healing the illnesses among Dusuns at the time 
that could not be otherwise healed by the bobohizan (Joko et. al, 2016: 113). 
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Although not often the case, Kadazan informants say that they are often taken aback 
when they hear Muslim Dusuns identifying as ‘Malay’ and not as ‘Dusun’. Christopher, a 
non-Muslim Kadazan man in his 60s said: 
I feel quite mad sometimes when I hear Dusuns call themselves 
Malay. One time, I bought vegetables from the vegetable stalls 
in Kundasang [a famous town in the foothills of Mount 
Kinabalu in the Ranau district]. I casually asked the seller, “Are 
you from this area? [Kau orang sini kah?]”.  
You know what she said, “Yes, I’m a Malay [Ya, orang Malayu]”. 
“Huh? Malay? You are a Dusun, aren’t you? Not a Malay [Huh? 
Malayu? Kau Kadazan bah kan? Bukan Malayu]”. The seller then 
looked confused, and said, “Yes, the one that is Muslim [Ya, 
yang Muslim]”. “Then you should not have to call yourself 
‘Malay’. ‘Malay’ is what Peninsula people [orang Semenanjung] call 
themselves”, I said.  
You see, they [Muslim Dusuns] should just call themselves 
Dusun, even if they are Muslim. See, they are confused because 
Malay identity is so strong. Just because you are Muslim, you 
are not a Malay. You can be anything [from any ethnic group]. 
Donald, a non-Muslim Kadazan man in his 30s, similarly found that a preference for 
using the Malay label is occurring among some Kadazandusun Muslim leaders. Donald 
said, ‘I heard one call himself a Malay. Then not long after that, I heard him say that he 
is a Kadazandusun. Now, which is which? I mean, is he confused? Doesn’t he know 
who he is?’. I asked Donald what he believes the leader’s identity is or should be. He 
responded, ‘So, okay, if he considers himself Muslim then he calls himself Malay. Is that 
it? But how about “Kadazandusun”’? You can’t use these two at the same time. I mean, 
come on, pick one!’. Donald continued, ‘You see, it’s like he keeps his Kadazandusun 
identity when he is with us [Sabahans]. Then as soon as he is with a different crowd and 
his Malay bosses from KL are there, he won’t think twice to call himself a “Malay”’. 
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Donald’s sentiment echoes the awkward feeling of other non-Muslim Kadazan 
informants upon hearing Muslim Bumiputeras, converts from either Dusun, Murut or 
other groups, use both their group label and Malay label. These informants said that not 
only does the individual concerned appear to lack loyalty towards their own ethnic 
group but their act of label-switching positions their own group as the weaker one in 
relation to the Malay group. Label switching was considered to reduce a person’s 
trustworthiness, as one did not know where their loyalty lay.  
The use of the Malay label can also be subjective among younger Muslims, 
grappling with their ambiguous identities. Corinna, a Christian Dusun teacher in 
her 40s, discussed her Muslim Bumiputera students’ dilemma over whether they 
ought to call themselves Malay or go by the name of their particular ethnic group. 
Corinna said: 
Some of my students came up to me after class to ask an 
unusual question. These were students who had become a tight-
knit group. All come from different parts of Sabah. One of 
them asked, “Teacher, what do I call myself now? I am 
confused, because some people say that we should call 
ourselves Malay because we are Muslim. But my family and I 
are Dusun with some intermarriage with other groups. It’s all 
very confusing”. I said, “You should call yourself whatever you 
want. But being Muslim is quite different from coming from an 
ethnic group. For instance, I am Dusun, too, but I don’t call 
myself a Roman, just because I am Catholic”.  
Yet, despite how some Kadazans believe that the Malay label is only salient among 
Dusun Muslims and non-Kadazan Muslim indigenes at large, I found that the 
subjectivity of identification among Kadazans is prevalent. Muslim Kadazans may use 
‘Muslim’, ‘Muslim Kadazan’ and/or ‘Sabah Muslim’ or vacillate between Kadazan and 
Malay as label and identity. Typically, the Malay label is used to infer association with the 
Malays, elevating one’s Bumiputera status, while Muslim Kadazans use Kadazan to 
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denote their original identity, or because of sentiment. Daniel, a non-Muslim Kadazan in 
his 30s, has an older brother who married a Muslim woman from a coastal Muslim 
community. His brother, Mohammad Ishak (formerly Isaac) has been married for 15 
years. Daniel said, 
In those days when Isaac just got married, wow, wasn’t he strict 
with his religious fervour [bukan main lagi ‘strict’ dia punya religion]. 
But over the years, I have seen him change. He has become less 
and less strict about saying ‘Islam this’ or ‘Malay that’. In fact, 
he’s even more patriotic about this Kadazandusun thing than 
me. He will say things like, “We have to protect our Kadazan 
culture from disappearing. We must always remember that we 
are first and foremost ‘Kadazan’ before anything else”. He has 
really changed over the years. So, it’s quite strange his Muslim 
and Kadazan identity. I don’t really get it, because to me, at the 
end of the day, if you are a Muslim, you will somehow be seen 
to belong to the Malay group than to the Kadazan group. 
The tendency to drop the Malay label and return to using Kadazan as a primary 
identifier also occurs after de-conversion. This typically happens when a Muslim 
Kadazan divorces from his/her Muslim spouse to return to Christianity. Michael, a 
Kadazan in his 40s, working in another part of Malaysia, returned to Sabah at least once 
a year. His schoolmate, Halimah, converted to Islam after marrying a Muslim man from 
the northern coast of Sabah. One day, Michael returned to Sabah to find that his 
schoolmate had reverted to her Christian name, Helen. Apparently, Halimah had broken 
up with her Muslim husband, and had converted back to Christianity. Michael said: 
Helen is even more devout now as a Christian than in the past 
before her Muslim conversion. [She is] forever preaching about 
Jesus and helping in the Church. I didn’t know you could do 
that. I mean, become Christian again after becoming Muslim. 
Someone said you can reverse the process, if you take it up in 
court or Shariah Court. But it is so confusing to me. Maybe 
because I am not there all the time. One day she is Malay, next 
day she is Kadazan again.  
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Yet, there continues to be underlying tension in the whole matter, as many Christian 
Kadazans continue to regard Islamisation and the use of the Malay label with fear, anger 
and defensiveness. At one level they fear lifestyle change as a result of Islamic 
conversion and loss of job opportunity but at a deeper level they fear the loss of 
Kadazan identity as a result of Malay influence. Many informants constantly spoke of 
the fear that Kadazans in Penampang were becoming subsumed under the Malay 
grouping. Some cited the use of Sabah Malay language as mother tongue among 
Kadazan families and worried about the demise of the Kadazan language, a topic for 
our discussion in latter chapters.  
That the Kadazans were no longer predominant in Penampang due to the vast number 
of migrants was another concern clearly expressed by Christian Kadazan informants. 
With PTIs forming the largest population in Sabah, and the third largest community 
after Kadazandusun and Chinese in Penampang, some Kadazans expressed fear that 
Muslim PTIs were now intermarrying with Kadazans. Patricia, a Kadazan of mixed 
Indian and Chinese ancestry aged in her 50s, worried that Kadazans were de-ethnicising 
to become part of the Bumiputera Malay, as the larger pool of potential marriage 
partners happens to be Muslim. Patricia said: 
I tell you, people are not worried that their children are 
marrying Muslims, and “Filipino [read: PTI] at that!” [Pilipin lagi 
tu!] … This lady [a neighbour] just let her daughter marry this 
guy. They even organised a huge wedding. I tell you honestly, 
they will regret it come the day when the whole of Penampang 
is only filled with ‘their kind’ of people [Muslims and PTIs]. 
There will not be any Kadazan left.  
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Muslim Kadazan female participants in the recent ‘Kaamatan Islamik’ in their hybrid 
Muslim ‘traditional’ costumes. Source: The Star (Malaysia). 9 May 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Chapter 4: Kadazan and Chinese 
As I watch a young mother push her toddler around in a pram 
in a busy department store, I noticed a small group of shopping 
attendants gathering around her, completely taken by her 
daughter. “Oh, how fair she is!” remarks one. “Just like a 
Chinese”, said the other. Instantly, the mother retorts, “Oh no, 
no, no, she’s not Chinese! We’re not Chinese!”. “But she looks 
so much like a Chinese” said one of the shopping attendants. 
“No, we are 100 per cent Kadazan. No mix of Chinese 
whatsoever” argued the mother. Unconvinced, two attendants 
standing farther away from the centre, and closest to me, chat 
between themselves, “Don’t you think the child looks just like a 
Chinese?” “Yes, look at ‘how white her skin is’                                
[punya putih kulit dia]”. 
The Kadazans of Penampang are well known in Sabah for intermarrying with the 
Chinese and this is evidenced by the presence of many Sino-Kadazans—descendants of 
intermarriage between the two groups. Today, owing to this history, it is not unusual, 
for instance, for outsiders and locals alike, including Dusuns and Sabahans who do not 
come from Penampang, to mistake the phenotypical features of the Kadazans for 
Chinese. Intermarriage between the Chinese and indigenous people in Sabah before 
amalgamation into Malaysia is well documented.60 In my field site of Penampang, 
Chinese people represent almost 20 per cent of the population and is the fourth largest 
Chinese populace in Sabah at 23,517 people compared to the largest Chinese population 
(82,837 people) residing in the city of Kota Kinabalu (Sabah Statistics, 2010).  
 
                                                
60 Sino-Natives in the southern parts of Sabah were recorded in 1862 by Spenser St. John, 
British Consul to Brunei, who wrote of the intermarriage between Chinese in Labuan (an 
island off Sabah) with mainlanders in Klias. In the area of Klias (in the modern-day district of 
Beaufort), Sino-Natives spoke some Hokkien and showed definite traces of Chinese influence 
(see St. John, 1862; Wong, 2005; Rutter, 1922: 56-58).  
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The Chinese presence in Penampang is evident in the four well-established Chinese 
communities, which have existed prior to Malaysian Independence in 1963. One 
community was established on the coastal front in the Petagas and Putatan areas.61 
Three other Chinese communities emerged inland: in Kasigui62, Moyog (village of 
Inobong and nearby villages) and in the Donggongon area, the site of the main town of 
Penampang today.63  The Chinese in these communities comprise a mixture of 
Hainanese, Hokkien and Hakka people, among other Chinese groups.  
It is unknown today just how many Sino-Kadazans there are in Penampang, as there is 
no statistics for mixed Kadazan identities in census or in other formal records. It can be 
estimated based on informant accounts that half or more than half of all Penampang 
Kadazans have some Chinese heritage owing to the historical intermarriages between 
the two groups. Some Kadazan families claim that their Chinese origin dates back to the 
colonial period, while others state that according to their family histories, their Chinese 
antecedents had arrived in Sabah in the sultanate period (circa 1700s). As a rule of 
thumb, Sino-Kadazan is largely self-determined by Kadazans concerned and the use of 
the label ‘Sino’ is often indicative of this.  
While Sino-Kadazans describe their identity as being mainly ‘Sino’ in reference to their 
mixed heritage, Sino-Kadazan identity is ambiguous. In the 1950s, Glyn-Jones reported 
that it was likely that those who considered themselves to be pure Dusun (the 
                                                
61 To make way for a highway in the 1980s, the Sabah government reclaimed the Petagas area 
while Putatan was developed into a township. 
62 Also known as Kosigui after the Kadazan name for the flame-of-the-forest trees growing wild 
in the area. Note that this area was a designated settlement for the Chinese during the colonial 
period, which resulted in the building of a row of shops. The Sabah government has since 
reclaimed the area and the shops were demolished in the 1980s. In recent years, locals have 
established a small eatery and a local market selling fruit, vegetables and meat by the Kasigui 
roadside. 
63 See Thu (1983). 
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classification that the Kadazans came under at the time) had several Chinese ancestors 
owing to the physical similarities between the Kadazans and the Chinese. Glyn-Jones 
also noted that ‘the Penampang dialect is more akin to the Chinese pronunciation than 
any other speech’ (Glyn-Jones, 1953: 105). Apart from these similarities to the Chinese, 
Sino-Kadazans’ Chinese heritage is also apparent through their siang (Chinese surname).  
Mahibol (1994) states that the choice of Kadazan or Chinese identity depends largely on 
whether Sino-Kadazans reside in the Chinese or Kadazan community. However, the 
culture practised by Sino-Kadazans, whether traditional Kadazan or Chinese culture, did 
not discernibly impact identity choice. According to Mahibol (1994), it was their religion 
that predicated which identity was more likely to be formally adopted. Sino-Kadazans 
who are Catholic tend to identify as Kadazan given that the majority of Kadazans are 
Catholic, while Buddhist or Taoist Sino-Kadazans tend to identify as Chinese.64 
However, as we will see in this chapter, the subjectivity of identification can be 
politically or culturally motivated and further tied to one’s economic desires and the 
desire for official recognition overall. 
 
                                                
64 It is not unusual for some Sino-Kadazan families to combine Kadazan and Chinese practices. 
For instance, in some Sino-Kadazan homes, one finds photos of Chinese ancestors in Sino-
Kadazan homes along with holy pictures of Jesus and Mary on the same wall.  In other Sino-
Kadazan homes, where Buddhism or Taoism is practised, elders may continue to keep the 
tradition of burning joss sticks for prayers for their Chinese ancestors during auspicious 
occasions such as Chinese New Year. In Buddhist Sino-Kadazan homes, the Chinese table for 
ancestral worship can also take a prominent spot in the house.  
However, in some Sino-Kadazan families, where some family members are Buddhist while 
others are Christians or belong to other religions, references to non-Buddhist religions are kept 
out of sight, if the patriarch in the family is a staunch Buddhist. Additionally, some Sino-
Kadazans become Christians only after the demise of a Chinese parent so as not to cause 
conflict in the home. 
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Chinese influences have received mixed reception among the Penampang Kadazans. In 
the colonial period, many Sino-Kadazans preferred to identify as Chinese, as the British 
government had faith in the Chinese due to their involvement in business. It was 
considered advantageous by many Kadazans to identify as ‘Chinese’ in order to be 
associated with their enterprising qualities, and to ensure the success of an application 
for a business license, for instance. At the time, the bulk of logging concessions awarded 
by the government went to British and other European firms, but locals—mainly 
Chinese towkays—also possessed annual licenses and were allowed to operate freely. 
Chinese towkays also performed sub-contracting work for expatriate logging firms (Lee, 
1976: 5). 
Some Kadazan elders however saw the Chinese influence on Kadazaan culture in 
negative terms and attempted to oust the Chinese from Penampang in the 1930s. After 
the economic downturn following WWI, many Chinese migrants relocated to Kadazan 
villages seeking subsistence. Kadazan elders claimed that these newcomers engaged in 
making arrack (or ‘arak’ in Malay, referring to alcoholic drink) and gambled, and they 
petitioned the British government to resettle the Chinese elsewhere. The Chinese in 
response wrote an appeal to the British governor stating that they had intermarried with 
the Kadazans, and that a move would mean breaking up families. The incident saw the 
resettling of some of the Chinese into the Kasigui area mentioned earlier. A private 
initiative by several Kadazan-Chinese families also resulted in the establishment of a 
settlement in the Donggongon area, which then became the Donggongon town.65  
                                                
65 Information about the 1937 petition against the Chinese can be found in a letter to the British 
governor written by Mr. Tsen En Fook, secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. See 
“A Petition by the Chinese in Penampang”, 1937. See also Wong (2005: 51-56).  (I thank Dr. 
Liang Chen, who was a fellow student at ANU, for taking the time to look at parts of the 
petition letter that was written in Chinese, and translate and discuss the content with me).  
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Despite the complaints of some Kadazan elders, some Kadazans, who became self-
conscious of the social differences between their groups, considered the Chinese with a 
mixture of admiration and apprehension. Kadazans generally look towards the Chinese 
in their daily lives because of the latter’s socio-economic mobility and prosperity, and 
hope to achieve the same success as their Chinese counterparts. The early interaction 
with the Chinese has done much to instil self-consciousness among the Kadazans in this 
area. In the colonial period, Kadazans (mainly women) rapidly intermarried with the 
Chinese and these marriages became a pathway for Kadazans to assert themselves as 
higher on the social scale than their indigenous counterparts, the Dusuns.  
However, while Kadazan women who married Chinese men were seen to have the 
opportunity to change their lot in life, the intermarriage also meant taking up a differing 
worldview. As an elderly informant in her 80s said, “When I got married, my parents 
said, ‘Should anything happen to your marriage, you need to follow your husband. They 
[the Chinese] are different from us. We will not know how to deal with them.’ A 
number of my conversations with informants revealed a picture of uncertainty and 
change among Kadazans in the colonial days, and while Chinese influence was 
welcomed, it often served to create a marked distinction between the two groups. Many 
Kadazans in the 1930s were not urbanised: some had the advantage of their wealth and 
land, and/or schooling; others had to emulate the Sino-Kadazans and/or the Chinese to 
get ahead. Stories of the haves and have-nots marked the experiences in the early 
contact days in Penampang.  
Like many Kadazans of her time, Mama Ben, an elderly Kadazan woman in her 80s, 
spoke of the bucolic Kadazan lifestyle as subsistence farmers during the 1920s. In her 
teens, Mama Ben became an amah (house-help) to her sister whose husband was 
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Chinese; Mama Ben herself married a Sino-Kadazan. Mama Ben spoke at length about 
her childhood: as a Kadazan child, the oldest in the family, she was expected to care for 
her younger siblings while her parents worked the paddy field, hunted, tended to their 
vegetable patch, foraged in the jungle or fished in the rivers. Mama Ben said that even as 
a young child she felt conscious about the difference between herself and the Sino-
Kadazan children in the village, as the latter seemed to know a lot about how things 
worked and carried themselves more confidently.  
One day, she went to the home of a Sino-Kadazan playmate and watched an omelette 
being made for the first time. Mama Ben said that up until then, she had only eaten rice 
and pinaasakan (stewed fish) or kinoing (salted fish), staple foods among Kadazans at the 
time—considered ‘traditional’ food by many Kadazans today. Mama Ben said: 
You know, in those days, I did not know how to make an 
omelette, let alone know what that was all about. It was only 
after seeing a Sino-Kadazan friend breaking some eggs to fry 
them in a pan with some oil in it that I knew how it was done. 
He flipped the omelette in one single move with his chopsticks! 
When I asked Mama Ben whether her parents had shown her how to make an omelette 
prior to this, Mama Ben responded by telling me a story about eating chicken for the 
first time. Mama Ben said: 
No, you see, they didn’t know how to do that either! What they 
knew to do, and they felt so foolish and embarrassed 
afterwards, was to exchange their eggs with the Chinese. The 
Chinese would come around door-to-door selling their 
galvanised tin plates [pinggan]. 
We also didn’t know to eat our chickens for their meat. One 
day, my brother came home from grazing the buffaloes. He was 
so tired, and threw his body to the floor. He had this strange 
look over his face, when suddenly, he says to me, ‘Sister, I am 
so hungry! Please do not tell father and mother, but I am going 
to catch one of our chickens and have it for our dinner’. Then, 
off he went to catch one, and I didn’t know how he knew what 
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to do, but he knew exactly how to slaughter the chicken by 
nicking the main artery at the neck of the chicken. He also 
knew to step on the chicken’s legs without getting pecked, and 
how to pluck out the feathers and singe the remaining tiny 
feathers afterward by passing the chicken over the fire. We 
boiled it up and we each had a chicken thigh to ourselves.  
It was the best meal ever, but we just couldn’t finish the entire 
chicken. So, we hid the chicken breast in our salt jar, and we 
threw all the soup away. My brother told me to go down to the 
river and throw all the feathers away toward mid-river so that 
they wouldn't get caught on the rushes [tamahang]. ‘Mother 
might see them’ [Okito mai di ina], he said.  
When our parents came home that night from a long day in the 
paddy fields, my mother began to prepare dinner. She reached 
into the salt jar and shouted, ‘snake!’ [bokusi!]. She had touched 
something fleshy and thought it was a snake, but it was the 
chicken breast! When our parents found out what we had done, 
they became silent. They did not get angry with us. They ate the 
leftover chicken quietly, and then said to us that, tomorrow 
morning, before we did our chores, we were to wake up early 
and catch two chickens. ‘Because we want to eat them again’, 
they said. Then throughout dinner, we all talked about how 
delicious the chicken was, and how foolish we were for selling 
our chickens and eggs to the Chinese, not knowing that chicken 
meat was delicious. 
You see, we just didn’t know any better. We continued to eat 
rice and salted fish, as other Kadazan families around us did. 
Little did we know that we could try to eat something else. 
Mama Ben may have told an apocryphal story, as it seems unlikely that the Kadazans 
had never consumed chicken meat in those days. Other Kadazan informants similarly 
spoke of the gap between the experiences and worldviews of the Chinese and Kadazans. 
Matthew, a Kadazan man in his 50s, commenting on Kadazan life in the past said: 
They just didn’t have any idea in those days. Knowledge is 
copied, you know. It won’t come straight away that this should 
be this or that. They would exchange the foods they had, but 
eat only what they were familiar with [fish and rice] even 
though this may be less nutritious for them day in and day out. 
Another informant, Jonathan, a Dusun man in his 30s from a district outside 
Penampang, recalled a similar story for his area:  
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People back then were comfortable living from day to day. As 
the Malay saying goes, ‘to live from hand to mouth’ [Kais pagi, 
makan pagi; kais petang, makan petang]. That was just the way it 
was. And sadly, some of our people [the indigenes] still see life 
this way and do not aspire for greater things. 
Some Kadazans were also reported as feeling insecure that their lack of money 
demeaned them, as the Chinese were firmly associated with entrepreneuring and the 
cash economy. According to James, a retired Kadazan teacher in his 70s: 
I used to teach in one of the Penampang primary schools in the 
1960s. There was a parent who could not afford to pay her 
child’s school fees. One day, she came to the school in an irate 
manner, and demanded to speak to the teacher who had been 
‘rude’ to her child. After speaking with her, I realised that she 
was referring to a reminder sent to all parents to pay 
outstanding fees from last term. “You think I can’t pay up, 
don’t you? Do you think I have no money to pay?” she argued. 
Well, later on, she did pay but she had to borrow money from 
one of her cousins, a wealthy Kadazan married to a Chinese 
shopkeeper. Oh, I tell you, in those days, it was very sensitive to 
mention anything about money to Kadazans. You see, the 
Kadazans had very little money, because they ate from the land 
and did not sell things like the Chinese. 
The position of the Sino-Kadazans was also tenuous in the past, as they were not seen 
to fit in readily with either Kadazan or Chinese groups. Glyn-Jones, in her research on 
the indigenes in Penampang, said: 
A Sino-Dusun [Sino-Kadazan] who has been brought up in the 
town will be laughed at not because his father was Chinese but 
because he can’t handle a buffalo or make a harrow board. 
Similarly the Chinese are apt to despise the Dusun and Sino-
Dusun who have no idea how to manage a business, who 
haven’t been to school and can’t read Chinese writing.  
(Glyn-Jones, 1953: 105) 
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In the homes of some Sino-Kadazans, a Chinese parent may point out to his/her 
children the differences between their Kadazan and Chinese cultures. Doris and 
Rosalind, two Sino-Kadazan sisters in their 50s and 60s respectively, spoke about their 
Chinese father who did not hide his disdain for the Kadazans. While Doris and Rosalind 
did not reject the idea that they were part-Kadazan, some of their siblings were affected 
by their Chinese father’s sentiment and saw things differently. Doris said: 
My father was too Chinese, you see. He didn’t like that he had 
so many daughters. He even threw my oldest sister [Agatha] 
down a well once! She didn’t die but maybe this was just to 
scare her or something. But he was a hard man. Yet, a long time 
ago people were like this. Even about getting married, he 
wanted his children to marry his own kind [the Chinese group 
that he comes from]. As for learning to speak Kadazan, he 
never did. He would always say to us that Kadazans are fan-po,66 
from the boondocks.  
Rosalind added: 
He would say Dusun mau-yung [Dusuns are worthless/hopeless]. 
To him, Kadazan or Dusun, it meant the same thing, we’re 
backwards. So among us siblings, Ah Chung doesn’t know 
[how to speak] Kadazan. Ah Mei, too, doesn’t. But me and 
Rosalind, yes, a little. Helen, she doesn’t like it. She would call it 
Pongku-ker [Pongku language]. When we speak Kadazan, she 
would tease and say, ‘Pongku, pongku!’ Then, I would say back to 
her, ‘And your blood isn’t Pongku!?’. Pongku is simply something 
to say fan-po, meaning Kadazan po (Kadazan woman/girl). 
Preference for identifying as Kadazan by Sino-Kadazans emerged when Kadazan 
sentiment rose towards the end of the colonial period. After WWII, Kadazan 
nationalism became more pronounced. In 1952, Sino-Kadazans formed the Society of 
                                                
66 The term ‘fan’, has a pejorative nuance and is used in this instance to create a boundary 
between the Chinese and the Other. Roslan, a Malay man in his early 60s and married to a 
Kadazan said, ‘I used to have a Chinese girlfriend before I got married. She would call me in 
jest, “You’re a fan-na”. Her calling me fan-na is like saying I am orang ulu [meaning in Malay: 
‘people from the interior’ or ‘a bumpkin’]’. 
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Kadazan so that Sino-Kadazans, along with other Kadazans and Dusuns in the areas of 
Penampang and from the adjacent district of Papar, could ‘reinvent their community 
and enhance the community’s position in the social, economic and political spheres’ 
(Wong, 2012). In 1961, members of the Society of Kadazan joined UNKO (United 
National Kadazan Organisation), a political group, to support the formation of a new 
Federation of Malaysia that would include Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North 
Borneo (Sabah).  
In the 1950s and 1960s, some Sino-Kadazans began to reidentify as ‘Kadazan’ and in 
some cases, Sino-Kadazans began reindigenising much earlier. The case of the Manjaji 
family as reported by Danny Wong (2012) is a clear example. The Manjaji family are 
Sino-Kadazan descendants of Wong Loong (d. 1895); they dropped their Chinese 
surname ‘Wong’ by the early 1900s. A prominent local figure, Joe Manjaji, the grandson 
of Wong Loong, wrote articles in the Kadazan language for local newspapers and 
became a promoter of Kadazan identity and a leader in UNKO. He went on to become 
a member of the first Malaysian parliament after Independence in 1963. Meanwhile, 
Richard Maning, a former head of the Sabah State Ministry of Finance, and a great great 
grandson of Wong Loong, had briefly used the Wong surname. Richard’s father, Francis 
Malakin, took up the Wong family name at the request of the Chinese school he 
attended, adopting the name Francis Wong Yu Ken. However, Richard told me that, 
following Chinese naming practices, as a descendant of Wong through the female line 
he was not supposed to use the ‘Wong’ surname, and so dropped it.67 
 
                                                
67 Personal communication with Richard Maning. 
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After Independence in 1963, a trend to buang siang (‘throw away the Chinese surname’ in 
the Malay language) occurred among Sino-Kadazans in Penampang. Motivated by 
public antipathy towards the Chinese at the time, many Sino-Kadazans sought to avoid 
prejudice by hiding their Chinese heritage but to also retain their ties as Sabah Natives, 
an important status if one wanted to claim NT inheritance. Buang siang occurs when, for 
instance, a Chinese father and Kadazan mother register their child at birth using the 
mother’s last name and declare their child as ‘Kadazan’. Another buang siang strategy 
involves keeping some parts of the siang by conjoining parts of the Chinese syllabary and 
romanising the result, so that the new surname resembles a Kadazan one. For example, 
a Sino-Kadazan with a Chinese forebear by the name of ‘Lo Pin Jang’ might create the 
surname ‘Pinjang’. The phonetically adjusted combination of parts of the ancestor’s 
name now highly resembles a name that a Kadazan is likely to have.  
There are reasons to believe that contemporary Kadazans are resinicising—becoming 
like the Chinese again. For instance, some Kadazan families conduct clan meetings and 
reunions to recognise their Chinese and Kadazan lineage. In some cases, yearly trips to 
China are organised so that Sino-Kadazans can visit their Chinese ancestors’ places of 
birth to demonstrate their cultural awareness and to connect with any remaining 
Chinese relatives. One of the goals of such visits is to register, in the genealogical 
records of their Chinese place of origin, the names of Sino-Kadazan family members in 
Sabah. Meanwhile, many Sino-Kadazan families continue to celebrate Chinese New 
Year. Sino-Kadazan elders take the opportunity during these occasions to give angpow68 
as a sign of good luck and fortune. 
                                                
68 Traditional Chinese envelopes typically red in colour containing money and usually given to 
the young or unmarried men and women in the family during the Chinese New Year occasion 
as a sign of good luck and prosperity. 
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Wong (2012) states that Sino-Kadazans’ desire to partner with Chinese in business has 
increased their desire to resinicise, as the association elevates Kadazan social status in 
Sabah today, as it has often done in the past. To gain status and facilitate trust with 
Chinese business partners, many Kadazans are eager to learn the Mandarin language and 
other Chinese dialects to demonstrate their readiness to do business and capacity to 
negotiate on their terms. The trend to sinicise is also seen in countries like Indonesia, 
where hybridised Chinese Indonesians are acquainting themselves with primordial 
Chineseness, learning Mandarin for instance in order to open up economic 
opportunities (Hoon, 2017). 
The resinicisation among Kadazans is especially clear in the educational pathways taken: 
many Kadazans send their children to Chinese schools from a very early age so that they 
may acquire the Chinese language and emulate the behaviours and worldviews of the 
Chinese. Sheila, a Kadazan mother in her 40s, who does not claim to have any Chinese 
ancestry, is a single parent with two teenage children and one child in primary school. 
Sheila was determined at the outset that all of her children should have a Chinese 
education. She, too, sought to learn some Chinese. ‘Thomas, take care of your sister 
over there’, she said in passable Mandarin. ‘Oh, you speak Mandarin yourself’, I said. 
Sheila replied, ‘I had to, because I want them to learn the language and be competent in 
it, and if they practise more at home, then they will be able to make it a normal part of 
their life in school, too’.  
Thomas and his older sister, Marilyn, exchanged commentary in Mandarin on the movie 
they were watching (an English program) while minding their sister, Cornelia, who was 
busy colouring in her book. ‘Chinese school is better, you see’, said Sheila, she told me:  
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They [Chinese schools] really promote discipline in the 
children. Homework is considered important. I also want my 
children to understand the Chinese mentality because they are a 
mega-economy. It’s for their future. I want them to put their 
studies first. If I compare my kids to my sister's, her children 
put house chores in front of their studies. For my sister, as long 
as her children go to school that’s enough. She doesn’t mind if 
they don’t excel.  
Perhaps the strongest evidence for the resinicisation of the Kadazans is the return of 
Chinese surnames. Among my informants, some third or fourth generation Sino-
Kadazans sought to emphasise their Chinese identity upon intermarriage with other 
Sino-Kadazans. For instance, upon becoming parents, some of these younger Sino-
Kadazans, especially those who felt close to their Chinese roots, had registered their 
newborns as ‘Chinese’ at the Malaysian Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages. Some 
had further given their children a Chinese surname as well as a two-syllabary Chinese 
personal name (in addition to the child’s Anglo first name given at the time of baptism). 
Some informants, however, were wary of resinicising and saw it largely as a trend. These 
individuals were against the rush to adopt Chinese values. Grace, a Kadazan aged in her 
30s, a teacher in a government-run primary school in Penampang, was not convinced 
that Chinese ways and thinking could guarantee a better future. Grace claimed that not 
all children who attended Chinese education became smart and hardworking, or excelled 
in their studies, as the Kadazans were inclined to believe. Grace said:  
You know, not all of them are well disciplined, even though 
they are from Chinese schools. I can prove it. My students from 
the Chinese school, well, they are ‘a thousand times lazy’ 
[gobulan insoibu] and ‘escape artists’ [kaki escape]. It depends on 
the individual, you see. If you send your children to Chinese 
school, and you yourself don’t know anything about Chinese 
‘that child will be truly worse-off’ [nadaa ihia tanak, bo]. Not all 
of them are good.  
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Some other informants said that while Kadazans continue to emulate the Chinese—
rather than the Malays— in order to prosper, Kadazans cannot become ‘just like the 
Chinese’, as they do not have the heart to be tough and exacting like the Chinese when 
doing business. For instance, a young Kadazan girl in her teens told me that, given the 
extent of Chinese influence on the Kadazans, the only way for Kadazans to be less 
Chinese and more ‘Kadazan’ is to be more compassionate towards people. She also said 
that Kadazans’ natural affection for nature and animals further distinguished 
Kadazanness.  
Some informants also suggested that Kadazan values are changing too much under 
Chinese influence and that there is an increasing tendency for Kadazans to treat 
acquired Chineseness as an integral part of Kadazan identity. For instance, some said 
Kadazans are now inclined to complain about the slow start of events in the kampung. 
As in many indigenous communities throughout Sabah, Kadazan events commonly start 
later than notified to ensure that all elders are present prior to the program 
commencing. However, this relaxed view greatly frustrates Kadazans who are time-
conscious, such as Pauline, a 40-year-old Sino-Kadazan. Pauline said: 
I don’t understand why we Kadazans can be so trivial about 
being punctual. The other day, there was a mass held at my 
sister’s house. But the priest came very late. It was a whole hour 
that we were waiting there and still no priest. My [Chinese] 
husband was there and my kids. He was getting frustrated, too. 
So, you know what? We just left!  
Then the next day or so, my sister calls me and has a row with 
me on the phone. She said I was ‘trying to act like a Chinese’ 
[mingsiisina] being picky about time and so on. She said, why 
couldn’t I wait like everybody else. Why show my irritation like 
that. But I said to her, ‘The mass shouldn’t start so late. That’s 
disrespectful to people too, for starting so late. So, if my trying 
to be punctual with my time is trying to act like a Chinese then 
what is being Kadazan? Being late? Late all the time?’ I got mad 
with her too. Sometimes, I don’t understand why the Kadazans 
treat time so carelessly. 
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The topic of money was also keenly debated, as some informants felt that Kadazans 
were coming to use the so-called ‘Chinese punya thinking’ (literally ‘Chinese thinking’ or 
‘Chinese approach’) for problem-solving. A Kadazan proprietor can be said to be lokek 
(meaning in Chinese ‘parsimonious’, ‘close-fisted’ or roughly meaning ‘stingy’), if she/he 
refuses to give a discount on his goods, claiming instead the exact dollar and cent, as a 
Chinese seller is observed to do.  
Meanwhile, monetisation is part of Kadazan practice: some Kadazan informants have 
said that it has now become commonplace in their family or in their village to contribute 
money, if they do not have time to personally help out in communal activities, such as 
clearing up the village compound and the community hall. The exchange of time and 
energy for money is also seen and widely accepted even in the Kadazan practice of 
mogitaatabang or gotong-royong (communal work) required when performing important 
cultural rituals such as burials. This often happens when Kadazans do not live in the 
village concerned but in towns, in different cities or overseas. It is also common practice 
among Kadazans to follow the Chinese custom of giving money as a wedding gift, 
whether or not the groom or bride is Chinese. Such adoptions of Chinese customs and 
practices are widespread among contemporary Kadazans, and often go uncontested. 
Choosing ‘Kadazan’ over ‘Chinese’ among Sino-Kadazans 
While identity choice—to be Kadazan or Chinese—can be influenced by sentiment, 
lifestyle, and religion, it can also be determined by the Malaysian Registrar of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages or National Registration Department (NRD) as a matter of 
default, that is, following the identity of one’s parent. That is, if one’s father is Chinese 
and mother is Kadazan, it is likely that offspring will be registered as ‘Chinese’ by the 
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NRD. In recent years, the NRD has been more flexible in allowing identification to 
follow the matrilineal line. For instance, a child born in 2011 of a Chinese father and 
Kadazan mother can be identified as being ‘Kadazan’ by his/her parents at the time of 
birth registration. 
During my fieldwork in 2010-2011, informants spoke of a trend among Sino-Kadazans 
to petition the NRD for a formal identity change from ‘Chinese’ to ‘Kadazan’. I 
observed that those who were involved in changing their identity to Kadazan were 
typically those who had been registered as ‘Chinese’ in their birth certificates and 
identity cards, and who carried the surname of their Chinese parent or ancestor. While 
at first, this was reminiscent of an earlier trend whereby Sino-Kadazans would identify 
primarily as ‘Kadazan’ owing to pressure from Kadazan nationalism, the current trend, 
however, appears closer to what happened after Independence in 1963 when some 
Sino-Kadazans, fearing they would lose their right to Sabah Native and Bumiputera 
statuses, sought to change their names and identify formally as ‘Kadazan’.  
As part of the transition to Kadazan, many informants performed buang siang in order to 
get rid of their Chinese identity. According to informants, the process for formal re-
registration as ‘Kadazan’ takes place through a lottery system or cabutan administered by 
the NRD. One must apply to be placed in this system and when a person’s number is 
drawn, they will be contacted and asked to appear in front of the Registrar to pursue 
their case with such evidence as a parent's birth certificate identifying them as ‘Kadazan’. 
One informant said that a formal policy outlining the official process for changing one’s 
identified ethnicity did not in fact exist but when one person successfully requested their 
identity to be changed to Kadazan using the strategy outlined above, others followed 
suit in a kind of snowball effect.  
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Other than being able to retain their Sabah Native status and so become eligible to 
inherit ancestral Native Title or Native land, a topic of much discussion, informants 
who changed their identity to Kadazan were also greatly motivated by various socio-
economic opportunities for Bumiputera that would be difficult to access otherwise. For 
example, if they are recognised by the authorities as being Kadazan, and thus being part 
of a Bumiputera group, then they are entitled to gain access to the much-discussed 
government-run wealth enhancement programs targeting Natives, the ASB, which 
offers an interest rate of 11 per cent (compared to 3 per cent paid by local banks).  
Among other Bumiputera programs that greatly appeal to Sino-Kadazan parents is the 
Bumiputera study loan offered under the prospective student’s name with the parents 
acting as loan guarantor. Loan repayments begin after a student completes their studies 
and formally enters the workforce. Without access to such a loan scheme, parents are 
compelled to take out a higher interest loan from a private bank. While various 
educational funds administered by the Malaysian government are open to all Malaysians 
regardless of ethnic background, scholarships are also offered that prioritise Bumiputera 
applicants, such as those from the Public Service Department or Jabatan Perkhidmatan 
Awam (JPA). Many Sino-Kadazan parents aspire for their child to obtain a Bumiputera 
scholarship for which there is no repayment. Scholarship holders may be further 
advantaged by endorsement from the JPA once they have graduated and are seeking 
employment.  
The decision making around label switching differs among Sino-Kadazan individuals: 
some change their names and formal ethnic identities without much thought, while 
others find the decision to be difficult and emotional. Sceptical about identity change, 
Vicky, a 40-year-old Sino-Kadazan from Penampang married to a Sabahan Chinese, saw 
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the act of abandoning one’s Chinese name as drastic, even farcical. Curious about the 
process, she accompanied her sister, Maria, to the Registrar’s office to apply to change 
her children’s ethnic identification. Maria is also married to a Chinese man from 
semenanjung (meaning ‘peninsula’, a colloquial reference to no particular state on the 
Malaysian Peninsula). While Maria went ahead with making the change on behalf of her 
children, Vicky hesitated. She said:  
Yes, my sister Maria and I always talk about this topic. But 
Maria is more concerned about these things than I. Maria says 
all the time that it is important that we go to the Registrar and 
change the ‘race’ in our children’s identity cards. She’s done it. 
‘It’s all for the good of the kids’, she said. My other sister, 
Jenny, and my brother, Paul, have also made this change for 
their kids.  
I am concerned about all these things but sometimes I feel that 
everything’s so superficial. For example, I am married to a 
Chinese, too, right? And I am born with a Chinese last name 
too. Well, it’s different now but still my grandfather had 
Chinese blood [Vicky’s maiden name appears more Kadazan]. 
But I don’t care [about my last name being a Chinese name]. 
I’m just Kadazan, a Sino-Kadazan.  
But with Maria, she is super conscious about these things. Even 
before her kids were born, she was already inventing their 
names to sound partly Kadazan and partly Chinese. One of her 
kids has a name that sounds like ‘Konlaumee’69 or something 
like that. I mean, it just sounds so weird. It does not make 
sense. It’s so superficial. 
Another informant, John, a Sino-Kadazan aged in his 50s, said that it was too easy 
nowadays to change from ‘Chinese’ to ‘Kadazan’. He said that he could see how the 
Registrar’s current policy through the cabutan system was trying to help Sino-Kadazans 
by minimising the red tape involved. John said:70  
 
                                                
69 ‘Konlaumee’ or ‘Kon-Lau-Mee’ is a common Hakka noodle dish typically served at Chinese 
restaurants in Sabah. 
70 All John’s responses are verbatim translations by the author.  
108 
 
What I can see is that the people in the Registration [office] 
cannot be bothered. [In the case of] Kadazan parents with 
Chinese blood, they [the Registration staff] don’t put Sino-
Native anymore, they don’t put Sino-Kadazan anymore. They 
are fed-up. They look at your parents. If you have one Kadazan, 
one Chinese, they ask you what you want. If you say Kadazan, 
they will put ‘Kadazan-lah’ [emphatic marker]. You see, there 
are so many of us, they cannot process the work. They will say, 
‘I don’t have the power to make that decision’, and so they are 
stuck. So now, with the circular [pamphlet outlining a new 
government directive], it has been simplified [they are advised 
to] just ask the person. If you say, ‘Sino’, they will put Kadazan 
or Dusun. Kadazan or Dusun, it doesn’t matter. As far as I’m 
concerned, and my friends like me, I’m happy, we’re happy. 
However, John then told me of an emotional argument that occurred with his sister. 
Being the eldest sibling and family matriarch, John’s sister vehemently opposed any label 
change to ‘Kadazan’. John said it all started when John’s sister’s grown-up children also 
wanted to follow John and his family in changing to the Kadazan label. However, John’s 
sister forbade them from doing so. John said:  
…[I told my sister] ‘if you want to declare the Chinese 
[connection], it is very easy. But if you want to declare Kadazan, 
claim your Native blood, it is difficult. But if you want to claim 
your Chinese blood, tomorrow you can do that’.  
‘Look, the situation is very simple. You want to call yourself 
Kadazan for the main reason to hold the NT [Native Title], 
that’s number one. Number two, your children can work. 
Number three, you can apply Bumiputera status and enjoy ASB 
[shares], contract licenses and all that. These are your 
considerations, correct? Tell me if I am wrong’, I said.  
Then I said, ‘So, what is your problem?’ ‘No, we are Chinese’ 
[said the sister]. ‘So, why don’t you declare this to the Registrar? 
But no you don’t, otherwise, how about mother?’ [John’s 
mother is Kadazan]. ‘You see’, I told my sister, ‘You got to 
make a decision you know [for the children], cos these people 
[John’s sister’s children] are confused. You are making life 
difficult for them’. 
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Despite John’s attempts to convince her, his sister did not give her consent to her 
children making the change. As her children did not dare cross their mother they placed 
the matter aside.  As a last resort, John brought them (his sister and her children) to 
China to meet their Chinese relatives there. Only after assurance that her children would 
still be considered ‘Chinese’ by relatives in China did John’s sister agree to the label 
change. John said: 
Our relatives said, ‘You people are Malaysian. You are not 
Chinese from China, you are from Malaysia. Call yourself Malay 
[even] not Chinese. But in China, you are Chinese, cos we have 
your record here. So follow what John said. What he says is 
correct, if it is easier for your future, do it. We have no 
problem, if you come to China, even if your passports say that 
you are Muslim, or Russian or what, we know that you are one 
of ours. We will accept you, no problem with that’.  
Meanwhile, there are others who reject the idea of changing identity because of the high 
pressure involved. Connie, a Sino-Kadazan in her 30s, thought hard about changing to 
‘Kadazan’ and felt ambivalent about the whole process. She spoke of not following the 
crowd and taking the time to consider the gravity of the identity change decision. In the 
end, it was too late for her to make the change. Connie told me: 
Well, yes, in the end I wanted to do what other people are 
doing and ask to be registered as ‘Kadazan’. But I don’t know, I 
couldn’t make up my mind, and then people told me that the 
Registrar had suddenly ‘frozen’ the label changing. Honestly, 
this thing of choosing ‘Kadazan’ over ‘Chinese’ in front of the 
Registrar makes me feel scared and depressed, because I feel 
like I’m being forced to give up one culture for another.  
Some informants said that, even after undergoing identity transformation, they continue 
to feel some stress over their identity. This is especially true for those Sino-Kadazans 
who are now officially ‘Kadazan’ but did not give up their siang. These people feel 
insecure since their names show that they are linked to the Chinese. ‘It’s true. It’s not 
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that easy’, said Jacinta, aged in her late 30s, a Sino-Kadazan married to a local Chinese. 
She explained: 
You see, it’s not that easy. So you should try your best to get 
this [change of label]. If they [the children] are recognised as 
Bumiputera, they will be able to apply for educational loans. I 
told my son that yes, there is ‘help’ coming from above with 
this ethnic label change, but it is still important that he opens 
his mouth and be vocal and pushes himself out there. You see, 
his name still has the siang. But what can you do? So, you see, 
you still have to push yourself out there. 
Some Sino-Kadazan informants, after changing their identity, experienced awkward 
situations such as when public officials scrutinised their Kadazan identity. I was told 
that, in some cases, Sino-Kadazans were asked to perform their Nativeness on demand 
by speaking or singing a song in the Kadazan language. This was experienced as both 
embarrassing and shameful, especially if an individual was unable to demonstrate their 
Nativeness as required. Having to demonstrate their Kadazanness as part of 
demonstrating their indigenous status contrasts sharply with the experiences of other 
Sabah Natives who can take their Native belonging for granted and do not have to 
demonstrate their indigenous identity in front of an official.  
In one example, Stanley and Shirley, two young Sino-Kadazan cousins in their early 20s, 
renewed their Identity Cards to become officially recognised as ‘Kadazan’. Both Stanley 
and Shirley have Chinese last names owing to their paternal Chinese grandfather. 
Stanley said that Shirley did not fully comprehend that government officers might put 
her new identity to the test in the process of applying for an ASB account. Stanley said: 
Shirley thought that she could just go up to any ASB counter 
with her IC [Identity Card] and open an account in her name 
like everyone else [other indigenes] does. But I told her be 
careful because Auntie so-and-so said it all depends who’s 
dealing with you over the counter. They can be mean and ask 
you to produce more supporting documents. 
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Then, when Shirley got there, they [ASB officers] gave her a 
hard time. They said that she looked too Chinese to be a 
Kadazan. And then, they asked her to speak in Kadazan. Of 
course, Shirley does not know how to speak Kadazan. Her 
mother always told her to learn the language because it would 
be useful one day, but she did not. So now she was made to feel 
ashamed [kana kasi malu]. Shirley said she felt so embarrassed 
that she left the ASB office. She’s not gotten around to opening 
her account since the incident. 
Meanwhile, there were also some Sino-Kadazans who did not want to become 
‘Kadazan’. Many said they had no desire to do so, while a few said they felt they simply 
did not belong as ‘Kadazan’. One informant said that he had negative experiences 
because of his mixed identity, and simply did not wish to court the idea of officially 
becoming Kadazan. Marvin, a Sino-Kadazan man, aged in his early 50s said:  
I tell you a story. This man, X, until now, he is the worst. He 
got it from me one day at a coffee shop. There were 8 or 9 of 
them big-shots there. Since X knows me very well, he saw me 
passing by and thought that was a good time to dig me in the 
ribs. ‘I’m in a hurry’, I said as I sat down with them. Most of 
them knew me. Then he started his teasing, ‘So, Marvin, the 
problem with you is that you are neither...nor’ and he started 
chuckling. The people there couldn’t figure out what he meant 
by ‘neither...nor’.  
But I said, ‘Hey, I know what you mean, so please get that 
stupid smile off your face. You know how many Chinese in the 
world, 1.6 billion, Kadazan there are 300,000 only. And you 
have the cheek to tell me that I am neither nor. Who are you to 
say this? What are you? What is your background? You answer 
me this’. He turned red and kept quiet.71  
Discussions with Sino-Kadazans who had not switched to the Kadazan label showed 
that while some worried that the switch was irreversible, cultural reasons were also at 
play in reaching a decision not to switch. Loyalty to the Chinese name and label is 
considered an expression of filial piety, a key tenet in Chinese culture that includes the 
tradition of ancestor worship. Some informants said that, in denying their Chinese 
                                                
71Verbatim translation by the author. 
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blood through the act of buang siang, they would disrespect their Chinese elders and 
culture. Further, they expressed devotion to their family name and pride in their siang 
and being a descendant of what may be a long line of Sino-Kadazans in Sabah. 
Other informants who retained their Chinese identity spoke of the trend among Sino-
Kadazans to formalise their Kadazan identity as an act of ‘de-ethnicising’ and as 
alienating Sino-Kadazans from their Chinese culture. These people felt that once traces 
of their Chinese heritage became eliminated, nothing remained to identify their hybrid 
Sino-Kadazan identity. Some felt that some day they could incur blame from their 
children for muddling their backgrounds and family histories, especially as Kadazans 
continue to heavily out marry. For Catholic Sino-Kadazans, for instance, their Chinese 
name and label becomes the last reference point or connection to their Chinese culture 
since they do not practise it. The act of buang siang and officially becoming Kadazan 
therefore means the dissolution of ties to the Chinese.  
Today, it is probable that among so-called pure Chinese individuals in Sabah—that is, 
those who are categorised in the census as ‘Chinese’, identify as Chinese and live a 
Chinese lifestyle—there are some with Sino-Kadazan roots who have chosen, for some 
reason, to bury past Kadazan ties. Among these people, the Bumiputera connection and 
Kadazan identity petered out at some point, failing to be transferred to the following 
generation. This can be seen in the case of Henry, aged in his mid-20s who identifies as 
Chinese and whose parents are identified as ‘Chinese’ in their birth certificates. Henry 
told me: 
Now and again, my mother would pester my father about this 
Bumiputera thing. You see, she said that we are actually part-
Native somewhere [in our geneaology]. My father’s people: I 
think his mother is like Sino or something like that; my dad is a 
Bumiputera. He has access to all the Bumiputera programs.  
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My mum would get riled about this because my dad never 
bothered to get us registered properly [as a ‘Kadazan’ and 
‘Sabah Native’]. ‘A waste!’ [Sayang!], she would say. Because 
then we could have applied for a scholarship and ASB. 
However, my dad would reply and say things like ‘no need’ and 
‘won’t change a thing’. 
Further discussion with Sino-Kadazan informants revealed some ambivalence around 
changing one’s identity for the purpose of attaining Bumiputera status. The process of 
becoming identified as Kadazan was considered excessively drawn out and tenuous by 
some; the return was not worth the effort invested. Others said that it was better to be 
self-reliant and not dependent on government handouts—a line of thinking that is 
associated more with the Chinese than with the Kadazan. Still other informants insisted 
that taking up Bumiputera status was important.  
Several informants queried whether they actually needed the Bumiputera status to 
survive. Connie, mentioned earlier, said in retrospect that after failing to become 
‘Kadazan’ she felt at first that she had missed out on becoming Bumiputera but her 
Chinese relatives advised her to get over her disappointment. Connie told me: 
For me, I am proud to have a siang… but yes, in the end, I wish 
I did go and change my label. But my Chinese relatives told me 
not to be too upset. So, to make ourselves happy with all this 
Bumiputera talk, my Chinese relatives like to tell us, ‘Ah, so 
what with this Bumiputera [identity]. We don’t need it anyway’.  
Some non-Muslim Kadazans (including non-Muslim Sino-Kadazans) and Chinese 
reflected on their shared experiences of subordination, particularly in public service, 
under the relatively superior position of Muslim and Malay Bumiputeras, and this acted 
to embolden their stance to be independent of the Bumiputera status. For instance, 
when these Kadazan informants confided in their Chinese friends about their struggles 
as Bumiputeras, they were likely to be reminded of the subordinate position of the 
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Chinese as ‘second-class citizen’—non-Bumiputera to the Bumiputeras. The Chinese 
further likened the Kadazans’ overall subservient position (as Bumiputera Other in 
relation to the Bumiputera Malays) to the Chinese position of being ‘second-class 
Bumiputera’ to the Malays. In another example, it was said that non-Muslim Kadazans, 
when competing against Muslims for job promotions and in vying for senior positions 
in the public sector, were considered a second choice (behind Muslim applicants). 
Chinese informants related to this situation: it was often only in the absence of Muslim 
and non-Muslim Bumiputera employees that Chinese employees gained the promotion 
or the position they sought.  
In another example in the context of the workplace, non-Muslim Kadazan informants 
said they looked to the Chinese to support them and to help them withstand the 
Bumiputera imbalance. For instance, some informants said that Chinese staff members 
had been known to defend their Kadazan co-workers, especially when Muslim 
supervisors shortlisted Muslim applicants and included only one or two non-Muslim 
applicants, whether indigenous or not. When this resulted in complaint, the director of 
the department could reject the shortlist in order to prevent the issue of religion 
affecting work relations. Often disparities between non-Muslim and Muslim staff could 
go unchecked for long periods and non-Muslim staff felt powerless to improve their 
situation. However, when Chinese staff became vocal about the disparity between the 
number of non-Muslim and Muslim workers, their Muslim heads of departments usually 
addressed the situation, to avoid being seen as prejudiced. In this respect, the Chinese 
indirectly had become a sort of advocate for non-Muslim Kadazans. 
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However, some Sino-Kadazans agreed with their Chinese friends and relatives that 
despite their shared experiences, it would be foolish of them to not try to alter their 
identity just because they felt bitter about the politicisation of the Bumiputera category. 
Some Chinese in fact sought to encourage Sino-Kadazans to attempt to become 
Bumiputera claiming that resources for Bumiputera were not finite. Peter, a 
Kadazandusun man in his 40s, said that his Chinese friend Roger would often discuss 
the benefits of Bumiputera status. Peter said: 
Roger always tells me how he does not have the same 
opportunities as me [as a Bumiputera] to apply for things. In 
some ways, Roger says that he is jealous of me and tells me this 
all the time: ‘You don’t know how far and deep this Bumiputera 
[identity] can take you, especially, you Kadazandusuns, you 
don’t know as much as the Malays. Take advantage of it, learn 
everything you can, do make full use of your Bumiputera 
status’. 
Yet, for many Sino-Kadazans, their situation—alternating between ‘Chinese’ and 
‘Kadazan’ identities—is not ideal. In recent years, activist Sino-Kadazans and other 
Sino-Natives have worked to formalise their groups and to petition for full recognition 
from the state. According to an association called ‘Sino-Native KDM’ (PPSBS)72, it is 
‘unconstitutional’ to deprive Sino-Natives, including Sino-Kadazans, of their identity 
and rights to their own native certification.73 PPSBS leaders want the National 
Registration Department (responsible for registering births, deaths and marriages) to 
include ‘Sino-Kadazan’ as a racial group. It is unclear whether this has been formally or 
fully adopted in the registration system, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, there is no 
federal process whereby Sino-Kadazans are recognised equally as other Bumiputeras. 
                                                
72 Note that the Sino-Native KDM (PPSBS), which stands for ‘Sino-Native Kadazan Dusun 
Murut Association’ has made changes to their association name over time. PPSBS also refers 
itself as the ‘Sabah Sino Kadazandusun Murut Association’ (SSKMA) and more recently as 
‘Sabah Sino KDM Association’ (SSKA). The PPSBS/SSKMA/SSKA has branches in districts 
where Sino-Kadazandusun and Sino-Murut predominate, such as in the capital city of Kota 
Kinabalu and in the west coast districts of Penampang and Keningau, among others. 
73 See “Sinos seek official NRD recognition”, 2017. 
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In the meantime, Sino-Kadazan activism is growing. For instance, Sino-Kadazan 
activists are now advocating for the rights of Sino-Kadazans to open ASB accounts.74 
The Sabah Sino KDM Association (SSKA) recently collaborated with a large Malaysian 
private bank, Maybank, which provides loans and financing programs designed 
specifically for Bumiputeras, to petition ASB headquarters in Kota Kinabalu. Thirty 
individuals, who did not possess the SAN to support their Bumiputera claim, were 
allowed to open their ASB accounts after ASB officials scanned their birth certificates to 
determine that they had at least one Native parent.75  
However, while Sino-Kadazan activists are gaining support, several issues confront the 
Sino-Kadazan movement. Firstly, the authenticity of Sino-Kadazan leaders’ Sabah 
Native status has come into question. State assemblyman Jimmy Wong was found to be 
‘pure’ Chinese rather than Sino-Kadazan, resulting in his SAN being retracted by the 
Sabah Native Court.76 When asked about Jimmy Wong’s case, KDCA responded that it 
was a ‘personal matter’ that did not involve them. Some informants interpreted this as 
an attempt at neutrality given that KDCA president Pairin Kitingan, held political office 
in the state government. However, others said that KDCA’s focus was rather to 
promote Kadazandusun identity rather than Sino-Kadazan identity. 
 
 
                                                
74 See “Sinos finally get to open ASB accounts”, 2015. 
75 Another program targeting Sino individuals is the annual ‘Sino Day’ celebration on November 
11 started by the Sabah Sino Native Association (SSNA) in 2011. The SSKA also conducts the 
annual Kaamatan event for its members and a Raani Tavanus (Beauty Queen) contest for its 
single female members. See “Nov 11 is Sino day”, 2011.  
76 See “Retract Jimmy’s Cert without delay”, 2011.  
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Secondly, a counter-proposal to uphold the rights of all Sino-Natives as a collective was 
seen by Sino-Kadazan supporters as competing with their own movement. A media 
report in 2011, the National Registration Department (NRD) had been registering Sino-
Kadazan and Sino-Dusun children as ‘Sino-Native’ without the knowledge of parents.77 
Melissa, a 30 year old Sino-Kadazan and, critical of the ‘Sino-Native’ category, 
explained:  
How can ‘Sino-Kadazan’ be placed in the same category as 
‘Sino-Bajau’? Yes, it may be called ‘Sino-Native’ but being 
‘Sino-Kadazan’ is very different from ‘Sino-Bajau’. Who is really 
in that [Sino-Bajau] category? Isn’t that opening the door for 
more PTIs [illegal immigrants] to get their identities ‘cleaned’ 
[legitimised] there? I will not accept being ‘Sino-Native’ in this 
way unless the government recognises ‘Sino-Kadazan’ as a 
proper ethnic group first. We have been here since before 
Independence and yet the government has not properly 
recognised us. 
A third challenge facing the Sino-Kadazan movement is the public debate on delimiting 
Sabah Native claims by Sino-Kadazans up to the third consecutive generation. 
Spokespersons of the ‘Sabah Sino Kadazandusun Murut Association’ (SSKMA) said 
that the move to delimit claims ‘would trouble the minds and souls of the Sino citizens 
as it involves their fundamental rights’. Kevin Lim, the Penampang branch president of 
SSKMA further said that, ‘such rights should not be threatened by the government, 
instead the government should be giving greater assurance that those rights would be 
protected’. Some Sino-Kadazans said that they were perplexed as to why other Sabah 
Natives seemed intent on them ‘giving up’ their ethnic belonging to any other group on 
account of Native rights. 
                                                
77 See “Sino-Native’ term a threat to KDM identity”, 2011.  
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A similar debate exists among Sabahan indigenes at large who are now involved in 
promoting the concept of ‘Indigenous People’ in lieu of Bumiputera. Proponents of the 
‘Indigenous People’ model support rural and marginalised Bornean indigenous groups 
in Sabah because of the latter’s struggle with Native land claims, for instance. However, 
proponents favour indigenous recognition through the patrilineal line with the 
antecedent (grandfather) being born of (two) Bornean indigenous parents, that is, the 
forebear must come from a group that originates from the island of Borneo. However, 
given the mixing of groups in Sabah, there is likely to be a large proportion of so-called 
indigenous Sabahans who are from mixed Bornean and non-Bornean groups primarily 
from the Philippines and Indonesia, and among these indigenes are those with mixed 
identities such as the Sino-Kadazans. 
The fourth challenge and perhaps one of the key criticisms towards Sino-Kadazan 
identity activism concerns the categories ‘Kadazan’ and ‘Sino-Kadazan’. Kadazandusun 
informants, who were critical of Sino-Kadazanism because it opposed the 
Kadazandusun movement, did not want Sino-Kadazanism to contribute to the 
fragmentation of the non-Muslim Bumiputera groups. These informants said that many 
Kadazans could potentially claim Sino-Kadazan as identity and this could leave 
‘Kadazan’ as an empty category. However, some Sino-Kadazan informants who were 
aware of the issue among Kadazandusuns said that this could never happen, as many 
Sino-Kadazans remained loyal to the Kadazan label, in recognition of the cultural group 
they come from.  
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Meanwhile, there are some Kadazans with weaker Sino identification and who may 
allude to Sino-Kadazan identity but otherwise do not solely identify as being one. Some 
informants said that it had become common among Kadazans that while they could be 
‘Sino’, they could also be Muslim, Christian or Buddhist; and have other group descent 
such as Indian; and/or have intermarried with other ethnic groups from other parts of 
the world including with orang putih (‘white person’, a reference to Westerners/ 
Caucasians). To identify exclusively as ‘Sino-Kadazan’ therefore would not make a lot of 
sense, as it would mean denying other identities. These have found the plethora of labels 
at their disposal a way to maintain equilibrium within their identity, and not to mention 
the ability to exercise their own prerogative as to which label most resonated with them. 
In so saying, I also found at times that informants use ‘Sino’ to simply connote being 
one of mixed identity, whether or not clear lines of affiliation linked them to the 
Kadazan, Chinese or Sino-Kadazan groups. In some cases, one’s official identity as 
‘Sino-Kadazan’ does not relate at all to one’s self-identity but in fact of a mistaken 
idenitty. For example, Judy, in her 50s, was classified as a Sino-Kadazan at birth, 
although her father was Indian and her mother a Kadazan. Judy was told by her parents 
(who in turn were informed by registration officers) that there was no category for 
Kadazan-Indian individuals in the birth application form and that the only mixed data 
field was ‘Sino-Kadazan’. Judy said it had annoyed her that this was her official identity 
and in recent years, after hearing about the possible identity change to Kadazan from 
her Sino-Kadazan friends, she went to the Registrar’s office to sort out her mistaken 
identity. Judy said: 
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Again, I was given the same reply that my parents got years ago: 
that there was no space in the Identity Card application for 
“Kadazan-Indian” unless I consented to being slotted under 
“Other” [Lain Lain]. Then, the officer said to me: “How about 
this? Which do you want to choose? ‘Kadazan’ or ‘Indian’?” 
Immediately, I said, “Kadazan”, because you see, all this while, 
like the Sino-Kadazans, I could not be recognised properly as 
Sabah Native let alone as Bumiputera. I am very happy now. As 
‘”Kadazan”, my children, too, could renew their National 
Identity Card and ask that they are listed as “Kadazan” like me. 
Now, we can apply for ASB and other things. 
The issue of Sino-Kadazan versus Kadazan identity thus continues to be the subject of 
ongoing debate. Some informants continue to believe that the Sino-Kadazan grouping 
simply cannot work because there is no basis to the ethnic separation from a cultural 
point of view, as contrastive identity markers to distinguish Sino-Kadazan from 
Kadazan do not exist. While some non Sino-Kadazan informants wondered whether 
Sino-Kadazans had developed a unique language or tradition to distinguish their group 
from others including the Kadazan and Chinese. Such views are common in Sabah and 
point to the classic cultural essentialism that continues to run through not just the 
Kadazan group but also many other groups in Sabah, whenever they seek to distinguish 
themselves from one another.  
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Local Sabahan artist, Yu Tian Long, sings ‘I love Sino-Kadazan’ in Hakka with some 
lyrics in Kadazan, Mandarin and English. Source:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVO04PdGuNE 
 
See also ‘In Hakka song for Sino-Kadazan girls, a Johorean’s paean to multicultural 
Sabah (VIDEO)’, Malay Mail Online. 2015. Source: 
http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/in-hakka-song-for-sino-kadazan-
girls-a-johoreans-paean-to-multicultural-sab#es4bPCvTvK2HpOLK.99 
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Chapter 5: Kadazan and Dusun 
The Kadazans and Dusuns have one of the most complex inter-ethnic histories in 
Sabah. This is apparent from their differing categories in census records over time. 
Presently, the Kadazans and Dusuns fall under the Kadazandusun category in the Sabah 
and Malaysian censuses. In colonial censuses in the past, the category ‘Dusun’ 
comprised both Dusuns and Kadazans, resulting in Kadazans being identified officially 
as Dusun. In the 1960 colonial census, ‘Kadazan’ appeared as a separate category beside 
the categories of ‘Dusun’, ‘Murut’ and ‘Other Indigenous’. This differentiation of 
Kadazans and Dusuns ceased in the 2000 census following the announcement in 1997 
by Kadazan and Dusun leaders that they had unified their identities to become 
‘Kadazandusun’. (I will discuss the combining of group labels to Kadazandusun in the 
next chapter.) 
While it is heavily assumed by outsiders that the Kadazan and Dusun labels may be 
arbitrarily used therefore given the inconsistency in their categories, and especially since 
Kadazans and Dusuns are now cooperating together as a single political unit under the 
combined identity of ‘Kadazandusun’, I did not find this to be the case: the Kadazan 
and Dusun labels are socially marked in Penampang, where I conducted my study, and 
Kadazans there who want to maintain distinction from Dusuns further look to do so by 
using language as a boundary. 
In terms of anthropological evidence, the Kadazan and Dusun agricultural groups form 
two distinct societies. According to Appell and Harrison (1969), Kadazan and Dusun 
have evolved separately for a considerable period of time, with the Dusuns being ‘dry-
rice’ planters (hill rice system) and the Kadazans being ‘wet-rice’ planters (irrigated rice 
123 
 
system). The divergence between Kadazan and Dusun also appears in gender roles: 
Dusun males and females tend to perform tasks collaboratively as a unit, while Kadazan 
females pursue separate socio-economic activities from Kadazan males. For instance, 
Kadazan women in the past performed riverine fishing and conducted the early rice 
planting stages, such as raising seedlings and planting, while their male counterparts 
pursued rice planting but also rubber tapping.78  
Kadazan and Dusun groups are culturally heterogeneous peoples (Appell & Harrison, 
1969: 212; Appell, 1968: 2) with degrees of similarities that are evident in material 
culture. For instance, similarities are seen in food, where traditional Kadazan and Dusun 
cooking methods rely mainly on boiling and preservation (Wanita P.B.S. Division of 
Moyog, 1980).79 In terms of traditional clothing, black is the predominantly colour: 
Kadazan and Dusun males wear loose tops and pants tied at the waist and a sigah (cloth 
headgear); while women typically wear unhemmed cotton sarong (Lasimbang et al, 
1997).80 More similarities are seen in dance movements (sumazau) for ritual or 
entertainment purposes; a common musical instrument among Kadazan and Dusun 
groups is the brass or bronze gongs called tagung (Benggon-Charuruks & Padasian, 
1992).81  
                                                
78 See Glyn-Jones (1953). 
79 Fermentation is another method to preserve meat and/or vegetables. These are fermented in 
cooked rice and consumed after a number of days (known as nonsom in Kadazan and bosou in 
Dusun). A preserving agent, pangi (scientific name: pangium edule), is used to ferment the 
nonsom or bosou. Both Kadazan and Dusun groups also process cooked rice to become distilled 
(montoku) and undistilled wine (lihing) using yeast.  
80 Unmarried and married Kadazan women typically wear sleeveless and short sleeve tops, 
respectively. A silver link belt (tangkong) at the waist and hip-belts made of brass rings (himpogot) 
are also worn to show affluence.  The Tindal women costume shows sleeves that are layered 
and multi-coloured; round silver clasps dangle from the neck. 
81 The traditional dance and music of Kadazans and Dusuns also vary.  Dancing is in pairs and 
involves gently bouncing from one foot to another with arms bobbing up and down by one’s 
side. The lead male dancer will give a warrior cry (pangkis) to signal a change in dance pattern. 
In the Rungus mongigol dance, dancers gently twist their feet while moving their arms. The 
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More Kadazan and Dusun cultural similarities are found in their customs and beliefs. In 
marriage negotiations, for instance, it is customary for the bride’s family to receive a 
‘bride-price’ (nopung) consisting of cash, brass canons and/or gongs, Chinese jars, and 
buffaloes.  Both male and female children can inherit heirlooms and land and a share of 
their parents’ estates (Rutter, 1929), unless where a couple dies without heir, their 
properties will go to the closest blood relative on either side (Phelan, 1997). Kadazan 
and Dusun spiritual leader can be both genders. For instance, a bobohizan (also known as 
bobolian or tantagas), is consulted to perform a ritual and negotiate with spiritual beings 
believed to inflict pain on humankind (Pugh-Kitingan et al, 2011). The concept of 
healing and reparation involves a fine known as sogit, which is adhered to by both 
Kadazan and Dusun groups.82   
Today, Kadazans can be more clearly distinguished from Dusuns due to the impact of 
religion, education, modernity and intermarriage. In terms of Christianity, Kadazans, 
particularly in Penampang, are mainly Catholic, while Dusuns are Catholic and followers 
of other denominations, such as Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB), Seventh Day Adventist. 
Among Rungus, for instance, the Basel church (Lutheran in orientation; Swiss-funded in 
earlier days) is prominent in Kudat and is led mainly by Hakka Chinese. As mentioned 
in earlier chapters, Muslim Dusuns (‘Dusun Islam’) are prominent due to spread of 
Islam to their areas before WWII (Joko et al, 2015). 
                                                                                                                                     
dancing patterns of Lotud and Tindal groups are characterised by criss-crossing side-to-side 
footwork. Traditional Kadazan and Dusun dancing and music are commonly performed 
during weddings and cultural celebrations. 
82 The more serious the offence, the higher the sogit. At present, the village head and/or a 
council of elders are typically consulted to determine the appropriate sogit. For instance, past 
fines for cases of adultery could involve a penalty prescribed by adat (custom) and ‘a fine 
[sogit] of $100 or a year’s rigorous imprisonment in lieu of payment’ (Rutter, 1929: 136). 
Today, the sogit lapau (fine for adultery) can also comprise the giving of a pig and buffalo to 
the children of the (first) wife. See “Sogit Lapau for marrying without informing wife,” 2006. 
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Perhaps the most apparent cultural distinction between Kadazans and Dusuns in the 
present is the extensive intermarriage occurring between the Kadazans and the Chinese, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. The onset of western education in the late 1800s 
leading to changes in occupation in public administration, governance and politics is 
evident among Kadazans (Reid, 1997). Their proximity to the city of Kota Kinabalu also 
makes Kadazan areas relatively more modernised and this has a direct impact on 
farming, particular rice-planting.83  
However, Kadazan and Dusun relationship became increasingly complex owing to their 
political reconstruction of identity resulting in sharing of ethnic labels and identity 
mergers. Towards the end of the colonial period, Kadazan leaders decided that it would 
be politically advantageous for Kadazans and Dusuns to unite into a single grouping in 
anticipation of the Malaysian confederation. These leaders believed that the Kadazan-
Dusun group was entitled to political primacy on the basis of its greater numbers and 
greater claim to indigeneity in Sabah, and would achieve it if they acted in a united 
fashion (Reid, 2010: 195). To unite the Kadazan and Dusun groups, their leaders, mostly 
Kadazans, sought to reinvent a new identity. This unified identity was given the 
Kadazan label, because of the view held by Donald Stephens, the top Kadazan leader at 
the time that ‘Dusun’ bore the stigma of colonisation because it was an exonym, 
bestowed by the British government. As Ongkili explains: 
                                                
83 The reduced interest in farming and increased pressure to be a developed town saw many 
paddy-fields in Penampang sold for local (government and commercial) plans.  According to a 
‘Town and Country Planning Memorandum’ on the Penampang district land use and planning 
scheme, 2/5 of the low-lying lands or ‘flat floodplain lands’ in Penampang are developed; with 
the development of the remaining 3/5 underway (Sabah State Government, 2001). At the time 
of writing, the actual percentage of Kadazan people engaged in farming is not known. On a 
national scale, only 10 per cent of the Malaysian population are employed or engaged in the 
agriculture, hunting and forestry industry whereas more than half are in the service industry 
(for example, as teachers, nurses, civil workers, among others) (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2009). 
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The Kadazans are the largest racial group in Sabah. In earlier 
days, and during the colonial period, they were given free-of-
charge the name Dusun. Unfortunately for their colonial 
masters, these indigenous Borneans repudiated that name and 
declared that it had become obnoxious not only because they 
never called themselves cheerfully as Dusuns but also because 
that label which had been tagged on them bears the dirty stigma 
of colonialism. 
(Ongkili, 1976: 6)  
Stephens however struggled to convince all Dusuns to reconceptualise the Kadazan and 
Dusun identities into a single form. By the end of the colonial period, Dusun leaders 
were more opposed to Sabah’s joining the Malaysian confederation than Kadazan 
leaders were. Further, there was Dusun perception that the Kadazan label as an 
autonym referred only to indigenes living in urbanised coastal-plains areas. Many 
Dusuns saw the Kadazan label as belonging to elites while the Dusun label was viewed 
as the identity of rural folk or kampung (village) people in the eyes of many Kadazans.  
Nevertheless, at the inauguration of UNKO (United National Kadazan Organisation) in 
1961, the only political party at the time dedicated to non-Muslim indigenes, Stephens 
urged all Dusun and Murut leaders to adopt the Kadazan label as the sole name for all 
non-Muslim indigenous groups in the state (Topin, 1997: 22). Some Murut leaders 
agreed and provided a written agreement renouncing the name ‘Murut’ for ‘Kadazan’ 
but many Dusun leaders protested against what they saw as Kadazan hegemony and 
sought to prevent this from happening. In 1967, G. S. Sundang, an OKK (Orang Kaya-
Kaya) (a title typically carried by influential and wealthy men) of the Dusuns, led a pro-
Dusun group to form the United Sabah Dusun Association (USDA) (Topin, 1997).  
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Due to the rejection from many Dusuns towards the Kadazan label, the meaning behind 
ethnic labels, especially the Kadazan label, often come into question. Rutter had stated 
that the so-called ‘Dusun person only describes himself generically as a ‘tulun tindal’ 
(landsman) or, on the west coast, particularly at Papar, as a ‘Kadazan’ (1929: 31). 
‘Kadazan’, for instance, had appeared as the race of several individuals’ Catholic 
baptismal records in 1889 in the area of Papar, a district adjacent to Penampang (Wong 
2012: 108). The term Kadazan also appeared in the 1920s in language research by 
Catholic priests, who stated that Kadazan was the name of the language used on the 
west coast of Sabah (Gossens, 1924; Staal, 1926). Meanwhile, Appell suggests that while 
‘Dusun’ was the referent term originating in the sultanate period, the term ‘Ida’an’ was 
also used by Muslim communities in reference to Dusuns (1968: 1-2).  
In terms of the Kadazan label, there is a connotation that ‘Kadazan’ is a common noun 
and not a name of group of people. Wong states how the term is commonly seen as 
being derived from kadai (shop) as opposed to kebun or dusun (orchard) (2012: 108). 
Kadazan apologists argue the meaning of ‘Kadazan’ as ‘shop’ [kakadazan] is a flawed 
perception among some Dusuns because there were no shops in the usual sense of the 
word in the Kadazan dominated districts, Penampang and Papar, until the 1960s 
(Tunggolou 1997). Cultural studies by the KDCA show that the word kadazan appears 
in bobohizan chants to mean ‘people’ in contrast to spirit beings (Guriting, 1991; Topin, 
2000; Tunggolou, 1999).  
However, given how Kadazan identity has become politically linked with Dusun, this 
has meant that over time, some of those who are not born of Kadazan parents or do 
not lead a Kadazan lifestyle may call themselves ‘Kadazan’ by choice. At the same time, 
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owing to past convention in the colonial period, many Kadazans have been recorded in 
census as ‘Dusun’ as well as ‘Kadazan’, post-Independence. For instance, some 
Kadazans born prior to Independence in 1963 may be identified as ‘Dusun’ on their 
birth certificates but these have registered their children, born after 1963, as ‘Kadazan’. 
Further, despite the rejection from USDA leaders, some Dusun individuals officially 
took up the Kadazan label, and this can be seen in birth records of individuals I spoke 
with who do not typically hail from either Penampang or Papar, or have Kadazan 
parents. The official identity of some Dusuns in Penampang and other parts of Sabah 
may thus be ‘Kadazan’ owing to the promotion of the Kadazan label. It is not clear 
therefore whom among Kadazandusuns today had been previously recorded in past 
censuses as Kadazan or Dusun. 
As I found in Penampang, the notion of who constitutes a ‘Kadazan’ or a ‘Dusun’ is 
complex. By location, it can be said that Dusuns living on the Penampang plains are 
‘Kadazan’ given that they identified differently from Hill Dusuns (Glyn-Jones, 1953: 
118). Penampang Kadazans and Dusuns may further be identified based on relative 
position along the Moyog River, the largest tributary in the Penampang region. Many 
Kadazans and Dusuns, especially the older generations, distinguish each another 
according to their respective up-river or down-river position. The terms hivan84 (or liwan 
in the Dusun dialect) and sokid (up-hill), for instance, are also used by Kadazans to refer 
to Dusuns. Some older Kadazans also told me that they call themselves the Dusun Laut 
(Sea Dusun) to the Dusuns, who are the Dusun Darat (Land Dusun).   
                                                
84 While the general impression is that hivan connotes the hinterland, Luping (2011) states that 
hivan or liwan means ‘forgotten’. Luping says, ‘The Liwan of Ranau and Tambunan call 
themselves by this name because they thought they were the forgotten children of Kinoingan 
(creator-God) and Nunuk Ragang (Red Banyan Tree)’ (2011: 31). (I will discuss the Nunuk 
Ragang in greater detail in the following chapter). 
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Language further marks the Kadazan in relation to the Dusun. For instance, individuals 
may be identified as ‘Kadazan’ in Penampang on the basis of their use of the Tangaa 
dialect while Dusuns are seen as speaking the Bundu dialect, the primary Dusunic 
dialect in the hill areas in Penampang and in the adjacent district of Tambunan on the 
Crocker Range. Linguistically, Kadazan Tangaa is similar to Dusun Bundu in structure, 
but there is a significant degree of variation in terms of phonology between these 
dialects, which is also seen in the differences in stress, pitch and length (Lees & Lees, 
n.d.; Miller, 1993). Most Kadazan and Dusun speakers attribute differences in their 
dialects to native intuition and say that differences are a matter of one’s hozuk (or loyuk 
in the Dusun dialect), meaning accent. This native intuition often prompts many 
Kadazans and Dusuns to view their dialects as being ‘more or less’ similar to one 
another.85  
The following map provides a rough idea of Kadazan versus Dusun distribution in 
Penampang according to speech areas. Villages located easternmost from Donggongon 
Township in Penampang are more inland and elevated and villagers tend to speak 
Dusun, for instance, the villages of Tulung, Moyog and Togudon. The Dusun speech 
area is thus progressively east and inland towards Togudon village. In contrast, Kadazan 
speech areas are located in the coastal areas and are spread throughout Donggongon 
and surrounding villages as well as in Putatan town and the Petagas area. The rate of 
mutual intelligibility between Kadazan and Dusun speakers is high with more than 90 
per cent of cognates shared (Tangit, 2005). Note therefore that many speakers in the 
Kadazan-Dusun speech boundaries areas speak both dialects.  
                                                
85 See Appendix A for tables on Kadazan and Dusun sound correspondences; and examples of 
sound correspondences in several shared cognates. Note that this appendix also features a 
sample of Kadazandusun text, the subject of discussion in the following chapter. 
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Map 3. Penampang, towns and villages (Kadazan and Dusun speech areas) 
Yet, despite the clear speech communities and boundaries, I found that Kadazan and 
Dusun speech areas do not actually correlate more broadly with Kadazan or Dusun 
identities: Dusun speakers may not necessarily identify as Dusun. That is, Kadazan is 
preferred as an identity label regardless of whether the individual speaks Kadazan or 
Dusun. At a Kadazan-Dusun boundary, Kampung Tulung (Tulung village), I spoke to 
two female elders in their late 70s to early 80s whom I met while crossing a hanging 
bridge above the Moyog River. I asked in Kadazan: ‘Inai, tuhun Dusun naku poingizon 
doiti?’ (Auntie, do Dusuns live here?). One of them replied in Dusun, ‘No, there are no 
Dusuns here. We are the Kadazan. You have to go farther up to the villages there. 
Those people there are the Dusuns’. The elderly Kadazan woman pointed to the 
mountain ranges on the Penampang highlands.  
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The Penampang lowlands and highlands, being the so-called Kadazan and Dusun areas 
respectively, are further heavily marked by socio-economic distinction. The plains and 
areas towards the coastline are relatively more modernised than the hills area, of which 
some parts remain difficult to access due to lack of roads. In relation to highlanders, 
Penampang inhabitants on the plains—the so-called Kadazans—tend to be seen as 
more modernised, as they were closest to the city of Kota Kinabalu. This is especially 
true for many Dusuns in the highlands who may continue to work the land by planting 
vegetables and rice, for instance, while Kadazans living in and around the city by and 
large no longer claim farming as their primary occupation. Being Kadazan therefore is 
typically associated with prestige while being Dusun is associated with stigma. From the 
Kadazan point of view, the Dusun language, label and identity is stigmatised also 
because of the views using the Tagas/tagaas lens. 
Among many of my conversations with older Kadazan informants, the name ‘Tagas’ 
came up frequently in reference to Dusuns. Some Kadazan informants believed that the 
Dusuns in Penampang were actually the descendants of a long-ago tribe called the 
Tagas. In the past, the term ‘Tagas’ was applied indiscriminately in Penampang (Glyn-
Jones, 1953: 118). Other informants said the Tagas is known for their backwardness, 
which they term tagaas. To these Kadazan informants, tagaas has a negative connotation, 
as it is used as an allegory for backward behaviour. These associations related to tagaas 
become mapped onto Dusun speakers because Dusun areas overlap with so-called 
Tagas areas.  
132 
 
 
Some Kadazans claimed that their ancestors were in touch with the Tagas. These 
informants also claimed that when their elders went foraging and hunting in the nearby 
jungle, they were aware of elusive people hiding in the jungle who they believed to be 
the Tagas. They said, ‘Our elders would be walking along a path and suddenly become 
aware of the presence of others [the Tagas] behind trees, watching them. They [the 
Tagas] do not want to interact with you, though’. The Tagas were believed to take the 
forest trail to attend the tamu86 in Inobong village located in the Kadazan-Dusun 
boundary area.  
Fanny, a Kadazan woman aged in her late 40s, told me a story of trading between her 
ancestors and the Tagas, who were considered to have a completely different disposition 
compared to the Kadazan. Fanny explained: ‘In my family, we have been passing down 
this story now for generations’. 
A long time ago, there were people called ‘Tagas’ and they came 
from the hills [mountains]. People in our village would take in 
this so-called Tagas people when they requested to stay 
overnight at their places. The Tagas came down to the lowlands 
to take part in the barter exchange of goods there [called badi or 
tamu in the local language]. The Tagas would exchange jungle 
produce [hunted wild game] for salt, for instance. 
One day, a group of Tagas men and women arrived and stayed 
for a week. On the last day, before leaving to return to the 
mountains, they were served sinako, a dry muesli type 
concoction of sago, rice and coconut, which had been toasted 
in a hot pan. After some time, the same group of Tagas 
returned to our village to take part in the upcoming badi. But 
this time, the group was noticeably smaller.  
                                                
86 The tamu or farmer’s market is a cultural institution traditionally involving barter trading. It 
remains important among indigenous communities in Sabah.  
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Our village elder asked, ‘What happened to some of your 
members? How come they did not return this time?’ One of the 
Tagas men replied: ‘Those died during our last trip’. What had 
happened was that after their meal of sinako, the Tagas left to 
walk uphill. They eventually made their stop at the Babagon 
[Moyog] River to drink/refill and rest. However, they started 
feeling bloated, as the sinako must have expanded in their 
stomachs through all the drinking, making them feel quite full. 
The story goes that the group of Tagas men and women did 
not bother to eat again after that, saying that it was enough to 
drink the water of Babagon, as somehow there was something 
magical in the water, which made them feel very full. None of 
them bothered to bring any food along the way (typically, they 
would catch fish and roast some wild yams before going on 
their journey). As a result, some of them died from hunger 
along the way.  
Fanny explained further: 
So, that is why, the next time the same group of Tagas came to 
our area, there were fewer of them. This story is being passed 
down to descending generations. We say: ‘Remember the 
Tagas’. It’s like a warning for our younger generations to not be 
like the Tagas who were such simpletons that they did not even 
bother to pack extra food for their long journey, and who 
thought that water is magic, and did not know that sinako will 
eventually expand in your stomach, and that is what actually 
makes you feel full, not the water itself. So, you see, we are not 
the Tagas. They were simpletons. We were and are nothing like 
them. 
However, when I asked several Dusun speakers in the highlands if ‘Tagas’ was 
interchangeable with Dusun, they refuted the association. Instead, Rita, a woman in her 
40s, who comes from the highlands of Penampang and who identified as Kadazan, said 
that she had heard rumours from other Kadazans and Dusuns of is a tribe living deeper 
in the mountains, which could be descended from the Tagas. Rita told me:  
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Yes, I have heard it before, too, that we on the hills are 
supposed to be this Tagas group. But I tell you, we are not the 
Tagas. It’s not a name my parents and my grandparents have 
ever used to summon our people.  
You know what I think, you know who might be the Tagas in 
these parts since people think the Tagas live in the highlands? I 
think the Tagas are this group of people living farther on up the 
mountain, and deep inside the jungle. There seems to be this 
village there where people speak so differently from anyone I 
know in these parts. Every other word or so sounds like 
‘hehhh’. Do you think this might be the Tagas that people seem 
to be talking about? 
Michael, a Kadazan his 50s, who comes from the plains area and is married to a Dusun 
from the hilly areas, said that he had also heard about the possibility of a mountain 
group being the descendants of the elusive Tagas tribe, and that they speak in a strange 
way. Michael demonstrated the ‘heh’ [he:] sound, much as Rita had, without any 
solicitation on my part.  
Meanwhile, another informant from the adjacent district of Tambunan, a Dusun 
speaking area, stated that the only time that he had heard the term Tagas mentioned was 
in reference to the Tagas tree87. Raymond, in his 40s, and identifying as a Tambunan 
Dusun, said: 
According to our family and the people here in my village, we 
believed that some people a long time ago who were migrating 
into our parts lived under this tree called the Tagas tree. They 
didn’t integrate very well with our kind. Yes, it could be that 
they are the Tagas that you mentioned. We are not them, and 
have not intermarried with them.  
                                                
87 The Tugas tree refers to the molave tree (scientific name: vitex parviflora); its etymology is 
traced to the Visayan language.  
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Villagers in the villages located in the speech boundary between the Kadazan and 
Dusun areas are keenly aware of this. Many are descendants of Kadazan-Dusun 
intermarriages and use either Kadazan or Dusun as their identity label, in the presence 
of Kadazan speakers they tend to identify as Kadazan. To avoid being identified as 
Dusun, many Kadazan-Dusun speakers spoke in Kadazan to Kadazan speakers rather 
than using the stigmatised Dusun dialect. Many Kadazan-Dusun speakers also attempt 
to hide the fact that they are conversant in Dusun. As seen in the examples below, the 
desire to distance from being associated with the Tagas is also to avoid being labelled as 
tagaas (bumpkin). 
Connie, a Kadazan-Dusun in her 40s, said that she spoke mainly Dusun at home with 
her parents. When she was younger, she feared retribution from Kadazan on the plains 
and became conscious of how she should identify when around non-Dusun-speaking 
Kadazan. Later she identified as ‘Kadazan’ and saw no harm in calling herself a 
Kadazan, especially since her parentage is Kadazan and Dusun. Like Connie, William, a 
mid-40s man and father of three living in one of the villages in the boundary areas, also 
identified as Kadazan. However, he questioned why some Kadazans would persist in 
labelling Dusun speakers as Tagas. I found that some Dusun informants would 
exchange the word ‘Dusun’ with ‘Tagas’, seemingly in defiance of the moralistic view of 
Kadazans. William said:  
Yes, I know people think that we are Dusun because they said 
our language is ‘Tagas’ or ‘Dusun’. But you see, we have a story 
among our relatives that the Tagas came to our village a long 
time ago. But we never intermarried with them so how can we 
be the Tagas or Dusun? 
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Christina, from the boundary area in Penampang and in her late 50s, used Kadazan 
when in the company of other Kadazans. She told me that, by switching to Kadazan in 
public, she was conscious of using language to conceal her Dusun identity. Christina 
explained that this was important to avoid the derogatory label tagaas. When she was a 
teenager, boys from Christine’s area would often get into fistfights with boys from the 
Kadazan-speaking area, as the latter would jeer and call the former tagaas: 
As a school student in the 1960s and 1970s I witnessed a lot of 
tension between the Kadazan and Dusun sides in Penampang. 
You see the situation was such that the more students there 
were from the Kadazan side in class; the more antagonised 
those from the Dusun side would feel. Similarly, if the majority 
of the class were Dusun, the Kadazan students would feel 
threatened. In secondary school especially, fights would break 
out between the boys, just because someone had called 
someone else tagaas. Then boys from different villages in the 
Kadazan-Dusun boundary areas would form a group to fight 
against the Kadazan boys. We [Kadazan-Dusun] would always 
win because there were more of us than them [Kadazan] at 
secondary school. But there were more of them than us in my 
primary school, so I was always scared of them. I didn’t dare 
speak to them in my [Dusun] language.  
Meanwhile, some Kadazan-Dusun speakers attempt to mask their mixed identity by 
using Malay and English, the languages that are popular with cosmopolitan Kadazans. 
Both English and Malay are spoken in school and in wider communication with others 
in towns and cities. Jennifer, aged in her 40s and identifying as Sino-Kadazan from a 
village in the boundary area, attempted to convince her husband, Mark, a fellow Sino-
Kadazan, to be more conscious about language use and identity to pattern more closely 
to the Kadazans. Both Jennifer and Mark were raised in families where one parent 
spoke Dusun and the other spoke Kadazan. At home, Kadazan and Dusun were used 
indeterminately. At the time of interview, Jennifer and Mark had four school-age 
children with two aged in their teens. Jennifer said: 
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I told my husband, speak to the kids in Kadazan. But he says, it 
is okay with me [if they don’t speak Kadazan], because I have a 
Chinese surname [siang] and therefore I don’t have to speak 
Kadazan, sothe kids don’t need to either. He said that he 
doesn’t want the kids to go through an experience like his. You 
were teased if you went to school and didn’t know how to 
speak Malay, and worse still if you didn’t know how to speak 
English, people would call you T-A-G-A-A-S. From the hills, 
they would say.  
So, the father says that he doesn’t need to speak Kadazan 
because he is Chinese, but he doesn’t speak Chinese either! 
Haha… Well, I want my kids to be able to speak like me: I can 
speak Tagas, Kadazan, and other languages. So, it would be nice 
if he also spoke the language with the kids, since we already 
speak Kadazan to each other. But I remember that language can 
get you into trouble. By speaking the Dusun, I would get called 
tagaas. In Penampang, the Kadazans would say to us, ‘Why is 
your language so different? It’s Tagas, right?’ We couldn’t 
answer. But when I started going to school, we learned 
Kadazan. Anyway, I managed to get our youngest to speak 
Kadazan, so at least one of my kids speaks to me in Kadazan. 
To use or not use the Kadazan label 
There is some reservation among Kadazans today to openly identify as Kadazan. Older 
Kadazans aged in their 70s and 80s expressed regret that Kadazan use of the term tagaas 
had caused offence to Dusun speakers in the past. Some considered it wrong that the 
term had been used at all to refer to Dusun. Mamai88 Danny, a Kadazan man in his late 
70s, said with remorse: 
We were wrong to look at the Dusuns as the Tagas and to have 
used this term tagaas against them [Dusun speakers]. See, how 
we [Kadazans] are estranged from them now due to all these 
politics when we should be unifying with them and letting go 
our differences. 
 
                                                
88 This is an honorific term meaning ‘male elder’ or ‘uncle’ in Kadazan.  
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Mamai Danny further explained that tagaas really had nothing to do with a group of 
people (ethnicity) but was a term used to describe or chastise a drunken person. That is, 
a person preoccupied with getting drunk is called a tagaas because he/she buys alcoholic 
homemade wine89 (momoduk) and further go out of one’s way to look for someone else 
with an alcohol surplus, and to make them part with some of their alcohol (mokiboduk).90 
Mamai Danny told me: 
To say tagaas is nothing more than a kind of saying or metaphor 
for someone who is prone to drinking the while away. We say 
to each other, ‘Don’t be a tagaas’ in order to stop the other 
person from doing the wrong thing or going the wrong way. 
A conversation with an elderly Dusun speaker revealed a lasting emotional impact as a 
result of Kadazan deployment of Tagas and tagaas. Now in his 70s, Alphonsus recalled 
that as a young boy in the 1930s, when his class teacher, a Kadazan, asked all Kadazans 
to stand up for a head-count, he would eagerly do so. But his teacher would come by his 
desk saying: ‘Alphonsus, what are you doing? You’re a Dusun, sit down!’ Alphonsus 
said: ‘The whole class would laugh. I was shocked and embarrassed. I had thought all 
along that I was a Kadazan. I think then it was because of my speaking Dusun that gave 
me away’. 
On another occasion, Alphonsus recalled how the Kadazan boys at school made fun of 
the food that he ate (boiled wild yams and river snails/tuntul), causing him to hide in the 
bushes to eat. But one day, a Sino-Kadazan student saw him and taunted, ‘Poor 
Alphonsus, is this all you can afford to eat? Why, you’re nothing like us [Kadazans]’.  
                                                
89 Talak is a derivative of arrack/arak (alcohol) and hiing (undiluted rice wine). 
90 Among Kadazans and Kadazandusuns drinking is generally permitted. Rice wine making 
among the Kadazans is a popular activity and plays a role in fostering camaraderie and male 
bonding. Male Kadazans in a village may set up a drinking hut outside their main house in 
order to distill and store rice wine called tapai. See Barlocco (2013). 
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Alphonsus said that as he grew older, he continued to feel anger towards Kadazans but 
decided to let go of the bad memories:  
You know, I still see that guy around today. He has probably 
forgotten what he said to me that day. But I never forgot how 
he made me feel. Whenever I feel bitter like this though, I have 
to let it go. I tell myself, ‘Why should I do to them what they 
have done to me?’ I have to remind myself that ‘revenge is a 
poison that one pours for oneself, and hoping the other would 
die’.  
Among younger Kadazans, the terms Tagas and tagaas appear to be dying out. Both 
terms are seen to belong to an older frame of reference and many younger Kadazans 
were not at all aware of the terms, indicating that anti-Dusun sentiment is not being 
transferred to subsequent Kadazan generations. Some Kadazans also say that nowadays 
while older terms of reference such as ‘upriver’ or ‘downriver’ are disappearing, terms 
such as sokid (interior/rural) are still used to refer to those coming from Dusun areas; 
although some claimed that sokid ought to be replaced with takad (highland) for the rural 
connotation in sokid can infer to backwardness.  
I observe that many Kadazans and Dusuns in Penampang are relying more and more on 
local forms of identification by drawing on such information as place names, including 
the name of their ancestral village, and kinship details. Penampang Kadazans and 
Dusuns, given their mobility in modern times, are likely to identify themselves according 
to their ancestral village, that is, the birthplace of their parents and/or grandparents. 
Inadvertently, this method averts attention away from the use of Kadazan or Dusun, as 
the mention of one’s nantadon (village of origin) is often enough to specify one’s identity 
as Kadazan or Dusun. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, this is a convention that is also 
common among other Sabahan groups interested in vetting the historicity of local 
identities given the presence of large migrant and PTI populations.  
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The lack of Kadazan label use shows that the Kadazans are perhaps changing in their 
self-perception around identity matters. Janet, a Kadazan woman in her 40s, told me 
that she has changed how she introduces herself to fellow Kadazandusuns. Instead of 
saying that she is a Kadazan, as she once would have done, she now says that she is 
from Penampang, and if more information is needed, she will then mention the village 
or ancestral village from which her family originates. When I asked Janet why she had 
changed her self-introduction, she said:  
I have become self-conscious over time. I think it is due to all 
this labelling talk. I don’t want people to start having different 
thoughts about me once they hear the word ‘Kadazan’. 
Anyway, things have changed; people don’t say ‘I am Kadazan’ 
or ‘I am Dusun’ anymore when they talk to each other. They 
just use the name of their area or village [for example, ‘I am 
from Monsopiad village’], and it is up to others to guess what 
kind of people live there [whether Kadazan, Dusun, or others]. 
Some Kadazans may also hesitate to use the Kadazan label due to a perception that it is 
tainted by a notion of ‘pride’. Studies show how Kadazans have become marked by 
status symbols, such as, educational achievement, English language proficiency and 
being part of the ‘intelligentsia’ (Reid, 1997) as a result of their participation in state 
politics in the pre-Independence period. Reflecting this, Kadazans are often viewed by 
other non-Muslim indigenes as self-important ‘orang bandar’ (city folk), and this 
reputation has carried well outside of the Penampang area. Melissa, a Dusun speaker in 
her 40s from the Ranau area, a wholly Dusun-speaking district, said: 
Yeah, in general, you have this feeling about the Kadazans 
whenever you meet one of them for the first time. I’m sure not 
all are like this, but on average, I can say that almost all the 
Kadazans that I have met would have this air about them [as 
though] they have their own worldview and approach to things, 
and it is somewhat better than ours [other indigenes].  
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‘Everyone has pride in themselves’, explained Marian, in her 50s, a Kadazan speaker 
from the Kadazan-Dusun speech boundary areas. Marian said, ‘But the Kadazans have 
extra pride in themselves. They feel like they’re constantly on top of the world: the 
superior ones among the Natives, the ones who have made it. This is their “high pride” 
about them’. Rosie, a Kadazan in her 30s who works as a nurse, commented that the 
way Dusuns talked to her seemed more polite than the Kadazans:  
Yeah, yeah… Kadazans and Dusuns are very different… 
Dusuns are more humble. Kadazans are more arrogant, to me 
lah91, I find, cos I am a Kadazan, I know. I find that maybe 
because they [the Kadazans] feel they are more superior 
compared to Dusuns… Dusuns are just more humble, more 
respectful compared to Kadazans… Dusuns are more polite 
whenever they speak…92 
When Kadazan informants were asked to comment on other’s perceptions of them, 
some claimed that this sort of superior behaviour or arrogance only came from ‘elitist 
Kadazans’, considered by other Kadazans to have a false sense of pride and entitlement, 
causing them to distance themselves socially. The terms au’ kasaamo (unable to bring 
oneself to mingle) and akakat (possessing ‘high pride’) were used to describe them. 
Some claimed that the behaviour of elitist Kadazans negatively affected the perception 
of Kadazans more broadly. Other Kadazan informants said that while they could agree 
with the general comment about Kadazans having ‘high pride’, those Kadazans with 
even higher pride were simply competitive and wanted to be the ‘better Kadazan’. 
‘These are the ones who have land, cash and are educated. People naturally look up to 
them because they are the “better Kadazan”’, said Aloysius, a 70-year old Kadazan man.  
                                                
91 Malay emphatic marker commonly used among Sabahans. 
92 Verbatim translation by the author. 
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While some Kadazans are critical of the dichotomous thinking behind the Kadazan-
Dusun opposition, other Kadazans attempt to justify Kadazan identity and reinforce the 
idea of Kadazan-Dusun difference, that is, Kadazans are modernistic while Dusuns are 
not. Crispin, a Kadazan man, aged in his late 50s, a civil service retiree, said: 
You know, it really should be about comparing city versus 
kampung people. Because you see, everyone is so exposed to 
modern things these days. How can you say, one is Kadazan, 
because he is modern, and the Dusun is the one still in the 
kampung? This is not true. You can’t prove anything this way, 
because nowadays, the Kadazans will always find anything 
bucolic as ‘primitive’, backwards and unmodernised, since they 
are not used to extreme village surroundings. And then Dusuns 
will say, you see, the Kadazans don’t like us because they see 
that we are from the kampung. So, whether Kadazan or Dusun, 
the question should be framed instead as those who live in the 
city versus those who live in the village, because the latter will 
tend to keep to traditional practices and not tend to mix and 
become influenced by others. 
References to Dusun thus continue to bring discomfort to some Kadazans who simply 
do not want their identity associated or compared to the Dusuns. In an interview with 
Margaret, a Kadazan in her late 30s, and her mother Catherine, in her 70s, Margaret 
became visibly upset when Catherine referred to her father as having ‘come down’ from 
the Dusun-speaking hills of Penampang, which the Tagas are perceived to occupy. 
Unhappy that her Kadazan identity might be tainted by Dusun proximity, Margaret kept 
asking her mother whether she was sure that it was a Dusun-speaking village that her 
grandfather had come from: 
Margaret: Are you sure, Mom? Are you really sure? Didn’t 
toing [grandfather] say that we had all come from 
Telipok? [an area outside of Penampang] 
Catherine: Yes, we did come through from there and then 
we came back to the Penampang area. But his 
own father was originally from village X [a village 
from the Dusun-speaking hills of Penampang]. 
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Margaret: But are you very sure, Mom? We are Kadazan, 
not Dusun. 
Catherine: Well, if you don’t believe me, ask your Auntie 
Vera. She knows this too. 
Margaret: Hmmm, I don’t know about this… [showing 
reluctance as her face visibly changed] 
In a similar case, Inai93 Lubi, an elderly woman in her 80s who identified as Kadazan, 
claimed that her parents were ‘Tagas’; however, her son strongly denied this connection. 
Inai Lubi said, ‘Yes, my parents were Tagas. They came from the dudan [a generic term 
for the innermost parts of a jungle]. All of their neighbours there were the Tagas’. 
However, her son, James, in his late 60s, said: 
Even though my mother says that he [grandfather] was a Tagas, 
I recall that he only spoke Tangaa [the Kadazan language]. So, 
my mother also only knows to speak Tangaa, and we, her 
children, also, know only Tangaa. So, you see, as Tangaa 
people, we are of the Kadazan group. Maybe she is thinking 
this to mean that her parents were people who had nothing or 
knew nothing, or something like that. 
Meanwhile, tension between Kadazans and Dusuns may still be present. Isabella, a 
Kadazan woman in her 20s, recounted how she went shopping with her mother and 
aunt, both Kadazans, in a popular shopping mall in the city. They entered a clothing 
boutique, with a view to trying on some clothes. Approaching the proprietor, Isabella 
started a conversation in Malay. She recalled: 
She [the proprietor] seem friendly and said that she was a 
Dusun and asked me whether I was a Dusun. When I said, 
‘Kadazan’, she gave us all a nasty look and walked away! My 
mother, my auntie and I were taken aback and we just stared at 
each other for a while wondering what had happened, and then 
we left the shop. We thought it was rude of her but it got me 
thinking that this labelling thing was still sensitive for some 
people. Maybe that’s why the owner of the shop got upset. 
What else could be the reason? 
                                                
93 An honorific for ‘female elder’ or ‘aunt’ in Kadazan.  
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‘If you are Kadazan, then speak Kadazan!’ 
Today, a movement to encourage Kadazans to use the Kadazan language indicates that 
the local dialect that one speaks continues to play an important role in defining identity. 
At present, the primary concern among many Kadazans—particularly the older 
generation which tends to be purist in this regard—is how to maintain Kadazan 
language use and project a clear Kadazan identity given diffused identities. As seen in 
previous chapters, Kadazans are multilingual with a strong desire to learn Chinese while 
Malay, that is Sabah Malay, is the primary language for overall communication. Elders 
and language advocates also have a strong concern about attitudinal changes. In some 
cases, Kadazans were more incline to acquire Dusun instead of Kadazan.  
Contemporary Kadazans have shifted markedly to the Malay language. A 1980s mother 
tongue use survey showed that while 50 per cent of Kadazan parents spoke Kadazan to 
their children, 40 per cent mixed their languages and the remainder had shifted fully to 
the Malay language (Lasimbang, Miller & Otigil, 1992). A recent study by Jane Wong, a 
linguist from Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), shows that urban youth, which include 
Kadazans, are likely to be monolingual in Sabah Malay. Wong (2000) shows that 50 per 
cent of urban respondents claim Sabah Malay as their mother tongue, while 30 per cent 
admit to speaking a ‘mixed language’ (bahasa campur-campur). 94  Meanwhile, only 20 per 
cent said they spoke Kadazan or a Native language at home. The stark difference in 
Kadazan language use in the 1980s and in the present confirms what some Kadazan 
elders feared: that the majority of Kadazans—‘80 per cent of Kadazans’—no longer 
speak, know how to, or want to speak in the Kadazan language. 
                                                
94 The evidence of ‘mixed language’ or code mixing among Kadazans shows that, while Kadazan 
is used for the purpose of vocabulary, the grammatical form draws on the Malay language 
structure. This insight was drawn from my discussions with Jane Wong. See also Wong’s 2000 
publication, The Sabah Malay Dialect: Phonological Structures and Social Functions.  
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The Kadazan preference for using the Malay language points to their overall use of 
Sabah Malay (a Bazaar Malay variety). Many Kadazans view Sabah Malay positively: it is 
the lingua franca in Sabah, which means that all ethnic groups know to speak it. It is 
commonplace in Sabah, for instance, to find that daily interactions—at the shops, 
outdoor markets, over the counter in government offices— are being conducted in the 
lingua franca Sabah Malay. To many Sabahans, the fact that most, if not all Sabahans, 
speak in Sabah Malay to each other, shows that the Sabah Malay language embodies the 
spirit of their multicultural Sabahan identity. Thus, many Kadazans say that Sabah Malay 
is a necessity not only for socio-economic mobility and wider communication, like 
(standard) Malay and English but for inter-ethnic camaraderie and relations. The use of 
Sabah Malay for inter-cultural social interaction and in multimedia (radio, television, and 
cinema) in the present time has further enhanced its status.  
One of the primary reasons for the decline in Kadazan language use is attributed to how 
many Kadazan parents rely on passive language learning strategies. For instance, some 
informants told me that they were confident that their children would eventually pick up 
the Kadazan language when they got older. Some believed that when their children 
become exposed to other Kadazans who want to learn the language, they would be 
influenced to do the same. Some Kadazan parents also said to me that, given neither 
they nor their children know how to speak Kadazan fluently, knowing and using just a 
few Kadazan words (‘sikit-sikit’) is sufficient for them. What is meant by ‘sikit-sikit’ here 
is the grasp of basic words and vocabulary, which do not require embedding in a fully 
formed sentence utilising Kadazan grammar. 
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Carolyn Miller, a language specialist from the USA who lived among the Kadazans in 
the 70s and 80s to study their language and culture, found that Kadazan children were 
more likely to adopt the mixed language (bahasa campur-campur) of their peers. Miller 
(1988) also stated that many Kadazan children lacked confidence in constructing full 
sentences in Kadazan because often their parents were themselves products of language 
shift. Jeannet Stephen, a university lecturer at the Universiti Malaysia Sabah, found that 
the competency of Kadazan children who were ‘passive bilinguals’ did not advance 
beyond listening. Passive bilingualism was exhibited in Kadazan families where parents 
would attempt to speak to their children in Kadazan, but their children would or could 
only respond in Malay or English (Stephen, 1999).  
Several Kadazan informants, aged in their 20s and 30s, said that while they would have 
liked to learn Kadazan when younger but they had not learned it from their parents at 
home. Hoping to acquire Kadazan when older, these soon realised that there was very 
little opportunity for practise. These informants said that there was no one to hold a 
conversation with, as none of their fellow Kadazan friends and/or relatives were 
sufficiently competent in Kadazan. One informant told me that, out of her desire to 
acquire the Kadazan language, she attended all of her relatives’ gatherings (weddings and 
birthday parties) so that she might practise speaking in Kadazan to elders in attendance. 
Many Kadazan language advocates and elders now try to create awareness in the 
Kadazan community by claiming that the Kadazan culture and identity would die 
without the Kadazan language. Some Kadazan language advocates tend to place the 
whole blame of language decline on Kadazan parents who permit use of multiple and 
non-Kadazan languages in the home domain. Many Kadazan parents (who do not 
practice Kadazan language at home or elsewhere) disagree with this view that 
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competency in Kadazan underscores Kadazan identity. Maria, in her early 30s, a Sino-
Kadazan, said, ‘Just because I do not speak Kadazan does not mean that I am not a 
Kadazan’.  
However, when speaking to Angeline, a Kadazan woman in her late 60s, who considers 
herself a true Kadazan because she still spoke the Kadazan language, I found that there 
are staunch views against laissez-faire attitudes. As Angeline told me, ‘If they do not speak 
Kadazan then I will not speak to them’. Angeline explained: 
I went to this coffee shop. I knew the proprietors there. They 
are Sino-Kadazans fluent in Kadazan. But the daughter or 
granddaughter, I am not sure, was serving the coffee. I spoke to 
her in Kadazan, something like, ‘Hi, how are you, where are 
your folks today?’ And she replied to me in Malay. I said, ‘Speak 
Kadazan-bah; you’re Kadazan’. Can you imagine this? She was 
so rude. She said, ‘I don’t speak Kadazan—so what?’ Well, I 
just got into it and lectured her. I told her that she should speak 
Kadazan since her parents and grandparents know how to 
speak it. Her face became so glum and she was not friendly 
after that.  
I asked Angeline, ‘Do you consider that girl a Kadazan still?’ Angeline replied:  
Well, no, and I don’t care anymore. These young people don’t 
want to speak Kadazan, even when they understand the 
language. So, if I speak to them in Kadazan, and they don’t 
answer me in Kadazan, I will not continue speaking to them. 
To me, they do not want to be Kadazan. So, they are not 
Kadazan. 
Grandparents of Kadazan children also place pressure on their grown children to ‘save 
the mother tongue’. Lawrence, a Kadazan man, is married to a Murut woman with 
whom he has three children. His oldest two children are enrolled in a public school 
where the majority of the children are Chinese and Malay. Lawrence and his wife were 
considering having their youngest child (newborn at the time of the interview) attend a 
Chinese school in her primary years. Lawrence explained: 
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Every time I visit my parents on the weekends with the kids, I 
get a lecture from my mother about my not teaching the kids 
Kadazan. You see, I grew up in a fluent Kadazan-speaking 
family, where all my [nine] siblings spoke it. So, people may ask 
how come we didn’t pass down this tradition to our own 
children. My mother has been influenced lately, I think, by her 
friends from neighbouring villages. She will say things like, ‘You 
know so-and-so’s daughter/son? Well, now they speak Kadazan 
in their family and my goodness, it was so delightful to hear 
their young children, even those aged three or so, speaking in 
Kadazan’. And then very quickly, she will add, ‘Now, why don’t 
you do that? Because if you don’t, you might regret not doing 
so in the future, when your kids don’t want to care about these 
sort of things [about Kadazan language and culture]’. But I 
don’t want to respond to her on this topic, because it’s not that 
easy. She doesn’t understand what it’s really like out there. 
He continued: 
… And yes, of course, I feel guilty when she talks like this, but 
you see, my wife and I already speak English between ourselves, 
and we intersperse Malay with English with the kids. 
Sometimes at home, I think of what my mother has said, and 
then I attempt to say a few short and simple sentences with my 
oldest two. Well, they say things like, ‘Daddy, you sound funny 
when you talk Kadazan!’ […]  
So at the end of it all, I think I will just follow my older sister 
on this one. She had much success teaching her kids Kadazan 
when they were young. They’re older now and have still 
retained the language. But that was a long time ago, and she 
said to me recently that the Kadazan language is actually only 
useful with family and Kadazan people, and that there is a 
whole big world out there and things are changing so fast with 
technology and all. She said that my kids would be 
disadvantaged when they grow up, if we do not expose them to 
other languages [Malay, English] starting now. 
Maintenance apart from loyalty plays a significant role in mother tongue transmission 
and language maintenance (Fasold, 1992), and as such, more conversations with 
Kadazans regarding language attitudes revealed their resoluteness around 
multilingualism and cosmopolitan identities. I spoke with Kadazan families living in the 
city, whose children spoke mainly English at home; these parents also had little 
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enthusiasm for learning the Kadazan language at home. My discussions with these 
families showed that many parents questioned the relevance of the Kadazan language in 
a world where learning Malay, English and, especially Chinese, are seen as necessary for 
future economic success. These parents placed a high premium on multilingualism and 
resisted their children learning and speaking Kadazan, as such practice did not match 
their cosmopolitan identity—a key to their future success. 
Meanwhile, other informants claimed that, given the blending by Kadazans into the 
broader Sabahan society through intermarriage with other groups, the use of Kadazan is 
simply impractical. Patricia is a Kadazan woman in her 40s married to a fellow Kadazan 
with whom she has three teenage children. Patricia had a traditional Kadazan upbringing 
in the village and spoke Kadazan exclusively in the home. Over the years, her values had 
changed, and she preferred that her children attend Chinese schooling. As a result, her 
teenage children conversed in Chinese whenever they wanted to prevent Patricia from 
knowing what they were talking about. As for their home language, Patricia and her 
husband used to speak to their children in Kadazan but they slowly shifted to Malay, 
and now Malay is the main language spoken at home. 
Patricia claimed that her family still attempted to speak Kadazan at home but admitted 
that it was sporadic and cumbersome. She found herself translating instructions she had 
uttered in Malay into Kadazan, and her children found this irritating. Patricia said that 
her children nevertheless still somehow learned about their ethnicity and understood 
that as Kadazans they were different from their Chinese friends at school. Patricia 
admitted that she did not think her children strongly identified as Kadazan but still 
believed that a sense for Kadazan identity would come, as they grew older. 
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How the concerns of the younger Kadazan generation differ from those of their elders 
is elaborated in the next example. Three Kadazan young women, Mia, Carmen and 
Serena, cousins in their early to mid-20s, told me about the pressure they felt to 
converse in Kadazan. They were conscious of their poor mastery of Kadazan and 
limited exposure to and knowledge of Kadazan traditions. However, their orientation in 
life was clearly directed at being multicultural and multilingual and the trio’s defiance 
was discernible during the interview, as they attempted to justify their lifestyle choices 
without Kadazan language or identity. Serena began:95 
I asked my dad this, ‘why did you speak to us in English?’ 
because they [Serena’s parents] were fluent in Kadazan. We 
understand a bit of what they [parents] say to us in Kadazan, we 
get the gist of it, but we can’t answer back in rolls of Kadazan 
words. So, if you try and speak it, and people laugh at you […] 
That’s the thing for me. […] Then, if you don’t speak, you can’t 
join in the conversation because you can’t express yourself fully. 
Mia piped up and asked, ‘As how you experienced doing the MC [Master of 
Ceremonies] thing the other day?’. Serena acted as MC for a social event and had 
been asked to use Kadazan in order to relate to the older Kadazans in the crowd. 
According to Serena, although an older relative who was fluent in the language 
wrote Serena’s MC script, the audience gave her blank stares. While Serena said 
she felt that she pronounced the words correctly, Mia claimed that Serena’s 
intonation was off. Serena said:  
Yeah, even Fanny and Alvin [two older cousins in their 30s and 
40s] asked who wrote the script I was reading, because even the 
words used were quite deep. We couldn’t really understand. I 
said, ‘Was it how I said it?’ ‘No, no, the words were deep’, they 
said. But I just read it, I didn’t even understand it. One thing I 
was proud of was that people said I pronounced it quite well, 
haha… 
                                                
95 Verbatim translation by the author. 
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A dialogue then ensued about using Kadazan in a church setting:  
Carmen:  Like going to Kadazan mass, for instance. I don’t 
like going to Kadazan mass. I don’t understand it!         
I look at the people around me and I say to 
myself, I don’t belong here. 
Serena:  But Car, can you say the Our Father and Hail 
Mary in Kadazan? 
Carmen:  Yes. 
Serena:  Do you feel that you are praying more if you are 
saying it in English?  
Carmen:  Yeah, it means something, because I can 
understand. 
Serena:  Yeah, I can say it in Kadazan after years of going 
to the October thing of the rosary. But when I say 
it in English it means more. 
Mia, the quietest of the three cousins, then intervened:  
Here’s the question, would you even think of… thinking about 
Kadazan language or culture in times of need when you don’t 
have Kadazan to begin with? [All girls vehemently said, ‘No!’]. 
It’s the same with religion, how can you pray if you don’t 
believe in anything? So, I think we are all practising Kadazan 
every day without realising. And for me that’s why I feel that I 
am Kadazan.  
Serena, the most vocal of the cousins, responded, ‘But I still feel you don’t need 
to speak Kadazan to be Kadazan. I can’t control how other people see me’. 
Mia:  So is that it, where’s that element of Kadazan in us 
then? In the name only?  
Serena:  No, I think it’s in the culture. 
Mia:  But we’re talking about Carmen here… What does she 
do that symbolises her [being] Kadazan? 
Carmen:  It’s only in the name. I already teach English at school.  
Serena:  But culture wise, I still identify myself as Kadazan. 
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Mia:  What do you do that’s Kadazan? We eat Peking Duck 
[iconic Chinese dish]. 
Serena and Carmen fell silent. Mia then said: 
See, that’s why. The only thing I have that is ‘Kadazan’ is my 
name. I don’t want to say that I am Kadazan sometimes, 
because you have to explain more, and then me myself I don’t 
know, I don’t understand, like how you were categorised, what 
Kadazan are you...the sort of Kadazan that is stupid/hopeless 
because they do not know how to speak Kadazan [yang Kadazan 
buduh, tidak pandai cakap]. 
Meanwhile, I observed that even as many Kadazans would say that the Kadazans 
continue to be distinguished from the Dusuns by their language, I found that Kadazans 
overall appear to have become more inclusive over time towards the Dusun language. 
For instance, many Kadazans are well versed with the contemporary Dusun songs 
played on the radio and through karaoke. These Kadazans claimed Dusun songs to be 
entertaining: evoking a bucolic kampung or village scene, recounting unrequited love and 
love-gone-wrong and occasionally poking fun at classism (rich and poor) in 
Kadazandusun society. Many Kadazans have also become heavily exposed to Dusun 
singers and songs through the popularity of Dusun singers in the mainstream media. In 
the past decade or so, many distinguished Dusun singers and entertainers, primarily 
from other parts of Sabah, perform on radio and TV. Some have accomplished high 
rankings on musical reality shows. For example, Stracie (Stacy) Angie Anam from 
Penampang (a Kadazandusun) became a season winner on Akademi Fantasia, a Malay 
language series broadcast on national TV. Felix Agus was another famous contemporary 
Dusun singer named by informants; while the late John Gaisah said to be the ‘Tom 
Jones’ of his time was another famous Dusun singer, according to older informants. 
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Some younger Kadazans, who are not familiar with Kadazan songs, said to me that 
Kadazan songs tend to be the ‘oldies’ to them, since only their parents or grandparents’ 
generations favoured them. The word songkotoun (evergreen) was used to refer to 
Kadazan songs, whereby those created in the 1960s and 1970s, have simpler veneers 
with uncomplicated subject matters. Yet, some Kadazans said that while Dusun songs 
may be plentiful and popular, they still preferred songs in their own Kadazan language. 
Some claimed they could not relate to the songs in Dusun as the lyrical content was 
unsophisticated and encouraged a preoccupation with provincial life.  
As the topic of mother tongue preservation was a major one among my Kadazan 
informants, one of the subjects of trenchant criticism by purist Kadazans is the 
Kadazandusun language teaching in school. The similarity in sound between 
Kadazandusun and the Dusun dialect caused some critics to fear that Kadazan children 
were being Dusunised. These reject the Kadazandusun language and some also reject 
the Kadazandusun label in the process. I will now discuss the Kadazans’ views towards 
the Kadazandusun language and label in greater detail in the following and final core 
chapter. 
154 
 
 
Mr. Sylvester Disimon, Deputy President of Kadazan Society Sabah (KSS) introduces 
the KSS’s first Kadazan Dictionary, 20 December 2013. Source: 
http://sabahevents.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/kadazan-society-sabah-launched-its.html 
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Chapter 6: Kadazandusun and Kadazan 
At one point in time, Dusuns (including Kadazans) in Penampang may have look back 
to the hills as their original home (Glyn-Jones, 1953: 13) but today, I found that few 
Kadazan informants claim to have descended from the ‘hills’. Contemporary Kadazans 
are more incline to claim plural identities owing to extensive intermarriages in their 
families, whether with groups from Sabah, Malaysia more generally, or from other 
countries.  
Similarly, the place of Penampang, while retaining the image as the Kadazans’ 
homeland, has also changed dynamically in relation to Dusuns and Kadazandusuns at 
large. For instance, many Dusuns in Penampang come from elsewhere in Sabah and 
choose to reside in Penampang for convenience’s sake, as it is the closest district or area 
to Kota Kinabalu city, where they work. Some also find Penampang to be an appealing 
place to live in not only because of how it is heavily populated with Kadazandusuns, but 
because it is highly urbanised but at the same time, there is still a lot of focus on culture 
and traditions owing to the work of advocates such as KDCA and the Kadazandusun 
Language Foundation (KLF). As one informant said, ‘It is nice to be able to go to the 
weekly tamu in Donggongon’. Another said, ‘If I want to learn about what’s going on in 
terms of culture and politics, I just take a look at Penampang because people 
(Kadazandusuns) there are on-trend’. 
Given the scenario above, I found that some Kadazans are struggling with the idea of 
the broader indigenous grouping identity in Kadazandusun, as these generally seek to 
locate their identities more locally. Some Kadazans are especially against the formulation 
of Kadazandusun in the first place. While Penampang Dusun speakers who have both 
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Kadazan and Dusun parents say that these did not mind calling themselves as ‘Kadazan-
Dusun’ or ‘Dusun-Kadazan’, these monikers are not the same as the now official 
Kadazandusun label, which has override the Kadazan and Dusun labels in official 
records, particularly in census and in the political arena. Many Kadazans as well as 
Dusuns may use the label Kadazandusun following their leaders, but the label and the 
formation of the Kadazandusun identity on the whole are marked with contention. 
In 1997, the two prominent cultural associations, KDCA and USDA, representing 
Kadazan and Dusun, respectively, agreed to the use of a single ethnic label 
‘Kadazandusun’, which first came to light through projects to save ‘the mother tongue’, 
a reference to the native languages and dialects of Kadazans and Dusuns. In 1989, 
KDCA, which was then called Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA), endeavoured to 
create a mother tongue education plan but tension ensued between Kadazan and Dusun 
leaders, as both groups wished to see their own dialects become taught as standard 
languages. In a language symposium organised by KDCA, its president, Pairin Kitingan, 
stated that Dusuns disputed the Kadazan standard language plan ‘with scepticism and at 
times blind resentment’ (Yee, 1991: 467). Pairin said: 
The development of a standard Kadazan language suffered a 
serious setback during British rule simply because the British 
Government found it difficult to obtain the consensus of the 
other Kadazan communities to have one of the dialects taught 
in our schools. Had it not been for this impediment, I believe 
the Kadazan Language would have been taught in our schools 
today. While we quarreled among ourselves, our Iban friends 
managed to have their dialect taught at the primary and lower 
secondary level. Had we set our minds to work together among 
ourselves the past three decades could have produced volumes 
of useful reading materials for our children in the primary and 
perhaps secondary schools. Now, in the twilight of the 20th 
century, it is time we stopped being parochial and, instead, 
made a serious effort to standardise the Kadazan dialects.  
(Yee, 1991: 467) 
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Kadazan leaders tried to urge Dusun leaders to once again adopt the Kadazan label, 
promoted in the 1960s by Donald Stephens, but Dusun leaders resisted. To prevent 
Dusuns from becoming subsumed under the Kadazan identity, USDA conducted a 
separate Kaamatan celebration in May 1989 to protest against the statements made by 
Pairin Kitingan. Although USDA leaders did not amalgamate with the then Kadazan 
Cultural Association (KCA) despite KCA’s appeal for USDA to do so, the KCA 
eventually went on to be renamed the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association (KDCA) in 
1991 as an attempt at rapprochement. Raymond Tombung, the deputy president of the 
USDA, reiterated the position of the USDA in demanding equal respect in label choice. 
Tombung said: 
From the community’s standpoint, we have accepted a 
compromise due to history and events in the generation that 
followed the 1961 decision [referring to the adoption of 
‘Kadazan’ over ‘Dusun’]. While others in the community have 
succeeded in promoting the word Kadazan, we have succeeded 
in retaining the word Dusun.96 
However, Dusun leaders began to acquiesce to Kadazan influence, when Kadazan 
leaders’ application for permission from the Malaysian Ministry of Education for the 
teaching of the Kadazan language in schools was granted in 1997.97 Dusun leaders 
decided to enter an agreement with Kadazan leaders for a share in the development of a 
standard language. Given their previous conflict over labels, to avoid ensuing debate, 
Dusun leaders agreed to combine the Dusun label with ‘Kadazan’ to form 
‘Kadazandusun’ as the name of the standard language. Kadazan leaders, on the other 
hand, agreed to the Dusun dialect (called Bunduliwan) as the base of the Kadazandusun 
                                                
96 See “Wrangle over a label”, 1994.  
97 The Kadazan language proposal was granted for teaching in Malaysian schools under the 
Pupil’s Own Language (POL) provision, a proviso that typically applied to Chinese, Tamil and 
Iban (Sarawak) schools where the medium of instruction is the standard language of the 
particular ethnic group (Kua, 1998). Official acceptance of the Kadazandusun language as a 
POL in Malaysia is the first time since Independence in 1963 that a vernacular language from an 
indigenous group has been permitted in the public school curriculum.  
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language, given that Dusun speakers outnumbered Kadazan speakers. See Appendix B 
for a copy (in Malay) of the Bunduliwan and Kadazandusun language agreements with 
English translations. 
Today, the term ‘Kadazandusun’ is commonplace and refers not just to the 
Kadazandusun language but more so to the sense of a broader grouping among 
Kadazans and Dusuns. Kadazan and Dusun leaders’ resolve on labelling issues has since 
influenced the authorities to adopt Kadazandusun as a new grouping label and to ratify 
the ethnic classification of the Kadazans and Dusuns. For instance, in the 1999 census, 
the Kadazan and Dusun groups were listed in two separate columns, but since the 2003 
census they have been merged under the single heading, ‘Kadazan Dusun’.  
However, there continues to be issues among Kadazans, and Dusuns for that matter, in 
their acceptance for the Kadazandusun label and language. When the Kadazandusun 
label was first introduced in the late 1990s, many Kadazans and Dusuns protested as the 
Kadazandusun label suggested that they could be both Kadazan and Dusun, which 
seemed inconceivable to many. Most Kadazans and Dusuns saw themselves as either 
‘Kadazan’ or ‘Dusun’ with the possible exception of those individuals who had both 
Kadazan and Dusun parents. Those who rejected, and continue to reject, the term 
protested by using punctuation marks, such as dashes, hyphens and slashes, to show 
that the two groups were distinct. For example, Kadazandusun was often written as 
‘Kadazan/Dusun’, ‘Dusun/Kadazan’, ‘Kadazan-Dusun’ or ‘Dusun-Kadazan’, 
‘Dusunkadazan’ or ‘DusunKadazan’, among other variations. Among researchers of the 
Kadazans and Dusuns as well, there was and continues to be a tendency to keep the two 
labels separate so as to ‘avoid taking sides’ (Reid, 2011).  
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Tombung had earlier stated that the Kadazan label promotion had caused many Dusuns 
to become defensive because of how Kadazan proponents had implied that Dusuns 
were ‘dungu, kotor, tidak berpelajaran, miskin, dan tidak bertamadun (in Malay)’ (‘yokel, dirty, 
uneducated, poor, and uncivilised’) (1992: 88). Tombung cited several proposed terms 
arising from Kadazans and Dusuns, such as ‘Kadus’ and ‘Duska’, abbreviation of 
Kadazan-Dusun and Dusun-Kadazan, respectively, that were not being considered by 
Kadazan leaders. Meanwhile, James (1983) had proposed ‘Kadusun’ to resolve the 
choice of either Dusun or Kadazan and Majihi (1979) had also raised the possibility of 
the term ‘Pasok Momogun’ (original inhabitant), a label attributed as the idea of G. S. 
Sundang, leader of Dusuns.  
The negative view towards the Kadazandusun label became exacerbated when many 
Kadazandusun politicians further created alternatives to the Kadazandusun label. These 
politicians did not view the Kadazandusun label as uniquely inclusive as dating back to 
the 1960s, the ‘Kadazan’ label had been promoted to the Dusun group as well as other 
indigenous groups such as the Murut group. Some politicians began addressing this 
problem by changing the term ‘Kadazandusun’ to ‘KadazanDusunMurut’ or KDM and 
‘KadazanDusunMurutPaitan’ (KDMP), and these alternate labels circulated quickly. The 
term ‘Paitan’ in this case referred to indigenes in Sabah’s outlying, northeastern parts.  
Jeannet Stephen (2000) studied the use of the KDM and KDMP labels and argued that, 
in creating such labels, the Kadazandusun leadership was unnecessarily creating 
disputation. Stephen found that the label ‘KadazandusunMurut’ had no clear criteria to 
distinguish it from ‘Kadazandusun’ and whether it meant a new language or a new 
identity. Stephen further argued that the KDM label was causing emotional distress: 
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… the sudden and unannounced appearance of the label 
‘KadazandusunMurut’ is adding another strain to the already 
blurred and chequered history of the Kadazandusun in terms of 
labels, which brings further social and psychological effects on 
the ethnic identity of the Kadazandusun. It is however 
unknown whether the organisations representing the 
Kadazandusun language and culture are doing anything 
concrete on addressing the matter of the new ethnic label. … 
The ethnic label ‘KadazandusunMurut’ should be duly 
explained and defined or it should stop be used because of the 
confusion that it brings to the already agreed label 
‘Kadazandusun’.  
Should this be a redefinition of the ethnic label ‘Kadazandusun’ 
then a consensus would probably be the best way to approach it 
and document it so that the future generations of the 
communities concerned has a definitive answer when asked by 
other people on the difference between ‘Dusun’, ‘Kadazan’, 
‘Kadazandusun’ and ‘KadazandusunMurut’.  
(Stephen, 2000: 17 & 21) 
Perhaps the problem could have been avoided, as some informants suggest, if people 
had been given the opportunity to vote for or against the Kadazandusun label. But such 
voting would almost certainly have shown that Kadazans and Dusuns each wanted to 
use their own label. For instance, Peter, a Dusun man aged in his 40s from Tambunan, a 
Dusun-speaking district, was unwilling to say that he is a Kadazandusun and told me:  
I just can’t bring myself to say, ‘I am Kadazandusun’, because 
you see, I am a Dusun [from] Tambunan. I speak Dusun and I 
grew up in a Dusun area. I don’t know anything about Kadazan 
[language]. I don’t even speak it. So, why should I even claim 
that I am it, or even part of it? 
In another example, the ‘Kadazandusun’ label was seen as curbing the freedom of 
Kadazan and Dusun individuals to choose their ethnic label, as they had done since the 
1960s. Roger, a Rungus man from Kudat, aged in his 50s, believed in determining his 
own identity and had chosen ‘Kadazan’ over ‘Dusun’. He said:  
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For me, personally, I prefer to call myself Kadazan even though 
I am a Rungus. Yes, most Rungus do call themselves Dusun 
because our area in Kudat is closer to Dusun areas than to 
Kadazan areas. But for me, Kadazan is far superior to being 
Dusun, socially and politically. And being Rungus is even less 
superior to being Dusun. So, for me, I prefer to call myself 
Kadazan.  
However, in the course of 20 years, despite the anger, confusion and disappointment 
among some Kadazans and Dusuns, many others have resigned to the Kadazandusun 
concept, and to the change of label and identity overall. The KDCA has also since 
reformulated the identity of Kadazan and Dusun groups. In KDCA’s list of 
Kadazandusun groups below, groups are now referred to according to the name of their 
dialects. For instance, what used to be Kadazan is now referred to as ‘Tangara’ (or 
Tangaa in the Kadazan dialect) while the ‘Bundu’ and ‘Liwan’ referring to downstream 
and upstream Dusun dialect communities, respectively, are typically associated with 
Dusun. Note that members of other groups stated in the list would have been recorded 
as being either Kadazan or Dusun in census in the past, according to their preference. 
Further note that in addition to Kadazan and Dusun groups, KDCA also recognises 
groups from other indigenous Bornean categories, that is, Murut and Other Indigenous, 
to be part of the Kadazandusun category, and some of these groups are found in the 
KDCA Kadazandusun grouping list on the following page.  
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Table 2: Kadazandusun groups according to KDCA 
 
The Kadazandusun Cultural Association’s (KDCA) constitution 
Article 6 (1) defines Kadazandusuns as the definitive indigenous 
peoples of Sabah comprising the following dialectical ethnic groups: 
Bisaya Kuijau Murut Sungei 
Bonggi Lingkabau Nabai Tatana 
Bundu Liwan Paitan Tangara 
Dumpas Lobu Pingas Tidong 
Gana Lotud Rumanau Tindal 
Garo Lundayo Rungus Tobilung 
Ida’an Makiang Sinobu Tolinting 
Kadayan Malapi Sinorupu Tombonuo 
Kimaragang Mangkaak Sonsogon Tuhawon 
Kolobuan Minokok Sukang Tutung 
Source: http://kdca.org.my/kadazandusun 
 
Overall, the Kadazandusun label appears generally accepted, as some Kadazans and 
Dusuns are open to the Kadazandusun label and the reconfiguration of Kadazan and 
Dusun groups, because of how the label primarily functions as a cover term for all 
indigenes primarily from the non-Muslim Bumiputera groups. For instance, there are 
some Kadazans who relinquish the Kadazan label in favour of ‘Kadazandusun’.                     
For example, Lucia, a Kadazan from Penampang, aged in her 40s, said ‘Why shouldn’t 
Murut people or whoever call themselves Kadazandusun? If it works for me, it should 
work for them, too. I can’t tell them what to call themselves’.  
However, while there were a few informants like Lucia above, I noted that Kadazans 
and Dusuns, in their teens, 20s and 30s, appear to use the term Kadazandusun without 
much reservation, while older Kadazans and Dusuns were generally more cautious and 
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would seek to argue the distinctions between the two labels in question. Many younger 
Kadazans and Dusuns view the term ‘Kadazandusun’ positively because they are 
unaware of the tension between Kadazans and Dusuns. In particular, the term 
‘Kadazandusun’ is used, as it is convenient and provides a quick way to introduce 
oneself. Imelda, a Dusun woman from Papar in her mid-20s, said: 
It’s too hard to explain to people, especially people who are not 
from Sabah, just what I am. If I say that I am Kadazan, then I 
also have to explain why I don’t think I am Dusun. I don’t 
understand all these things myself. So, I just call myself 
Kadazandusun. Then, no one asks me further. End of story 
[Tutup cerita]. 
Several informants said to me that if they were grievances, the rejection of the 
Kadazandusun label should not be overemphasised because of the potential conflict that 
can arise. These informants cautioned against talking about labels in general because the 
topic is seen as dividing non-Muslim Bumiputera groups from one another, in the face 
of the more tightly knit Muslim Bumiputera groups. The Muslim Bumiputera groups are 
perceived to be more united because of their shared identity as Muslims. As some 
informants said: ‘They [the Malays] are strong because they have something to unite 
them. We have nothing that can truly unite us and we should remind ourselves of this 
instead of going on and on about labels’. 
The emphasis from their leaders on cohesion and unity has done much to soften the 
stance of some Kadazans and Dusuns. In political speeches by Kadazan and Dusun 
leaders, for instance, use of the ‘Kadazandusun’ label is justified through discussion of 
cultural similarities, rather than differences, among the Dusuns and Kadazans. The 
slogan ‘Iso ii ngaavi tokou’ or ‘We are all the same’ is used not only to engender a sense of 
collective identity but also to curb any discussion on socio-cultural differences, as had 
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occurred in the past. In political rallies, in the 1990s and 2000s, PBS would also create a 
similar slogan ‘Misompuru tokou vagu’ (‘We will unite again’), which resonated with the call 
to focus on similarities. Thus, while Kadazandusun as a label was largely devoid of 
meaning to most Kadazans and Dusuns on the ground, politicians used the term to 
refer to any non-Muslim Bumiputera and so allude to the idea of an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1989), where members are all perceived to adhere to the same 
identity and to want the same outcomes.  
However, some Kadazans and Dusuns also criticise the creation of the Kadazandusun 
language. Since the Kadazandusun language program in schools began in 1997, it has 
reached over 30,000 students at the primary school level. Today, it is taught at the 
secondary school level as an elective in the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) exam 
(Malaysian Education Certificate), the basic secondary school qualification in Malaysia. 
The Kadazandusun language is also taught as an elective at Universiti Malaysia Sabah 
(UMS), which recognised it as a foreign language program. It is mandatory for medical 
students, for instance, to acquire mastery in Kadazandusun language prior to their 
residencies in hospitals. As such, the teaching and expansion of the Kadazandusun 
language has the financial, moral and technical support of the Malaysian Ministry of 
Education, the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education, the Sabah Education 
Department, KDCA, USDA and KLF, and other volunteers and donation sponsors. 
Stephen and Atin (2004) reported that the Rungus feared that they were being 
‘Kadazandusunised’ by cultural associations KDCA and USDA through the teaching of 
the Kadazandusun language in their schools. The Rungus pointed out that the language 
campaign was akin to how they were ‘Kadazanised’ in the 1960s through the promotion 
of the Kadazan label. Rungus speakers criticised the Kadazandusun language as bearing 
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little, if any, resemblance to their own dialects. At the same time, Rungus parents 
wondered why their own language could not be taught in schools in their own 
neighbourhood, as almost everyone spoke Rungus and not the major dialects of 
Kadazan or Dusun. Atin (2004) reported that the number of schools offering the 
Kadazandusun language is declining because there is not enough demand from parents 
to keep classes open.98  
Based on my own calculations, the Coastal Kadazan (Tangaa) dialect in the Penampang 
district and the Central Dusun (Bundu) dialect in Tambunan district are mutually 
intelligible with more than 90 per cent shared cognates (Tangit, 2005). In contrast, the 
Rungus dialect in the Kudat district to the north is less intelligible to the Coastal 
Kadazan and Central Dusun dialect speakers, and vice-versa, with intelligibility cross-
tests resulting in less than 50 per cent intelligibility (King & King, 1984; Stephen & Atin, 
2004). According to Banker and Banker (1984), linguistic groups within the Dusunic 
language family form a dialect-chain with mutual intelligibility determined according to 
where speakers are located on the chain. 
Despite the higher rate of mutual intelligibility between Kadazan and Dusun speakers, 
among Kadazans, purists were critical of the Kadazandusun language and felt that it was 
detracting from their campaign to save the Kadazan language from erosion. In 
particular, Kadazan purists criticised in the first instance the lackadaisical attitude of 
many parents in transmitting the Kadazan language to their children, and in the second 
instance, the openness of many Kadazan parents towards the Kadazandusun language.  
                                                
98 See Stephen & Atin (2004), Atin (2004), and Tangit (2005). 
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Kelly and her husband, in their 30s, are both fluent Kadazan speakers but speak Malay 
at home to their three children. With her children taking Kadazandusun at school, Kelly 
and her husband attempted to speak some Dusun with their children to provide them 
with some practice. Both Kelly and her husband knew some Dusun through learning it 
from friends in the workplace. The couple spoke some Kadazan with their parents and 
Kadazan relatives but most of the time the conversations were peppered with Malay and 
English words. Kelly worried that she would be seen as ‘spoiling’ the Kadazan identity 
through her actions. Kelly told me: 
Yes, I know it’s [Kadazandusun’s] Dusun, but it’s okay with my 
husband and me. Otherwise, the kids would just know to speak 
in Malay at home. Oh, how I suffer when certain relatives come 
to visit. There is this one aunt of mine; she says I am turning 
my back on my own Kadazan people. ‘To think that you 
yourself actually know how to speak in Kadazan [Gazangan no do 
apandai ko moboos Kadazan]’, she will say, implying that I should 
teach them Kadazan but instead am letting my children learn 
Dusun. It’s like I have spoiled my children’s Kadazan identity 
by allowing them to learn Kadazandusun. I just ignore her 
when she gets into this sort of talk. Finally, when she feels like 
I’ve completely given her the shove, she’ll say, ‘For goodness 
sake, if you’re Kadazan then speak Kadazan!’ 
Not all Kadazans are against the Kadazandusun language and saw things positively, but 
there are mixed perspectives on the matter. Kadazan informants who had children 
taking the Kadazandusun language in school generally spoke positively about the 
program. Kadazan student, Patricia, an 18-year old recent high school graduate had 
completed six years of Kadazandusun instruction at school. With both her parents being 
fluent Kadazan speakers, Patricia claimed that she was also fluent in Kadazan. Patricia 
told me: 
I never truly realised that Kadazan and Dusun people were 
different when I was young. I also did not realise that their 
languages were different. Only when I entered secondary 
school, did I begin to see for myself that those who spoke 
Kadazan were in one group, and those speaking Dusun were 
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together in another group. As for learning Kadazandusun, my 
parents never told me that this was not actually their language, 
or a language that they liked or did not like. In fact, they would 
send me to an aunt who would help us with our Kadazandusun 
homework. [Patricia’s aunt is also a Kadazan who has some 
understanding of the Dusun language.] For me, it was a 
language for all Kadazandusuns. 
Other young Kadazans I spoke with, who learnt the language in school, also viewed the 
Kadazandusun language positively. Due to it being taught in the school domain, a place 
of prestige, these young people saw the Kadazan language as a status symbol and this 
sentiment became transferred to other young Kadazans who had never taken the class 
at school. Overall, promotion of the Kadazandusun language was viewed as an honour 
or tribute bestowed upon the Kadazan community.  Some Kadazan youth likened the 
Kadazandusun language program to Kaamatan, which is also heavily funded by the 
government. Both were considered as recognising the Kadazandusuns as a distinct 
ethnic grouping. Now, the youths said, we feel on a par with the Malays, Chinese and 
Indians, as these groups also have their language and cultural holidays recognised and 
supported by the authorities.  
Nevertheless, some Kadazan parents felt ambivalent and/or confused about the 
Kadazandusun language itself. Some thought that the teaching of the standard would 
involve the learning of the Kadazan language, while other parents thought that because 
of the label ‘Kadazandusun’, the language would consist of a number of distinctly 
Kadazan words: a vocabulary composed equally of Kadazan and Dusun words. But 
when it became evident that this was not the case, parents said they became 
disappointed because their children would come home speaking to them in Dusun 
instead of Kadazan.  
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Other parents, while initially confused, had changed their viewpoint. These parents said 
that what the Kadazandusun language entailed had initially surprised them but, later on, 
they had convinced themselves and their children to treat Kadazandusun not as a 
standard but as a new dialect. Mary, a Kadazan mother of six children, of whom three 
were attending Kadazandusun language classes at the time of the interview, said: 
For me, it’s okay to take Kadazandusun. I tell my children to 
think of it as learning a new dialect, not Kadazan, but Dusun. I 
also tell them that they should be proud that they are learning a 
language that at least represents the indigenous groups in 
Sabah.       
I observed that while Kadazan and Dusun children can learn the Kadazandusun 
language in school, it is not mandatory for them or any other Kadazandusun to do so. 
There is also no pressure for Kadazandusuns to learn or use the Kadazandusun 
language elsewhere. For instance, during Kaamatan, the Unduk Ngadau (literal 
translation: ‘zenith of the sun’) pageant, a beauty contest, is organised. In this popular 
program, a question and answer portion require contestants to speak in the ‘mother 
tongue’ and all attempted to do so in their respective dialects. However, none spoke in 
or claimed to have spoken in the standard Kadazandusun language. Meanwhile, in the 
newspapers and on the radio, Kadazan and Dusun columns and programs remain 
separate, as was the practice prior to the introduction of the Kadazandusun language in 
1997. In the day-to-day, multilingualism is maintained: many Kadazans and Dusuns, 
young or old, speak to one another exclusively in Sabah Malay and/or English.  
Meanwhile, KDCA and partners such as the Kadazandusun Language Foundation 
(KLF), Sabah Department of Education and Sabah Library and Sabah Museum provide 
state-sponsored programs to encourage the use of the Kadazandusun language. For 
instance, the Minggu Galakan Membaca Bahasa Kadazandusun (MGMBK) (Kadazandusun 
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Language Reading Week) is organised yearly since 1997. Some of the activities that are 
conducted are the monusuzan (folk tale), monudodoi/ monugandoi (sung poem), magandai 
(lullaby) and piboi’an mananong (story telling competition). Typically, primary school 
students from throughout Sabah are invited through their Kadazandusun language 
teachers to participate. This program is aimed at supporting the Kadazandusun language 
teaching in schools and to increase the proficiency of students taking part. Many 
Kadazan and Dusun parents who are exposed to the MGMBK program are happy for 
their children to take part, as they see the program as helping to promote mother tongue 
use in children, whether or not the ‘Kadazandusun language’ in question mirrors the 
dialect of their respective groups.99 
Today, Kadazandusun leaders describe Kadazandusuns in ethnolinguistic terms by 
referring to them as ‘dialectical ethnic’ groups without referring to past categories in 
Kadazan and Dusun. Despite the lack of response towards the Kadazandusun label and 
language in some Kadazans and Dusuns, many welcome the reference to their linguistic 
relation, and do not appear to mind the overall presence, use and promotion of the 
Kadazandusun label and language. To these informants, the term ‘Kadazandusun’ is 
regarded as a political convention created by their leaders for the sake of having a 
common label to refer to the indeterminate groups among them. People were also 
keenly aware that being classified as Kadazandusun at the broader level did not change 
their affinity with their cultural group.  
Overall, Kadazandusun groups today give the semblance of being united in solidarity 
and sharing a common political struggle. To advance this image, the Kadazandusun 
elites are using the Kaamatan ‘as a rallying point for uniting the KD [Kadazan and 
                                                
99 See “Minggu Galakan Membaca Bahasa Kadazandusun dan Sambutan Ulang Tahun Ke-10 
[Kadazandusun Language Week and 10th anniversary celebration]”, 2006. 
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Dusun] in order to obtain certain political goals’ (Barlocco, 2011) and to simultaneously 
promote ‘Kadazandusun culture’ as a national culture. The Kaamatan is used extensively 
to carry out this objective.  
The Kaamatan is based on a pre-colonial practice, which seeks to honour the rice spirit 
(Bambaazon) for a bountiful harvest. The Bambaazon is invited to rest after taking care 
of the rice fields and the bobohizan performs chants.100 In the colonial period, the 
Kaamatan or ‘Harvest Festival’ took shape as an outdoor entertainment and local 
festival based on the Tamu Besar (Big Outdoor Market) and the harvest festival held in 
the interior districts of Keningau and Tambunan, where the British government 
inaugurated a three-day holiday for Natives (Yamamoto, 2011). Some of the activities 
were beauty contests, football games and a display of traditional costumes staged by 
young Kadazan and Dusun women (Uedo, 2009).  
Today, the official Kaamatan takes place yearly at the end of May and Sabahan and 
Malaysian authorities continue to recognise it as a three-day public holiday for Natives. 
While the contemporary Kaamatan program continues to include outdoor sports, such 
as, the traditional sport of tarik tali (tug-of-war), the traditional costume component has 
been reinvented as Unduk Ngadau, the popular beauty pageant that takes place as the 
program finale. In more recent years, the Buvazoi Kaamatan (Young Man of Kaamatan) 
program similar to Unduk Ngadau has become popular.  
Throughout Sabah, among predominantly non-Muslim Bumiputera communities, 
Kaamatan celebrations at the local levels can occur directly preceding and following the 
official Kaamatan holiday at the end of May. The official Kaamatan holiday celebration 
                                                
100 For references on the bobohizan and rituals, see Pugh-Kitingan et al (2011); Lasimbang & 
Kinajil (2005). 
171 
 
is conducted by the KDCA in the building and compound of its headquarters in 
Penampang. This event represents the official state-level Kaamatan. It receives 
substantial sponsorship from the state and is incorporated into the tourism program of 
the Sabah government and widely advertised to attract mass tourism.  
As a politically charged event, the KDCA promotes the Kadazandusuns as ‘the 
definitive peoples of Sabah’ in order to reinforce the sense of a single identity among 
non-Muslim indigenes. Speeches take up most of the first day of the program, drawing 
the presence of VIPs such as sponsors, politicians and government heads and officials. 
In their speeches, organisers emphasise inclusiveness and uphold Kadazandusun as one 
of the national cultures of Malaysia—on a par with, Malay, Indian and Chinese 
cultures—by comparing Kaamatan to the Chinese New Year, Thaipusam (an Indian 
holiday), Gawai (an indigenous Iban festival in Sarawak), Aidilfitri or Idul Fitri (a 
Muslim holiday) and Christmas (a Christian holiday).  
The Kaamatan is also heavily utilised as a political stage on which Kadazandusun actors 
demonstrate their clout. For instance, at the local level, a VIP, the district officer or their 
representative, is invited to grace the occasion and declare the Kaamatan celebration 
officially open in the area. Village leaders typically accompany the VIP at the local-level 
Kaamatan. The KDCA Kaamatan, the main state-sponsored program, is a hot political 
event because only Kadazan and Dusun politicians who align with the central or federal 
government attend the KDCA Kaamatan. Those that do not attend are likely to be 
Opposition politicians who create their own Kaamatan events within their political 
parties. Many Kadazandusun leaders thus attend the KDCA Kaamatan to foster 
solidarity and to demonstrate loyalty to their leaders as well as out of a fear that their 
absence would be noticed.  
172 
 
Through Kaamatan, Kadazandusun leaders use the opportunity to modernise the 
image of Sabah’s Bornean indigenes. An example relates to alcohol consumption, 
which is commonplace during Kaamatan, since Kadazans and Dusuns brew rice wine, 
beer and spirits for ritual occasions. Copious amounts of rice wine, in particular, are 
traditionally consumed to aid merry making. However, drinking alcohol, especially in 
great quantities, is considered coarse and embarrassing in the present day (Barlocco, 
2011). To counter the image of coarseness, Kadazan and Dusun leaders have sought to 
mask the images of alcohol routinely displayed at the official Kaamatan premises by 
contracting Nestle to sell and display instant coffee. Nescafe. This can be seen at the 
state-level Kaamatan, where the banners of sponsors such as Maggi (Nestle) and Digi 
(a mobile service provider) are placed in prominent areas, while the Carlsberg (beer) 
banner is place in a secondary and relatively out of sight spot. 
KDCA also attempts to balance traditional and modern elements in the Kaamatan. In 
one example, the Kadazan myth of Huminodun, the legendary daughter of Kinoingan 
(the Creator) is used and perpetuated by the KDCA to show Kadazandusuns that they 
possess a truth that can unlock the secret of their origin. Huminodun, according to the 
origin myth, sacrificed herself to stop a famine. A magical growth of various edible 
plants followed her death and these sustained the Kadazans.101 The story of Huminodun 
is clearly associated with the Unduk Ngadau competition, where participants are female. 
The Unduk Ngadau competition has become heavily commercialised over time. 
Winners typically receive scholarships, makeup and grooming vouchers, airline tickets, 
hotel stays, mobile phones, food hampers, among other prizes. Prizes are normally 
shared with the winners’ makeup artists, personal groomer, hairstylist, costume designer 
and whoever had had a role in preparing the candidate for the pageant.  
                                                
101 See KDCA’s website for more information on Huminodun – https://www.kdca.org.my. 
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In another example, KDCA highlights the bobohizan during Kaamatan to acknowledge 
the significance of rituals in traditional culture. Traditionally, a Kadazan community 
undergoes purification and blessing in the Moginakan ritual, the climactic ritual in the 
Kadazan rice culture. Seven Chief Bobohizan (Bohungkitas) conduct rituals and 
chanting that last a week and at the end, a grand feast is prepared, which signals the 
harvest festival or Kaamatan. In the KDCA Kaamatan, only the Mangambai or ‘ritual 
dancing’ is given focus, a precursory Kaamatan ritual. Several Kadazan men and women 
dance in a circular procession while ‘chanting’ to venerate the rice spirit, Bambaazon. As 
many elders do not know bobohizan chants, these chants may be improvised in part. By 
tradition, it is taboo to recite these chants if one is not a bobohizan for fear that incorrect 
utterances may invoke malevolent spirits. 
Changes in the traditional costumes of Kadazandusun groups provide another example, 
as KDCA leaders also seek to monitor how many costumes are being embellished with 
modern material such as velvet, suede and the use of machine-stitched embroidery, 
while accoutrements such as the tangkong (silver link belt) and himpogot (hip brass ring 
belt) may remain traditional. These are changes that become keenly criticised by some 
Kadazandusuns as not patterning closely to the traditional garments of their groups, for 
instance, what comes into question are the design of clothes and colours of stitching, 
whether red or gold (Uedo, 2009). 
Yet there are major differences between the Kaamatan organised at the state level and at 
the community or village level, and these are telling of the attempts by Kadazandusun 
leaders to inculcate a single identity at the broader level. Speeches by village heads or 
district officers target only the Kadazan or Dusun group concerned in the areas and do 
not reference the amalgamation of indigenous groups according to the political 
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narrative. Speeches at this level can be more forthcoming and exposes a problem in the 
Kaamatan when discussing how Kaamatan is now more about fostering relations in 
their communities, as the fact is most do not plant rice or harvest at all but work in 
offices and such (Uedo, 2009: 52-53). At the state level, Kadazan and Dusun leaders 
restrict the rhetoric of Kaamatan to thanksgiving for a bountiful harvest, whereas at the 
village level, no harvesting aspect is discussed. 
Further, while the KDCA has created a new tradition to establish the supposed history 
and hierarchy of the Kadazandusuns, this is not entirely congruent to held beliefs on the 
ground. KDCA claims that the ethnogenesis of the Kadazandusun groups occurred at 
Tampias village in Ranau, a Dusun enclave in the inland northeast of Sabah. In the 
village of Tampias, lies a memorial hall in the shape of a tree trunk sponsored by 
KDCA. A hollow space within the memorial acts as a meeting place that can hold 25 or 
so people; visitors can also enter and read the history of the Kadazandusuns displayed in 
panels in the inner walls of this building. During the Kaamatan festival, the Nunuk 
Ragang centre is open to Kadazandusuns and the public to undertake a pilgrimage to 
their supposed site of origin. 
According to the KDCA narrative, Kadazandusun groups had inhabited a huge banyan 
tree called Nunuk Ragang (meaning ‘Red Banyan Tree’) by the Liwagu River in the 
distant past. Banyan trees in the Kadazan and Dusun belief relates to the dwelling of 
forest spirits. It is believed that the Nunuk Ragang hosted the predecessors of the 
Kadazandusun groups, who lived peacefully and happily but when a great flood 
occurred, these groups dispersed throughout Sabah into the places where their 
descendants now live.102 However, the Nunuk Ragang tradition has been criticised for 
                                                
102 See “Pesta Moginakan Nunuk Ragang 2011”. 
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spreading untruths about Kadazan and Dusun peoples’ histories and for undermining 
the origin stories of individual groups. For instance, the migration of the Tobilung 
group towards the northern and western areas of Sabah ties them to Chinese ancestors 
from Brunei (Shim, 2000); while the Bisayas claim direct links to the Visayas in the 
Visayan Islands of the southern Philippines (Harrison & Harrison, 1971: 9).  
In Penampang, Glyn-Jones stated that the Nunuk Ragang (or Nunukaragan) legend is 
followed and Kadazans and Dusuns typically regard all other groups coming from 
Nunuk Ragang as their own people (1953: 117). However, note that among 
contemporary Kadazans I spoke with, many were less inclined to claim the Nunuk 
Ragang as legend and thought it as a nice myth or story to know. Some older Kadazans 
sought to narrate their ‘origin’ story as being that of how the world began and the 
folktale on the pampang (huge rock), the namesake of Penampang, was told to me. The 
pampang tale speaks of the first Kadazan man and woman born as babies whom emerged 
out a huge rock, when it split open (Lasimbang, 1999; Luping, 2009). 
There are also alternative versions involving the Nunuk Ragang that are promoted by 
other than KDCA, which further illustrate the differing views from the ground. For 
instance, the Sabah Tourism Board seeks to promote “Papakang: The Odyssey of Seven 
Brothers” as migration folklore. The Nunuk Ragang in Ranau is taken as the site of 
dispersal of seven brothers, who fought each other to possess a papakang (tree back 
beater in a shape of a stone) that had magical powers and uses. The father of these 
brothers intervened and broke the stone. Each brother took one piece of the stone 
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before leaving Nunuk Ragang. These brothers would then travel to all parts in Sabah 
and come to recognise each other when each started to reveal their heirloom stone.103  
Another tradition that is causing some Kadazandusuns to remain tentative towards 
adopting the Kadazandusun identity is a traditional blessing ceremony for the Huguan 
Siou, meaning brave paramount leader, which is now conducted for over 30 years. The 
ceremony is conducted by the bobolian in the Nunuk Ragang monument and during the 
Kaamatan period as a means to increase the supernatural power of the Huguan Siou. 
However, there is criticism of the Huguan Siou blessing ceremony: some informants say 
that Pairin Kitingan, the current Huguan Siou, ought to refrain from engaging in 
ritualistic traditions because he is a Christian.104 To create a hierarchical structure in their 
leadership, the KDCA’s executive council had adopted the Huguan Siou tradition in the 
1970s. It originally existed, as a Kadazan practice to honour the most feared warrior 
among them. Prior to Pairin Kitingan, the first Huguan Siou was Donald Stephens. The 
Huguan Siou traditions cease momentarily after Stephen’s death to resume in 1984 with 
the installation of Pairin Kitingan. 
Given all of the above, the Kadazandusun identity cannot be said to have resulted so 
far in convincing all Kadazandusuns to align only to the Kadazandusun label, language 
and traditions. Conversely, by allowing Kadazans and Dusuns to remain affiliated to 
                                                
103 See “Papakang: The Odyssey of Seven Brothers”. 
104 Note that some Kadazans may continue to hold contradicting belief systems. For instance, 
Kadazans have traditionally worshipped the spirit of massive stones or megaliths, which were 
used as boundary stones in the Kadazan areas (Phelan, 1997). Kadazans also believed in the 
keeping of the head of one’s enemy, as the spirit dwelling in the skull is believed to protect one 
from invaders. In the past, Kadazan families who had such skulls were seen as influential in the 
community, because this meant that their ancestors had been headhunters, typically the 
warriors in traditional Kadazan villages. Some Kadazans thus may continue to keep skulls. 
Further, some of my informants told me that although they are Christians, they consult with 
Kadazan psychics in order to mokiintong (ask to see into one’s future or problem by 
communicating with spirits). Some may also consult Buddhist or Taoist mediums or the 
Muslim bomoh (Malay shaman). See “St. Aloysius Church Limbanak Penampang 1910-2010”. 
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their respective ethnic groups and traditions while under Kadazandusun alliance, 
Kadazandusun leaders must contend with how the loose arrangement prevents a single 
culture and identity—as Kadazandusun—to transpire in order to augment the political 
idea of Kadazandusun. As we look further into the Kaamatan, there are evidences of 
the persistent heterogeneity among them.  
To conduct the state-level Kaamatan program, KDCA invites indigenous groups, 
mainly non-Muslim Bumiputera, from throughout Sabah to participate and represent 
their cultural groups. In the KDCA compound, groups would live in replicas of their 
traditional houses made for them by the KDCA. Representatives dress in the 
traditional costumes of their groups and bring their traditional musical instruments and 
other materials, such as baskets, beads, clothing and other paraphernalia that depict 
their traditional cultures. These entertain the throng of visitors that have come to see 
what Kadazandusun culture is like, while in the main KDCA building, speeches and 
the Unduk Ngadau pageant take place. 
For the entire three-day Kaamatan, these KDCA representatives of the various 
indigenous cultures reenact their traditional cultures through dance, food and music, 
while the public comes to visit each house to sample the various cultures being 
represented. For newcomers to the KDCA Kaamatan, the first impression upon 
entering the site is the sound of merriment everywhere, with traditional gong beats and 
people in costumes performing traditional dances. There appears to be no overt 
hegemon among the groups represented and the sense of merriment and of 
Kadazandusun as an eclectic grouping is palpable.  
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Throughout the KDCA compound, I note the heavy references to rice planting and 
harvest offer homage to the traditional occupation of the non-Muslim indigenes and 
symbolise the agricultural identity of all Kadazandusuns. Various small booths in which 
government agencies promote their services, merchants sell merchandise and 
Kadazandusun singers sell their CDs, among other booths, dot the periphery of the 
KDCA compound. The term Kadazandusun is visible in banners announcing the 
Kaamatan, in Kaamatan program books and in the banners of merchandise sponsors. 
At the side of the main KDCA building, there are also numerous food stalls and 
fellowship take place among family members and friends, who come together to eat, 
drink and have a good time irrespective of whether they take part in the more official 
day events of the Kaamatan, and their commensality encourages aramaiti (‘being many 
together’, from the Malay root word ramai, ‘many’), a popular term used when drinking 
(Barlocco 2011). The scene reminds how Kaamatan is not practiced to represent 
Kadazandusun culture but rather to deepen friendship and relationship within a local 
community. As Uedo states, “It [Kaamatan] is an opportunity to have commensality 
and to meet with friends, neighbours and family members” (2008: 53).  
The so-called Kadazandusun community in this regard is ever representative of the 
broader Sabahan community, whenever Sabahans would tell me that they have no 
qualms sitting together with each other to have a meal, whether they were Muslims or 
non-Muslims. Many Kadazandusun groups may continue to participate in the KDCA 
Kaamatan therefore to experience and encourage the bond or fellowship between their 
group and others, while at the same time allowing for their participation to help reify a 
culture and identity (passed off as Kadazandusun) but otherwise may not bear much 
resemblance to their lived realities.  
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However, I further note that perhaps many Kadazandusuns are inclined to support the 
Kadazandusun concept seeing as to how they are also being exposed and encouraged to 
further expand their indigenous identity. For instance, KDCA periodically hosts the 
International Indigenous Peoples’ Day, an event that is initiated by the UN and heavily 
attended by activists.105 Through Indigenous People activism, Kadazandusun leaders 
foster the idea of Kadazandusuns as being the Orang Asal (Indigenous People) in Sabah 
and in Malaysia. The move is decidedly political because Kadazandusun leaders are 
seeking out a pan-indigenous identity that can unite them also with indigenous groups 
throughout Malaysia. Several Orang Asli groups on the Malaysian Peninsula have since 
pledged membership to UPKO, the United Pasok Kadazandusun Organisation, the 
largest Kadazandusun political party in Sabah.106  These Peninsula-based groups are 
linked to Partners of Community Organisations Sabah (PACOS) through ‘Jaringan 
Orang Asli SeMalaysia’ (JOAS) (The Indigenous People’s Network of Malaysia), the 
umbrella network for Indigenous-focused NGOs in Malaysia, which has or has had 
many Sabahan leaders at the helm.107  
Note that the origin of the Indigenous People’s movement in Sabah most likely 
stemmed from social justice groups in the 1970s and 1980s, which mainly comprised 
non-Muslim Bumiputera university students. According to informants, many of the 
Christian students from Sabah and Sarawak attending Universiti Malaya (UM) and 
Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (UPM) in the towns of Bangsar and Serdang on the 
Malaysian Peninsula, formed a group amongst themselves to undertake outreach to rural 
areas in Sabah and Sarawak. These students were Catholic and came mainly from 
                                                
105 Note that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples promulgates 
the term ‘Indigenous’. This term is not used in formal Malaysian contexts. 
106 See “UPKO sets up four branches in Perak”, 2009. 
107 See JOAS website - https://www.forestpeoples.org/en/partner/jaringan-orang-asal-
semalaysia-joas-indigenous-peoples-network-malaysia. 
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Kadazandusun groups in Sabah, although indigenous groups from Sarawak were also 
represented. The ‘Students of Sabah and Sarawak Action Group’ (SASSAG) was formed 
and, in every university semester break, SASSAG members would commit to voluntary 
missions to improve the living conditions in remote areas of Sabah and Sarawak.  
Some of the leaders of SASSAG went on to become well-known political leaders and to 
serve in past and current Sabah governments. In the mid-1980s, several university 
graduates affiliated with SASSAG formed non-government organisations (NGOs) in 
Sabah dedicated to helping minority communities. Established by ex-SASSAG members 
is PACOS, an NGO at the front of activism behind the Indigenous People movement 
aforementioned.108  
However, not all Kadazandusuns I spoke to are aware of the Indigenous People 
identity, and some even contest it. City-based indigenes, according to some informants, 
do not strongly identify as ‘indigenous’ per se, since they do not need this identity in 
order to advance socio-economically, in contrast to marginalised indigenous villagers in 
rural areas whom they read about in the news. Many indigenous groups in rural villages 
have benefitted from the assistance of PACOS, especially in land-grab issues. PACOS 
helps them to unite as a larger collective—as ‘Indigenous People’ or ‘Orang Asal’—
rather than in their individual ethnic groups, to protest land claims by outsiders, whether 
corporations or government. Nevertheless, by participating in KDCA’s broader 
reindigenising program, it can be said that Kadazandusuns would not only acquire a 
firm identity as a political indigenous group in Sabah but also then go on to become 
                                                
108 PACOS liaises with indigenous groups throughout Sabah and Malaysia to promote social 
justice for rural communities. Indigenous villagers in remote places in Sabah are often 
embroiled in land-grab issues and PACOS helps them to unite as a larger collective—as 
‘Indigenous People’ or ‘Orang Asal’—rather than in their individual ethnic groups, to protest 
land claims by outsiders, whether corporations or government. 
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more knowledgeable and savvy about indigenous affairs at national and international 
fronts. Meanwhile, KDCA continues to offer a variety of activities to continue to 
engage Kadazandusuns throughout the year.109   
Today, it can be said that those who do not take part in any of the above KDCA-led 
Kaamatan and Indigenous People events are removing themselves from the sphere of 
Kadazandusunising influences. In 2007, a group of Kadazans tendered their letter of 
exit from the Kadazandusun group to the Huguan Siou of KDCA. These Kadazans 
went on to reestablish the Kadazan Society of Sabah or KSS. According to KSS 
leaders, the goal of the KSS is to reinstate the Kadazan label to prevent the Kadazan 
identity from disappearing under the Kadazandusun framework (KSS Inauguration 
book, 2007). KSS spokespersons stated that a major motivation for their decision to 
reject the Kadazandusun label was the change, in 1989, of the name of the Kadazan 
Cultural Association (KCA) to the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association (KDCA). In 
1953, the Society of Kadazans Penampang (SOCP) was registered to cater for the 
Kadazans’ needs. In 1966, the founders of the SOCP established the Kadazan Cultural 
Association (KCA) with which the SOCP merged.  
The president of KSS, Marcel Leiking, expressed concern that Kadazan cultural identity 
was being lost as a result of Kadazans having relinquished control over the running of 
the KDCA. In his inaugural address at the opening of the KSS, Leiking said: 
In this millennium, our hearts are worried because there are 
now many cultural associations such as USDA, Murut, Rungus, 
Bisaya, Lundayo and many more. Where is the Kadazan cultural 
association? See, KDCA is for the perpetuation of the tradition 
and celebration of the Kadazan Harvest Festival [Kaamatan], 
which is translated as Pesta Menuai. Meanwhile, the Kadazan 
                                                
109 See KDCA website – http://kdca.org.my/event/events. 
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people worry in their hearts thinking as to what will become of 
them and the Kadazan name [emphasis Leiking] if there is no 
cultural association for us.  
(KSS Inauguration book, 2007:15) 
Further, the Chairman of KSS Trustees, Clarence Malakun, decried the decision of the 
name change to the Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA). Malakun said: 
When the name of the Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA) 
was changed to the Kadazandusun Cultural Association 
(KDCA) on 5th November 1989 during the KCA Delegates 
Conference, I was quite sad but I went along with the 
resolution at the time in the name of ‘cooperation and unity’ 
amongst our beloved people. However, with the change, little 
did we realise that at one stroke of the pen, the Kadazans 
disappeared to become overnight the ‘Kadazandusuns’, whilst 
the Dusuns continued to exist as a separate entity and with no 
change within the United Sabah Dusun Association (USDA). 
The USDA was correct. The KCA was sacrificed. And, either 
we are a Kadazan or a Dusun. There is no such race called 
‘Kadazandusun’ in the first instance. By agreeing to the new 
terminology, the Kadazan ceased to exist from the face of the 
earth, or they had become only half a race, whilst the Dusuns 
not only remain 100% intact, but in fact gained half more 
within the ‘Kadazandusun’ name.  
(KSS Inauguration book, 2007: 14) 
The KSS also stated their concern over the Kadazandusun language program stating 
their grievance towards the language itself. Malakun above stated that the 
Kadazandusun language neither resembled the Kadazan or the Dusun language, as used 
currently in the media (radio) but a fusion of ‘just a little bit of Kadazan and largely the 
so-called Bunduliwan dialect as commonly used in the District of Tambunan’ and that 
Kadazan words contributed only 20% to the Kadazandusun language with the 
remainder being Dusun words. Malakun further said:  
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It should have been the other way round or at least on a 
50:50% basis since the Kadazan language was already widely 
used and understood by listeners through the Pangaan Kadazan 
[Kadazan Section] radio Sabah Broadcast since the early 1960s. 
The decision to sideline Kadazan was made without much 
regard and consultation since the President of USDA at the 
time, and the President of KDCA are both pure Dusuns. In the 
meantime, there has been a proliferation of other ethnic 
Cultural Associations throughout Sabah, with tacit approval 
from KDCA officials.  
(KSS Inauguration book, 2007: 15) 
The current relationship between KSS and KDCA is unclear. There has been no formal 
response to the Kadazans’ departure from KDCA and, since 2007, a group of Tatana 
people left the Kadazandusun group in 2013, also citing cultural dilution as the reason. 
The Sabah Tatana Cultural Association (STCA)’s primary concern is to be recognised 
officially by the NRD. STCA spokesperson, Monih Epin, stated that the Tatana have 
been denied the right to be formally identified as such because the ethnic ‘Tatana’ does 
not appear in the NRD’s list of races. The STCA claims that there are about 15,000 
Tatana in Sabah who feel forced to choose between Dusun or Kadazan as official 
identity and cite the case of the Kelabits in Sarawak, who are able to register themselves 
Kelabit under the Orang Ulu group despite numbering less than the Tatanas. STCA 
assured that they were not intending to rival KDCA but rather to complement the work 
of KDCA by insuring that STCA looks at researching and document Tatana culture and 
language.110 
Meanwhile, KSS influence has grown among the Kadazans in Penampang, the enclave 
from where most of my respondents were drawn. Several Kadazan informants said that 
since the KSS came into being, a sense of cultural purity had developed among the 
Kadazans and a renewed concern for the Kadazan label. As KSS is also concerned 
                                                
110 See “Association wants Tatana to be officially known as race by NRD”, 2013. 
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about language maintenance, Kadazans who support KSS are likely to strictly monitor 
the use of the Kadazan language in Kadazan families, and in their own families. KSS 
conducts regular meetings and has since renamed itself the ‘Kadazan Society 
Association’ with the mission statement, ‘to preserve, maintain and to uphold the 
dignity of the Kadazan race as an indigenous ethnic [group] in Sabah’. The KSS also 
conducts its own Kaamatan event called KSS Hontog Kaamatan.  
The appearance of KSS may well be part of the reasons why there is a lack of 
participation from Kadazans in KDCA and/or during the KDCA Kaamatan that I 
attended in 2011. However, I kept returning to the theme of dichotomous relationship 
between Kadazan and Dusun and find that this too is responsible for influencing some 
Kadazans to move away from Kadazandusun as identity. Further discussions with 
ordinary Kadazans revealed that many are choosing to forego Kaamatan activities for 
various reasons. Some informants told me that they avoid going to KDCA during 
Kaamatan because of the heat (or rain) and massive overcrowding that can occur at the 
Kaamatan venues, as well as because of the lack of proper car parks. Some said that they 
prefer to take the three-day holiday outside of the country with their friends and family. 
Others said that if they go to the KDCA Kaamatan at all, it is only to catch a glimpse of 
the beauty queens vying for the Unduk Ngadau trophy and for the entertainment 
programs, such as the free nightly concerts by Kadazan and Dusun popular singers. 
However, still other respondents told me that they do not bother celebrating Kaamatan 
because it is simply not meaningful to them. Charlie, a Kadazan man, aged in his mid-
20s, and working as a waiter at an up-market restaurant said: 
I just stay home. It’s a chance for me to catch up on my sleep. 
After all, there are just too many people there at KDCA. And 
it’s more like a show for tourists and VIPs than an actual 
celebration to respect our [Kadazan] culture. 
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During the KDCA Kaamatan in 2011, I observed that alternative Kadazan-run 
Kaamatan events around Penampang were taking place concurrently. Away from the 
KDCA building, in nearby Kadazan villages, several banners hanging from the sides of 
buildings, posted by the roadsides and tied onto peoples’ homes advertised Kaamatan 
family days. Different from the KDCA Kaamatan, the family Kaamatan is a closed 
event meant to serve only kin and clan members.  Some Kadazan informants said that 
these family events bring kin closer together, in line with the current trend to archive 
family histories and especially to trace lineage and build family trees. But other 
informants said that the trend for a family-run Kaamatan is fairly new and because the 
event is heavily sponsored by prominent families with political connections, often the 
patriarch of these families give speeches during the lunch or dinner to spread their 
political ideas.  
I also sensed an underlying tension when many Dusun spectators appeared to 
disapprove that the Penampang Kadazan candidate won the Unduk Ngadau 
competition. When pressed on the Unduk Ngadau competition, some informants said 
that many people did not want the Penampang Kadazan candidate to win, as 
candidates from Penampang routinely won the competition, making people feel as 
though the competition was for Kadazans only. Some Dusun informants told me that 
the competition must have been rigged and that the judges were biased. One informant 
said: 
This is unfair. The Kadazan ‘look’ is too common now because 
the Kadazans are mixed with Chinese, so they look more like 
the Chinese. The judges should allow other girls from other 
districts to win so we can see what their beauty is like from 
those parts [in Sabah].  
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Some of my Kadazan informants told me that Kadazans have seemed to go out of 
fashion. One informant said, ‘It is no longer popular to be Kadazan given that Dusun 
leaders are now more prominent’. ‘They [Dusuns] don’t care about us anymore, even 
though we (Kadazans) have helped them to come up [politically]’, said another 
informant. Another said that the Kadazans’ influence upon Dusuns had waned in the 
face of stronger Dusun influences. As I went from one traditional house to another at 
the KDCA Kaamatan grounds and observed how excited the participants and guests 
were, a contrastive and telling picture emerged. At the Dusun Ranau House, two 
Muslim Dusun ladies in their tudung danced to the Malay joget accompanied by modified 
tunes on traditional Dusun gongs. A crowd cheered them on and applauded joyously 
when they had finished. Beside this scene was the Kadazan Penampang House, and the 
mood could not have been more different: a subdued-looking solo guitarist 
accompanied by his keyboardist casually played ‘Blue Spanish Eyes’ to one or two guests 
in attendance, who appeared oblivious to the din next door. 
Many Kadazans today may be reindigenising into Kadazandusun therefore because of 
their support for indigenous identity overall; and their desire to be united and to have a 
community and group that is filled with a sense of belonging; or simply because they 
feel that it is the right thing to do. Yet, other Kadazans are contesting—and even 
rejecting—Kadazandusun while some have returned to the idea of Kadazan as ethnic 
group and identity. These continue to struggle with the incongruity generated by yoking 
together, under one composite term, two dissimilar groups of people. As one informant 
said, the juxtaposition of the two labels Kadazan and Dusun into a single term only 
serves, ironically, as a reminder that while all can belong as ‘Kadazandusun’ (the official 
category), for as long as Kadazans and Dusuns seek to identify as one or the other, ‘no 
one is really a Kadazandusun’.  
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Pairin Kitingan walking on sacred gongs (tagung).                                                                            
Taken in June 2011 at the Nunuk Ragang Memorial, Tampias, Ranau. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
At the start of the thesis, I set out to survey the diverse ethnic labels that Kadazans 
today identify with as a result of a range of factors including intermarriage with other 
groups, changes in religion, desire for a business identity, and desire for a broader 
indigenous identity. We saw how through the influx of new migrants, Sabahan 
demography has changed dramatically since Independence in 1963. PTIs today 
constitute the largest group with far reaching consequences for Sabahan society and 
politics. They also influence ethnic classification, with both the Sabah Native status and 
especially the Bumiputera status being susceptible to abuse. These categories do not 
distinguish between Sabahans from Bornean groups and those from other groups with 
roots in the wider Malaysian-Philippine-Indonesian archipelago.   
As non-Muslim Kadazans grapple with the influx of PTIs, they must also contend with 
the growth of Malay and Muslim influences. Despite a high tolerance for cultural and 
religious differences between non-Muslims and Muslims, Kadazans in general are 
concerned about their possible absorption into the Malay grouping through factors 
including conversion, Malayanisation of their lifestyle, decreasing economic 
opportunities and the imposition of the Malay label. Many non-Muslim Kadazans fear 
not only a drastic change of lifestyle upon becoming Muslim but also the subsumption 
of a distinctive Kadazan identity under the more dominant Malay identity. These look 
upon permissive ethnic label use among Muslim Kadazans—for instance, switching 
back and forth between Malay and Kadazan labels—as evidence of Kadazan 
acquiescence to Malay power.  
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Meanwhile, many Kadazans seek to acquire Chineseness, through language and 
education, for instance. Intermarriage between Kadazans and Chinese, which has given 
rise to those who think of themselves as Sino-Kadazans, particularly means that Chinese 
influence on the Kadazans is strong. However, while some Kadazans believe that 
identification as Sino can provide them with an alternative to competing in the 
Bumiputera world, others are reluctant to give up the benefits that flow from 
participation in the Sabah Native and Bumiputera programs. Some thus still choose to 
identify officially as Kadazan while for others, owning a mixed identity is more 
appealing, and in this context, this is what the ‘Sino’ signifies. 
We have also seen that Kadazans and Dusuns are historically, politically and culturally 
related and that members of both groups use both the Kadazan and the Dusun labels. 
However, while Kadazan and Dusun identities may be intertwined, in my fieldwork site 
of Penampang Kadazan identity is distinguished from Dusun identity on the basis of 
language, the identification of Kadazans with modernity, and the higher degree of 
Chinese intermarriage with Kadazans relative to Dusuns. However, the Kadazans’ lack 
of language loyalty has prevented a solid boundary from forming between them and 
Dusuns: against the wishes of purist Kadazans, many Kadazans are multilingual in line 
with their cosmopolitan identities. Self-consciousness as a result of the Dusun view that 
Kadazans are elitist also prevents some Kadazans from using the Kadazan label more 
openly. As a result many Kadazans today are falling back into the old practice of 
identifying through the use of place names.  
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In spite of the official combination of the Kadazan and Dusun labels into 
‘Kadazandusun’, we have seen that in many areas of life—as exemplified in major 
events such as the Kaamatan—a single Kadazandusun identity and culture has not 
emerged. Nevertheless, many of those within the broader Kadazandusun grouping 
desire to foster camaraderie and a sense of community with one another, while their 
leaders continue to promote the image of a cohesive group. While many Kadazans 
remain open to the idea of being reindigenised as ‘Kadazandusun’, a growing number of 
Kadazan purists are abandoning this broader identity. These have rejected the 
Kadazandusun label, language and identity, and have gone on to (re)establish the 
Kadazan Society, an association exclusively for Kadazans.  
In summary, we have seen that non-Muslim Bumiputeras in Sabah today must contend 
with a world in which they are not the main actors. The Malay label is seen as anathema 
to the majority of Kadazans, and many Muslim Kadazans seek to use the Kadazan label 
to avoid derision. The subjective character of Kadazan identification is further evident 
among Sino-Kadazans, many of whom vacillate between Kadazan, Chinese and Sino-
Kadazan as formal identities. Many Kadazans also move fluidly between Kadazan and 
Dusun identities, while some Kadazans are open to a combined indigenous group 
identity. Yet others continue to desire contrast between the Kadazans on the one hand, 
and other indigenous groups including the Dusun, on the other. In other words, 
contemporary Kadazans are selective in their choice of ethnic labels, giving rise to a 
highly complex ethnic landscape. Kadazandusun, despite being their official ethnic 
category, is rejected by many.  
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In conclusion, Kadazan ethnicity today continues to demonstrate fluidity even as some 
Kadazan individuals attempt to fix Kadazan identity to certain labels or criteria. In 
particular, the increasing openness to the Sino-Kadazan label reflects the desire of some 
Kadazans to assert the legitimacy of mixed identities. The phenomenon of mixed 
identities, demonstrating a similar tendency towards maintaining fluidity is also found in 
other parts of Borneo, as cited at the start of this thesis. In this respect the case of the 
Kadazans is reminiscent of that of the Bidayuh in Sarawak, as outlined by Chua (2007).  
Chua notes that many Bidayuhs seek to maintain ‘a certain freedom of movement’, 
which they associate with being Bidayuh. As she sees it, the concept of Bidayuh involves 
a constant effort towards fluidity: 
Rather than trying to ‘preserve’ or ‘construct’ a distinctive 
‘Bidayuh identity’, I would argue that my informants are more 
interested in maintaining a certain freedom of movement which 
they associate with being Bidayuh — but which does not 
necessarily have to culminate in the formation of Bidayuh 
identity.  
(Chua, 2007: 262) 
I would suggest that like the Bidayuh, we can see in Kadazans’ engagement with their 
identity a desire for freedom and choice that is a direct response to the (Malay-
dominated) Malaysian ethnic system, where ‘Malay-ness is marked by an inescapable 
fixity which stifles a fluidity that they value as intrinsic to Bidayuh-ness’ (Chua, 2007: 
262).  
Given this, it may well be that the Kadazans’ relationship to the Dusuns, the 
Bumiputera group that they are often compared to, may never be completely signifiable 
through an ethnic label given the repeated reconstruction of Kadazan-Dusun identity. 
Yet, in the past year or so, as a result of apparent increased political unity, several 
Kadazan and Dusun leaders have proposed the renaming of ‘Kadazandusun’ to 
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‘Momogun’, meaning ‘an inhabitant’ in both the Kadazan and Dusun dialects (it is also 
the autonym of the Rungus group). The proposal is presented as a way to be rid of the 
awkward juxtaposition between the Kadazan and Dusun labels, and so to expunge the 
label ‘Kadazandusun’ from official records. As this is a very recent development, I have 
not been able to discuss it in the thesis. However, based on some of the news reports I 
have seen, many Kadazan and Dusun leaders do not agree with such a renaming, and 
argue that ‘Kadazan’ and ‘Dusun’ are proper names of original groups while ‘Momogun’ 
is simply a noun and hence should not be elevated to a group name. It will be important 
to review this proposed change in follow-up studies. 
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Glossary 
 
Term 
 
Definition 
adat customary law and practices 
anak negeri Native 
angpow 
traditional Chinese envelopes typically red in colour 
containing money 
amah  house-help 
arak (or arrack) term in Malay referring to alcoholic drink 
bahasa campur-campur mixed language 
bobohizan a traditional ritual priest/priestess (also known as 
bobolian or tantagas) 
bomoh a traditional Muslim/Malay shaman 
bosou fermented vegetables and/or meat in cooked rice 
(Dusun) 
buang siang  to throw away the Chinese surname 
cabutan  a lottery system  
datu Malay term for ruler and/or nobility 
pinggan galvanised tin plates  
halal food preparations according to Muslim code 
hiing (or lihing) a Kadazan alcohol made from fermented rice 
himpogot hip-belts made of brass rings (Kadazan) 
hivan  inland 
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inai 
an honorific term for Kadazan female elders (usually 
an aunt) 
kafir person who is not Muslim (used chiefly by Muslims) 
kampung a village 
kinoing  salted fish (Kadazan) 
joget traditional Malay dance 
lihing see hiing 
lokek  parsimonious, close-fisted or stingy (Chinese) 
mamai an honorific term for Kadazan male elders 
mokiintong 
ask to see into one’s future or problem by 
communicating with spirits 
montoku Kadazan distilled wine  
mufti  senior Muslim official (scholar and expert)  
murtad apostate (Muslim) 
nonsom  fermented vegetables and/or meat in cooked rice 
(Kadazan) 
orang tua Kadazan or Dusun term for elder 
pangeran Brunei term for ruler 
pangi  a preserving agent, (pangium edule) 
pasok  indigene 
pinaasakan  traditional Kadazan stewed fish  
poco-poco a popular line dance originating from Sulawesi 
rumah terbuka ‘open house’, a feast open to the public 
rumpun  referring to stock (people) 
uztaz Islamic teacher 
saman malu  defamation summon (traditional based on adat) 
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sampan small boat with oars at the stern 
seluar puntung  cropped pants that ended at the calves (female wear) 
semenanjung  meaning ‘peninsula’, a colloquial reference to no 
particular state on the Malaysian Peninsula  
siang Chinese surname 
sigah  traditional headgear  
sogit  Kadazan adat-based fine typically paid in the form of 
livestock 
sokid  up-hill, referring to things or people 
sumazau traditional Kadazan dance 
tagaas bumpkin 
tagung an ensemble of brass gongs 
talak see arak 
tamu 
traditional outdoor market, site of barter trading in 
the past 
tangkong  silver link belt worn at the waist (Kadazan) 
towkay Chinese for head of a household or business 
tudung (or hijab) head scarf, covering or veil worn by Muslim females 
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Appendix A  
Contents: 
1. Kadazan and Dusun sound correspondences with examples – pages 11 & 12 
2. Application of Kadazandusun language with example – pages 97 & 98 
 
Ref: Tangit, Trixie. 2005. Planning Kadazandusun: Labels, language and identity. MA 
thesis. University of Hawaii, Manoa. Unpublished manuscript, 11-12; 97-98 
 
Note: 
1. Page 11 – some explanation & a comparison of Kadazan and Dusun vowels and 
consonants and sound correspondences 
2. Page 12  – some explanation & examples of sound correspondences in shared 
cognates 
3. Page 97 – some explanation and English test sample  
4. Page 98 – test samples showing an application of the Kadazandusun language – 
compare Kadazan, Dusun and Kadazandusun texts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
 
 
219 
 
 
 
!
 
220 
 
!
!
 
221 
 
 
 
222 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Contents: 
1. Bunduliwan agreement (my translation and original) 
2. Kadazandusun language agreement (my translation and original) 
 
Taken from: Tangit, Trixie. 2005. Planning Kadazandusun: Labels, language and 
identity. MA thesis. University of Hawaii, Manoa. Unpublished manuscript 
 
Note: 
1. English translation of the Bunduliwan agreement followed with a copy of the 
agreement in original Malay. 
The Bunduliwan agreement pertains to the formulation of the basic code 
of the Kadazandusun language. 
2. English translation of the Kadazandusun language agreement followed with a 
copy of the agreement in original Malay. 
The Kadazandusun language agreement, which outlines the purpose and 
shared responsibilities between KDCA and USDA. 
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BUNDULIWAN AGREEMENT (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) 
 
Declaration of Agreement 
 
Bunduliwan dialect as base dialect 
Standardization and Pembakuan Kadazandusun language 
between 
Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association 
And United Sabah Dusun Association 
 
That the Kadazandusun language Consultative Council Committee – Jawatankuasa Majlis 
Perunding Bahasa Kadazandusun (MPBK), that has been formed between the Kadazan Dusun 
Cultural Association (KOISAAN) and Sabah Dusun Association (USDA), on 11th April, 1995 
with this agree:- 
 
A. to use the Bunduliwan dialect as the base dialect for the standardization of the 
Kadazandusun language in the writing and speaking in the teaching and learning of the 
Student’s mother tongue [Pupil’s Own Language (POL)]. 
B. The Bunduliwan dialect will continue to be enriched by other dialects that are found in 
the Kadazandusunic and Paitanic tree/group. 
C. In order to revise the development of the Kadazandusun language, a consultative body 
called the Kadazandusun language Consultative Council Committee – Jawatankuasa 
Majlis Perunding Bahasa Kadazandusun (MPBK) is formed, to function as a reference 
body in spelling aspects, use of standard words, the incorporation of words from other 
dialects in the Kadazandusunic, Paitanic group/tree and foreign languages into the 
Kadazandusun language. 
 
This declaration of agreement is made based on the following factors:- 
 
A. In general, the Bunduliwan dialect, as the base dialect in the forming of the 
Kadazandusun language, received fewer objections, if compared with other dialects, 
from the representatives of main ethnic groups with the dialect Kadazandusunic and 
Paitanic, that were present at the symposium “Towards standardization of Kadazan 
Language” that was held at the Perkasa Hotel, Kundasang on the 13th of Januari, 1989. 
B. Bunduliwan dialect has been identified by linguistic research experts, specifically 
Summer Institute of Linguistic (SIL) as dialect that has the highest ‘intelligibility” 
among the dialects that are found in the Kadazandusunic and Paitanic group. 
C. From a geographical angle, the Bunduliwan dialect is used and spoken with more wide 
spread by those multi-ethnic Kadazandusunic and Paitanic, if compared with other 
dialects, specifically in the Apin-Aprin, Bundu Tuhan, Inanam, Kota Belud, Kota 
Marudu, Keningau, Kinarut, Kiulu, Kundasang, Lingkabau, Menggatal, Paitan, Ranau, 
Sook, Tambunan, Tamparuli, Telipok, Telupid, Tongos, Tuaran, Ulu Kinabatangan, 
Ulu Penampang dan Ulu Papar. 
 
The success of teaching and learning of the Kadazandusun language at schools as the Student’s 
Mother tongue is dependent on the number of request (not less than 15 parents of students) so 
that the language may be taught in a/the school. Therefore, the use and speech in the 
Bunduliwan dialect that is more wide spread if compared with other dialects in the 
Kadazandusunic and Paitanic tree, at least will be able to help assure the success of the teaching 
and learning of the Kadazandusun language. 
 
This declaration of agreement is made by KOISAAN and USDA and is witnessed by those 
signed below: 
 
SIGNATURE PORTION 
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KADAZANDUSUN AGREEMENT (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) 
Declaration of Agreement 
Kadazandusun language as Official Language 
Between 
Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association 
And United Sabah Dusun Association 
 
This Declaration of Agreement was made on the 24th of January, 1995 between the 
Highest Council Members of the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association and the Highest 
Council Members of the United Sabah Dusun Association, two associations that is 
respectively/each registered under the Association Act of 1966 that is Bil. Number SAB 
356 addressed at Kilometre 6, Penampang Road, W.D.T. (Window Desk Transfer) No. 
39, 89509 Penampang for the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association (hereafter KDCA) 
as the first party and Bil. Number SAB 119 addressed at 1st Floor, Block A, Sinsuran 
Complex for United Sabah Dusun Association (hereafter USDA) as the second party. 
 
That, KDCA and USDA, with full awareness and remorse/regret have agreed regarding 
the matters that are stated inside the Declaration of Agreement below: 
 
1. KDCA and USDA are with this agrees that: 
I. The Kadazandusun language is the official language for the two 
associations KDCA and USDA; 
II. The Kadazandusun language is the language that is used in the 
writing and speaking in the teaching and learning of the mother 
tongue (POL) [Pupil’s Own Language], and 
III. The Kadazandusun language is the language that is used by all 
Kadazan Dusun ethnic without restriction to the use of other local 
dialects. 
 
2. KDCA and USDA with this agree: 
I. The Kadazandusun language is conserved and developed collectively 
for the benefit of all races in Malaysia that are interested in learning 
the Kadazandusun language. 
II. Shared responsibility to develop the Kadazandusun language at the 
local, national and international levels, specifically for those that 
would like to learn and study/research the Kadazandusun language. 
 
This declaration of agreement is made by KDCA and USDA and is witnessed by those 
that represent both parties, as those signed below: 
 
SIGNATURE PORTION 
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